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Revisiting the Fictional Originalism in 
Crawford’s “Cross-Examination Rule” 
A REPLY TO MR. KRY 
Thomas Y. Davies† 
[The] process by which old principles and old phrases are charged 
with a new content, is from the lawyer’s point of view an evolution of 
the true intent and meaning of the old law; from the historian’s point 




Originalists attribute heightened normative importance 
to the original meaning of a constitutional provision.  Given 
that position, should they be expected to exercise discipline in 
making claims about the historical content of the original 
meaning?  Should they refrain from making originalist claims 
in the absence of clear historical evidence of the Framers’ 
understanding?  If so, what are the criteria for identifying valid 
historical evidence of the Framers’ design?   
These issues are at the root of a controversy regarding 
one of the two originalist claims that appeared in Justice 
Scalia’s 2004 opinion for the Court in Crawford v. Washington.1  
In a 2005 article in this Law Review, I criticized the historical 
claims in Crawford as yet another example of fictional 
originalism in Supreme Court opinions.2  Mr. Robert Kry, who 
clerked for Justice Scalia during the term in which Crawford 
  
 † E.E. Overton Distinguished Professor of Law and Alumni Distinguished 
Service Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. 
 †† Frederic Maitland, Inaugural Lecture at Cambridge (1888), quoted in 3 
PETER GAY & VICTORIA G. WEXLER, HISTORIANS AT WORK 301-02 (1975). 
  Quotations of historical sources are presented in this article with the 
original spelling, capitalization, and punctuation, but in modern typeface.  
 1 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 2 Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know 
It?  Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005). 
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was decided, now responds that my criticisms of one of 
Crawford’s originalist claims were unfounded.3  I reply to Mr. 
Kry in this article. 
A. Justice Scalia’s Originalist Claims in Crawford 
The subject in dispute is a facet of the original meaning 
of the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause in the Bill of 
Rights.  There is no doubt that the Framers intended for that 
Clause to require that evidence in criminal trials usually be 
presented by live witnesses, in the presence of the defendant, 
and subject to cross-examination by the defendant in the view 
of the jury.  However, the scope and content of the 
confrontation right has seemed problematic with regard to the 
admission of hearsay evidence—a witness’s repetition at trial 
of an out-of-court statement made by a declarant who does not 
testify at the trial. 
Because admitting out-of-court statements made by a 
person who does not testify at trial contravenes the face-to-face 
and cross-examination aspects of the defendant’s confrontation 
right, it seems apparent that such statements should not be 
admissible if the out-of-court declarant is available to be 
produced as a prosecution witness at trial.  In fact, the use of 
out-of-court statements of persons who could have testified in 
person is the specific abuse associated with the creation of the 
confrontation right.4  However, the admissibility of out-of-court 
  
 3 Robert Kry, Confrontation Under the Marian Statutes: A Response to 
Professor Davies, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 493, 494 (2007).  Kry notes that his focus on this 
aspect should not be viewed as “acquiescence” in other aspects of my criticism of 
Crawford.  Id. at 556 n.291. 
 4 For example, the admission of out-of-court statements by a person who was 
available to be called as a witness was one of the notorious defects in Sir Walter 
Raleigh’s 1603 trial.  See Raleigh’s Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1 (1603).  That defect was noted 
in legal authorities widely used by the Framers, such as Sergeant William Hawkins’s 
leading treatise on criminal law and procedure, which also stated that it was 
subsequently adjudged that out-of-court depositions of persons who might have been 
produced as witnesses at trial could not be admitted into evidence.  See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM 
HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 430 (5th ed. 1771). 
  Volume one of Hawkins’s treatise was initially published in 1716; volume 2 
in 1721.  Several subsequent editions that were virtually identical to the first edition 
were published in 1724-1726, 1739, and 1771.  For simplicity, I cite to the 1771 edition.  
For bibliographic information, see 1 A LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE BRITISH 
COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS 362-63 (W. Harold Maxwell & Leslie F. Maxwell eds., 2d 
ed. 1955) [hereinafter MAXWELL]. 
  Thomas Leach edited two further editions of Hawkins’s treatise in which 
he made substantial additions.  He published an edition in 1787 in which he added 
substantial notes and sometimes textual material to Hawkins’s original work.  Most of 
the surviving copies of that edition in American libraries are of a 1788 Dublin 
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statements made by a genuinely unavailable declarant (for 
example, a declarant who has died prior to the trial) poses a 
more difficult issue, because such statements may involve 
important evidence, or even the most pertinent evidence, that 
could not be presented in any other way.  How should the 
confrontation right now be understood with regard to the 
admissibility of out-of-court statements? 
In Crawford, Justice Scalia asserted that originalism 
could answer that question and made two related claims about 
“the Framers’ design” for the application of the Confrontation 
Clause to such hearsay statements.5  First, he asserted that the 
Framers’ concern was “focused” on “testimonial” out-of-court 
statements6—that is, statements comparable to formal witness 
examinations taken by justices of the peace during the 
eighteenth century.  On that basis, he strongly suggested that 
the confrontation right should apply only to “testimonial” out-
of-court statements, but not to more casual or “nontestimonial” 
sorts of hearsay statements.7  In other words, the Confrontation 
Clause would not bar the admission of “nontestimonial” out-of-
court statements even when the declarant was readily 
available to be produced by the prosecution as a trial witness, 
and even when the out-of-court statements provided crucial 
evidence for the defendant’s conviction.  (Crawford left defining 
the boundary between the “testimonial” and “nontestimonial” 
categories “for another day,”8 but the distinction it suggested 
has since become law in the 2006 decision Davis v. 
Washington.9) 
  
reprinting, so that edition was only becoming available in America in 1789.  
Additionally, Leach also published a four-volume enlarged edition in 1795 in which he 
added considerable new material.  To differentiate Leach’s work from Hawkins’s 
original work, I cite Leach’s 1787 and 1795 editions as LEACH’S HAWKINS. 
 5 541 U.S. at 68. 
 6 Id. at 50-53. 
 7 Id. at 60-61.   
 8 Id. at 68. 
 9 547 U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).  Davis and the companion decision in 
Hammon v. Indiana provided some indications of the testimonial/nontestimonial 
boundary, but still stopped short of offering a broad definition of the boundary.  See 
Materials distributed at Brooklyn Law School Symposium, Crawford and Beyond 
Revisited in Dialogue (Sept. 29, 2006) [hereinafter Symposium].  In Hammon, the 
Court concluded that statements made to police officers by a victim of a domestic 
assault after the assault ended were testimonial and subject to the confrontation right 
because the statements were primarily for the purpose of  preparing for a prosecution.  
Davis, 547 U.S. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 2278.  Conversely, in Davis, the Court found that 
statements made to a 911 operator during a domestic assault were nontestimonial and 
not subject to the confrontation right because they were not made primarily for the 
purpose of preparing a prosecution.  Id. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 2276-78. 
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Second, with regard to “testimonial” out-of-court 
statements, to which the confrontation right would apply, 
Justice Scalia asserted that the Framers understood that the 
confrontation right would be violated by the admission of such 
a statement in a criminal trial unless (1) the declarant was 
genuinely unavailable to testify, and (2) the defendant had a 
previous opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.10  Justice 
Scalia dubbed this latter requirement the “cross-examination 
rule,”11 and asserted that this rule was part of the original 
understanding of the Confrontation Clause.12  Specifically, 
Justice Scalia asserted that the cross-examination rule 
regulated the admissibility in criminal trials of witness 
examinations taken pursuant to the Marian post-arrest 
procedure that applied in all felony prosecutions in eighteenth-
century England and America.13 
  
 10 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54. 
 11 Id. at 46. 
 12 Id. at 53-56. 
 13 The Marian statutes, enacted in the mid-sixteenth century, provided the 
procedure for initiating felony prosecutions.  See 1 & 2 Phil. & Mar. 1554, c. 13, § IV; 2 
& 3 Phil. & Mar. 1555, c. 10, § II.  The provisions of the statutes applied when a person 
was arrested for a felony or manslaughter.  They required the justice of the peace to 
whom the “prisoner” (that is, the arrestee) was taken to take the sworn “information” 
of the witnesses who made the arrest and brought the prisoner, as well as the unsworn 
“examination” of the arrestee himself, to reduce those statements to writing, and to 
certify those written records to the next session of the felony trial court (either the 
court of “gaol-delivery” or “sessions of the peace,” depending on the specific felony).  
The Marian statutes also required coroners to take the sworn information of homicide 
witnesses and certify it to the trial court.  For a more detailed discussion, see Davies, 
supra note 2, at 126-30. 
  I realize that the reader, who will almost certainly be aware that we no 
longer use Marian examination procedure—and who will possibly never have heard of 
any such procedure prior to encountering Crawford—may think that an argument 
about Marian committal procedure is a rather arcane basis on which to construe the 
Confrontation Clause today.  I think that, too.  See Davies, supra note 2, at 189.  
However, this is the kind of historical inquiry to which originalism leads. 
  More accurately, this is the kind of inquiry that originalism may pose.  
Often there is a preliminary question of exactly what aspects of framing-era law are 
deemed pertinent.  In Crawford, Justice Scalia directed attention to what he termed a 
common-law “cross-examination rule” and to the “statutory derogation” posed by the 
use of Marian witness examinations.  See supra text accompanying note 11.  However, 
as I pointed out in my previous article, the Framers would have had no difficulty 
deciding the outcome of the actual issue in Crawford on a much narrower ground.  The 
statement at issue in Crawford was a wife’s statement that tended to incriminate her 
husband; however, framing-era sources stated a clear rule that a wife’s examination 
could not be used against her husband as evidence.  See Davies, supra note 2, at 110 
n.18.  Hence, Crawford purported to provide an originalist construction of the 
Confrontation Clause by disregarding the fact that the Framers would have decided 
the question on an entirely different ground. 
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B. My Criticisms of Crawford  
In a 2005 article in this Law Review, I argued that the 
two originalist claims that Justice Scalia made in Crawford 
both rested on misconceptions of the evidence regime that 
shaped the Framers’ expectations about the confrontation right 
in 1789.  Specifically, I argued that he interpreted the original 
scope of the right too narrowly, but also overstated one aspect 
of the substance of the right. 
With regard to the original scope of the confrontation 
right, I argued that there was no historical basis for the 
restriction of the confrontation right to only “testimonial” 
hearsay, but not “nontestimonial” hearsay.  Because an oath 
was still a necessary requisite for admissible evidence in a 
criminal trial under framing-era law,14 and “hearsay” was then 
defined as any out-of-court statement not made under oath, the 
rule was still that “[h]earsay is no evidence.”15  Thus, because 
  
 14 In Crawford, Justice Scalia asserted that unsworn statements obtained by 
police interrogations would be “testimonial” because police interrogations bore a 
“striking resemblance” to Marian witness examinations taken by justices of the peace.  
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.  He dismissed the significance of the fact that Marian 
examinations were taken under oath, but that the modern police interrogation at issue 
in Crawford did not involve an oath.  See id. at 52-53.  However, that departed from the 
framing-era understanding of valid evidence.  See Davies, supra note 2, at 202-03 
(noting that the police testimony regarding an out-of-court statement in Crawford 
would have been inadmissible in 1789 for lack of an oath). 
  Justice Scalia’s dismissal of the historical oath requirement was especially 
noteworthy because the importance of the oath as a condition for admissible evidence 
was emphatically stated in two English cases cited in Crawford.  In King v. Woodcock, 
Leach (1st ed. 1789) 437, 440 (Old Bailey 1789), the 1789 case that Justice Scalia cited 
as evidence of a “cross-examination rule,” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46, 54 n.5, the trial 
judge ruled that the out-of-court statement at issue “cannot be admitted before a Jury 
as evidence; for no evidence can be legal unless it be given upon oath, judicially taken.” 
  In addition, in King v. Brasier, 1 Leach (4th ed. 1814) 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 
202 (Twelve Judges 1779), cited in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69-70 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
concurring), the Twelve Judges stated that “no testimony whatsoever can be legally 
received [in a felony trial] except upon oath.”  Id. at 200, 168 Eng. Rep. at 202.  The 
description of the evidence admitted in the trial in the report of Brasier cited in 
Crawford differed significantly from that which appeared in the initial version 
published in 1789, but there was no change in the statement of the Twelve Judges.  See 
Brasier, Leach (1st ed. 1789), at 346. 
  Indeed, peace officers were not permitted to conduct interrogations of 
arrestees during the framing-era.  Police interrogation arose during the nineteenth 
century after the standard for warrantless arrests was reduced to “probable cause.”  
See Thomas Y. Davies, Farther and Farther from the Original Fifth Amendment: The 
Recharacterization of the Right Against Self-Incrimination as a “Trial” Right in Chavez 
v. Martinez, 70 TENN. L. REV. 987, 1030-33 (2003) [hereinafter Davies, Self-
Incrimination]. 
 15 See, e.g., GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 107 (1st ed. 1754) (“a 
mere Hearsay is no evidence”); id. at 149-50 (4th ed. 1777) (same).  For bibliographic 
information, see Davies, supra note 2, at 143 n.123.  Under modern evidence doctrine, 
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there was no distinction of hearsay into categories, I argued 
that Justice Scalia’s claim that the original confrontation right 
was limited to only “testimonial” out-of-court statements was 
merely a political choice posing as history.16  Crawford’s 
categorization of some out-of-court statements as 
“nontestimonial” permits the admission of unsworn hearsay 
statements that would have been inadmissible under framing-
era law. 
I criticize the originalist claims made in Crawford and 
Davis about the “testimonial” scope of the confrontation right 
in more detail in a forthcoming article.17   However, because 
Mr. Kry does not address this aspect of my 2005 article,18 I do 
not discuss Crawford’s restriction of the scope of the 
confrontation right in this article, even though it seems likely 
that the limitation of the confrontation right to only 
“testimonial” hearsay will prove to be the more significant 
dimension of Crawford’s originalist scheme.19 
  
of course, an out-of-court statement is not hearsay unless the statement is offered in 
evidence for the truth of the content of the statement.  However, that reflects a post-
framing alteration of the definition of hearsay that does not appear in framing-era 
sources.  Rather, framing-era evidence law treated all unsworn out-of-court statements 
as “hearsay” and, thus, as “no evidence.”  See GILBERT, supra, at 107-08 (1754 ed.); id. 
at 149-50 (1777 ed.). 
 16 Davies, supra note 2, at 189-206.  The potential implications of limiting the 
confrontation right to “testimonial” hearsay statements is discussed infra note 46. 
 17 I further develop my criticisms of this aspect of Crawford in a follow-up 
article, Not “the Framers’ Design”: How the Framing-Era Ban Against Hearsay 
Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial” Formulation of the Scope of the 
Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter Davies, 
Not the Framers’ Design].  This article further develops my presentation in Symposium, 
supra note 9, at 85-109, titled Originalist Alchemy: Applying the Crawford-Davis 
Testimonial/Nontestimonial Distinction Despite the Framing-Era General Ban Against 
Hearsay Evidence. 
 18 Kry states that he does not acquiesce in my criticisms of Crawford’s 
testimonial/nontestimonial distinction but does not address it because it has been well 
addressed by other authors, and cites Richard Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for 
Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011 (1998).  See Kry, supra note 3, at 556 n.291.  
However, Friedman’s article merely mentions some of the very early history of the 
confrontation right, but makes no attempt to address either the right or the conception 
of hearsay at the time of the framing of the Confrontation Clause.  See Friedman, 
supra, at 1022-25 (discussing the confrontation right to the middle of the seventeenth 
century). 
 19 The significance of the cross-examination rule announced in Crawford will 
depend upon how broadly or narrowly the justices define the concept of “testimonial” 
out-of-court statements.  The 2006 decision in Davis leaves open the possibility that 
only statements made to government agents can be “testimonial,” but that not all such 
statements will be “testimonial.”  Indeed, Justice Scalia stated in Davis that whether a 
statement is “testimonial” will depend upon its “primary” purpose and that “initial 
inquiries” made by police will “often” be nontestimonial and thus not subject to the 
confrontation right.  See Davis, 547 U.S. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 2279.  Hence, although 
the Crawford opinion itself may convey the impression of a robust confrontation right, 
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In my 2005 article, I also criticized Justice Scalia’s 
originalist claim regarding a Marian cross-examination rule.  
Based on my prior research regarding the Framers’ 
understanding of the criminal procedure provisions of the Bill 
of Rights,20 it was apparent to me when I read Crawford that 
Justice Scalia’s opinion did not reflect sufficient discipline 
regarding the historical materials that he offered as evidence 
that a cross-examination rule was part of the original 
Confrontation Clause.  Justice Scalia had cited reports of two 
1696 English proceedings and three English cases decided in 
1787, 1789, and 1791.21  On the basis of those sources, Justice 
Scalia claimed that at the time the Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause was ratified in 1791, it was settled law 
that the written record of a Marian examination of a witness 
who had become genuinely unavailable to testify prior to the 
trial could not be admitted as evidence in a felony trial unless 
the defendant had had an opportunity to cross-examine the 
witness when the examination was taken.  Additionally, 
Justice Scalia asserted that post-framing English 
commentaries and cases and post-framing American state 
cases also demonstrated that the cross-examination rule 
announced in Crawford had been part of the original meaning 
of the Confrontation Clause.22  
However, I was aware that the 1787, 1789, and 1791 
English cases that Justice Scalia had cited as evidence of a 
  
it will not be surprising if future rulings circumscribe “testimonial” statements so 
narrowly that the confrontation right and its cross-examination rule rarely apply.  See 
infra note 46. 
 20 To date, I have researched original meaning and criticized erroneous 
Supreme Court “originalist” claims regarding the Fourth Amendment, Thomas Y. 
Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999) 
[hereinafter Davies, Fourth Amendment], the law of warrantless arrest, Thomas Y. 
Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the 
Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239 (2002) [hereinafter Davies, Arrest], and the Fifth 
Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination, Davies, Self-Incrimination, 
supra note 14, at 1023-28. 
 21 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 45-47, 54 n.5 (citing Fenwick’s Case, 13 How. St. Tr. 
537 (H.C. 1696); King v. Paine, 5 Mod. 163, 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (K.B. 1696); King v. 
Radbourne, 1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) 457, 168 Eng. Rep. 330 (Old Bailey and Twelve 
Judges 1787); King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) 500, 168 Eng. Rep. 352 (Old 
Bailey 1789); King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 168 Eng. Rep. 383 (Old Bailey 1791)). 
 22 Id. at 47, 49-50.  Justice Scalia also cited some colonial and framing-era 
statements by Americans, but they only endorsed the confrontation right in general 
terms, but did not actually address the specific issue of the admissibility of Marian 
witness examinations.  See id. at 47-49.  One of those statements was altered by 
editing and does not appear to have addressed confrontation in criminal cases.  See 
infra note 81. 
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settled cross-examination rule had all been published in 
London too late to have come to the Framers’ attention when 
the Confrontation Clause was framed in mid-1789.23  (As I 
explain below, further research has uncovered additional 
objections to the 1787 and 1791 cases: the initial version of the 
1787 case differed significantly from the later version cited in 
Crawford;24 and the 1791 case was not published until 1800.25) 
My previous research also led me to doubt that the 
Framers were familiar with the details of the seventeenth-
century English treason trials that Justice Scalia discussed.  
Additionally, that research convinced me that post-framing 
sources could not be assumed to be trustworthy guides to the 
original meaning.  With regard to the latter, the reality is that 
judges, abetted by commentators, have altered legal doctrine 
more drastically over the two centuries since the framing of the 
Bill of Rights than is commonly recognized.  Put bluntly, 
during that time, judges and commentators have repeatedly 
revised major legal doctrines while pretending to simply apply 
existing doctrine, and the cumulative effect of their 
misdescriptions has often produced mythical descriptions of 
framing-era doctrine.26  Hence, descriptions of original meaning 
that depend upon post-framing sources are rarely accurate. 
  
 23 In a 2003 article, I had previously noted that all of the English cases first 
reported in Thomas Leach’s Cases in Crown Law were published too late to have come 
to the Framers’ attention prior to the framing of the Bill of Rights because that volume 
was not published until 1789.  See Davies, Self-Incrimination, supra note 14, at 1026-
28.  In my 2005 article criticizing Crawford, I was able to document more precisely that 
Leach’s volume could not have been published any earlier than May 1789—although it 
could have been later—because that volume reported a case from late April 1789.  See 
Davies, supra note 2, at 160-62 n.182. 
  Additional information now suggests that the first edition was probably 
published late in 1789.  Mr. Kry has informed me that the 1792 second edition of 
Leach’s reports presented cases only through July 1791.  See Kry, supra note 3, at 520 
n.107.  Thus, there was a publication delay in the 1792 second edition of at least six 
months after the last reported case.  If there were a similar delay in the first edition, it 
would not have been published in London earlier than October 1789. 
  Moreover, it is increasingly apparent that Americans did not immediately 
consult Leach’s reports of Old Bailey cases when they were published.  See infra notes 
289, 296, 301. 
 24 See infra notes 175-92 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra text accompanying notes 206-10. 
 26 For example, modern Supreme Court opinions have stated that “probable 
cause” was the pre-framing—or even the ancient—arrest standard, but that is only a 
myth.  If one consults historical statements of arrest standards it is patent that 
nineteenth-century English and American courts had relaxed the framing-era “felony 
in fact” arrest standard to the modern “probable cause” standard, and had conferred 
more arrest authority on peace officers than private persons, all without 
acknowledging those changes.  See, e.g., Davies, Fourth Amendment, supra note 20, at 
634-40, 639 n.252. 
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Thus, in my 2005 article, I argued that Justice Scalia’s 
“cross-examination rule” was itself a misstatement of the 
original content of the Confrontation Clause that would exclude 
some out-of-court statements that framing-era law would have 
treated as admissible evidence.  I argued that the significant 
date for assessing the original meaning of the Confrontation 
Clause was the Clause’s 1789 framing date, rather than the 
1791 ratification date that Justice Scalia used in Crawford.27  I 
also pointed out that no statement that could constitute a 
“cross-examination rule” had appeared in the discussions of the 
admissibility of Marian witness examinations in any of the 
legal authorities that the American Framers actually could 
have consulted prior to the 1789 framing.28   
In particular, no statements imposing a cross-
examination requirement on Marian witness examinations 
appeared in any of the leading eighteenth-century English 
treatises on criminal procedure and evidence, or in any of the 
excerpts of those treatises that appeared in the justice of the 
peace manuals that were published in America and widely 
used by the framing-era American officials who took Marian 
witness examinations.  Rather, the framing-era authorities 
simply indicated that the written record of a sworn Marian 
examination was admissible if the witness had become 
  
  There is also an even larger dimension of the judicial revision of the 
Framers’ understanding of constitutional criminal procedure protections; namely, the 
state supreme courts and the Federal Supreme Court relocated the standard for lawful 
arrest from its initial locus in the state “law of the land” constitutional clauses and in 
the Fifth Amendment requirement of “due process of law” to the state provisions 
banning general warrants and to the Fourth Amendment, which was initially only a 
ban against legislative approval of general warrants—again without any 
acknowledgement by the judges who brought about that massive alteration of doctrine 
and constitutional content.  See Davies, Arrest, supra note 20, at 216 n.344.   
 27 Although the Bill of Rights was not ratified until December 1791, the text 
of the Confrontation Clause took its final form on July 11, 1789, and the Bill of Rights 
was adopted by the First Congress on September 25, 1789.  See Davies, supra note 2, at 
157-60.  I argued that the original meaning has to be that which informed the First 
Congress, not merely the later ratifiers.  Id.  I further argued that, as a general matter, 
statements appearing in English sources after 1775 probably do not constitute valid 
evidence of the American original understanding of provisions of the Bill of Rights.  Id. 
at 153-56.  The use of the inappropriate 1791 date mattered for Justice Scalia’s 
analysis in Crawford because it seemed to allow the use of a 1791 English decision (so 
long as one did not consider when the case report was published) and also because it 
allowed Justice Scalia to deflect statements by English judges in the 1790 English 
decision in King v. Eriswell, 3 T.R. 707, 100 Eng. Rep. 815 (K.B.).  See Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 54-55 n.5.  I explain the difficulty Eriswell posed infra notes 218-40 and 
accompanying text. 
 28 Davies, supra note 2, at 135-53, 160-62. 
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genuinely unavailable prior to trial.29  Hence, Justice Scalia 
misstated the authentic history when he claimed that the 
American Framers would have understood that there was a 
settled rule that the admissibility of a Marian examination of 
an unavailable witness depended on the defendant having had 
an opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the time the 
examination was taken.  There is no evidence that framing-era 
Americans were aware of any such rule. 
I agreed that endorsements of a cross-examination rule 
began to appear in English authorities that reached America in 
the decades after the framing of the Confrontation Clause, and 
that such a rule also became evident in nineteenth-century 
American state cases.30  However, I concluded that Justice 
Scalia had made a prochronistic error when he asserted that 
the original Confrontation Clause included an existing cross-
examination rule.31  Thus, I identified both Justice Scalia’s 
cross-examination rule claim and his unhistorical 
testimonial/nontestimonial hearsay distinction as further 
examples of historical fiction in Supreme Court originalist 
claims regarding criminal procedure.32 
C. Mr. Kry’s Response to One of My Criticisms 
Mr. Kry now responds to my criticism of Crawford’s 
originalist claim of a cross-examination rule by asserting an 
expansive view of what can constitute valid evidence of original 
meaning.  Indeed, he ups the ante by invoking substantial 
additional materials that pertain to English Marian practices 
that were not mentioned in Crawford. 
In particular, Kry agrees that Marian procedure was a 
standard feature of felony prosecutions in England and 
America during the eighteenth century, but complains that I 
overlooked how Marian committal hearings were actually 
conducted in eighteenth-century England, or at least in 
  
 29 Id. at 143-52, 182-87. 
 30 Id. at 173-78, 187. 
 31 Id. at 119, 161.  See also id. at 116 n.34 (defining “prochronism” as the 
specific form of anachronism in which later conceptions are imposed on earlier 
understandings). 
 32 Id. at 188-89 (describing the claim of a framing-era cross-examination rule 
as “historical fiction”).  I have used the phrase before in discussing historical errors in 
Supreme Court opinions.  See, e.g., Davies, Arrest, supra note 20, at 239 (titled “The 
Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism”). 
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London.33  He asserts that the arrestee was “routinely,” or even 
“almost invariably,” present when a Marian witness 
examination was taken,34 and that this in-the-presence-of-the-
prisoner practice evolved into an in-the-presence rule, which 
then further evolved “at some point” into a rule that a Marian 
witness examination was inadmissible unless the arrestee had 
had an opportunity to cross-examine.35  Additionally, Kry 
insists it is appropriate to project statements in nineteenth-
century English cases and commentaries and nineteenth-
century American state cases backward in time and treat them 
as valid evidence of an earlier, framing-era American 
understanding of the confrontation right.  Thus, he treats post-
framing sources as evidence of the original meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause.36  Like Justice Scalia in Crawford, 
however, Kry pays little attention to what the American 
Framers could have known, or when they could have known it. 
D. Overview of My Reply 
I welcome this exchange with Mr. Kry because I think it 
provides a useful opportunity to reiterate the requisites of a 
valid claim of original meaning.  In Part II, I argue that, 
precisely because originalists assert that original meaning 
should be accorded a heightened normative status in 
constitutional discourse, it is appropriate to insist that they 
exercise historical discipline and make a claim of original 
meaning only when there is clear historical evidence of the 
Framers’ understanding when the provision at issue was 
framed. 
In Part III, I call attention to an important point that 
should not be lost amid the specific disagreements between Kry 
and me: although Kry attacks my article, he makes a 
significantly different and significantly weaker historical claim 
than that asserted in Crawford itself.  Although Kry’s general 
remarks sometimes conflate an in-the-presence practice with a 
cross-examination rule, his pre-framing evidence indicates, at 
most, only a London framing-era practice in which Marian 
examinations were taken in the presence of “the prisoner” (that 
  
 33 See infra notes 241-42 and accompanying text. 
 34 See Kry, supra note 3, at 495, 512-16. 
 35 See id. at 495. 
 36 Id. at 545-48. 
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is, the arrestee37), but not the supposedly settled rule requiring 
an opportunity for cross-examination that Justice Scalia 
asserted in Crawford. 
In particular, although Justice Scalia invoked the 1791 
date of the ratification of the Bill of Rights as the relevant date 
for original meaning in Crawford,38 Kry does not actively 
dispute my conclusion that the important date for assessing 
original meaning is the date of the framing in 1789.39  
Additionally, Kry concedes at several points that, even in 
London, as of 1789 there still was only a controversy but not a 
settled rule regarding an arrestee’s opportunity to cross-
examine during a Marian witness examination.40  Hence, even 
compared to Kry’s historical account of London practice, Justice 
Scalia’s originalist claim in Crawford regarding a settled 
“cross-examination rule” was fictional. 
In Part IV, I respond to the specific pre-framing 
evidence that Kry offers for his conclusion that an in-the-
presence-of-the-prisoner standard had become part of English 
Marian practice by the time of the framing, and argue that his 
conclusions outrun his evidence.  I begin by challenging his 
suggestion that the mere requirement that Marian witness 
examinations be taken before an arrestee was committed to jail 
to await trial or was released on bail supports an inference that 
the defendant necessarily would have been present. 
I next reiterate the profound silence in the framing-era 
legal authorities as to even an in-the-presence rule.  In my 
prior article, I noted the absence of any reference to cross-
examination in the statements regarding the admissibility of 
Marian examinations of unavailable witnesses in criminal 
  
 37 Framing-era usage deemed an arrest to be “the beginning of 
imprisonment.”  See Davies, Arrest, supra note 20, at 392 n.518.  Hence, the arrestee 
was commonly referred to as the “prisoner” and that term was also commonly used to 
identify the defendant in a criminal trial.  
 38 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46, 54 n.5. 
 39 Davies, supra note 2, at 157-60.  Kry writes that he “take[s] no position on 
whether 1789 or 1791 is the more relevant date for assessing original meaning because 
[he does] not view that two-year difference as having much practical significance.”  
Kry, supra note 3, at 522 n.119.  However, he effectively concedes that 1789 is the 
significant date when he repeatedly refers to the date “of the framing” throughout his 
article.  Of course, the date “of the framing” is 1789.  See supra note 27. 
 40 See infra text accompanying notes 65-67.  Additionally, in Crawford, 
Justice Scalia downplayed Marian procedure as merely a departure from “common 
law.”  See Davies, supra note 2, at 132-35.  In contrast, Kry acknowledges that 
“[b]ecause those Marian examinations were a routine feature of felony prosecutions at 
the time the Sixth Amendment was framed, their admissibility is relevant to any 
general theory of the Confrontation Clause.”  Kry, supra note 3, at 493-94. 
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trials.  In this article, I point out that the same silence also 
appears in the framing-era descriptions of Marian procedure 
itself.  I also call more attention to a point I only touched on 
before—that a number of the framing-era authorities, including 
the leading English justice of the peace manual, actually 
contrasted Marian witness examinations to the cross-
examination standard that applied to depositions taken in civil 
lawsuits.  Hence, the legal authorities that framing-era 
Americans could have consulted regarding the arrestee’s 
presence or opportunity to cross-examine during a Marian 
witness examination did not indicate any such legal 
requirements. 
I then turn to the pre-framing English evidence Kry 
offers regarding the practice of taking Marian witness 
examinations in the presence of the arrestee.  I initially 
consider the two seventeenth-century sources Kry invokes.  
Kry insists that the 1696 ruling in King v. Paine and the 1696 
attainder proceeding in Parliament in Fenwick’s Case provide 
significant evidence.  I persist in the view that Paine, as a 
ruling in a misdemeanor case, carried no implications for the 
Marian procedure that applied specifically to all felony 
prosecutions.  I likewise persist in the opinion that it is highly 
unlikely that Americans were aware of any discussion of a 
witness deposition in Fenwick.41  Additionally, I note that Kry’s 
conclusion that there was only a controversy about cross-
examination in Marian examinations in London in 1789 
demonstrates rather clearly that these two cases could not 
have been understood to have mandated a cross-examination 
rule during the eighteenth century.   
Moving on to Kry’s description of eighteenth-century 
Marian practice in England, I argue that, regardless of the 
historical validity of his description of the evolution of English 
Marian practice (which strikes me as plausible), the practice he 
describes still does not constitute significant evidence of the 
American understanding of the confrontation right at the time 
of the framing in 1789.  For one thing, common practices are 
not equivalent to legal rules or rights.  Although Kry 
sometimes concludes that there was an in-the-presence rule by 
the time of the framing, the evidence he presents falls short of 
  
 41 As I discuss below, Kry does correctly point out that I overlooked the 
potential implication of a margin citation to a page in the report of Fenwick that 
appeared in a prominent treatise; however, I do not think that alters the larger picture.  
See infra text accompanying notes 152-60.  
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a rule, and far short of the settled cross-examination rule that 
Justice Scalia asserted in Crawford.  Moreover, it is unclear 
that the London practices that Kry describes were even typical 
of the rest of England; there is no reason to assume they shed 
light on American Marian practices.  Of course, it is also 
unclear how framing-era Americans would have learned of the 
English practices Kry describes in the absence of any published 
accounts. 
The salient feature of Kry’s evidence about Marian 
procedure is what is missing—he does not identify a single 
legal authority that states a Marian in-the-presence rule that 
Americans could have consulted prior to the 1789 framing of 
the Confrontation Clause.  Hence, I do not think Kry has 
identified evidence that framing-era Americans would have 
thought that Marian witness examinations were subject to 
even a legal in-the-presence requirement, let alone the settled 
cross-examination rule that Justice Scalia asserted in 
Crawford.   
In Part V, I discuss Kry’s heavy reliance on post-
framing materials, including nineteenth-century English cases 
and commentaries and nineteenth-century American state 
cases.  Although Kry sometimes discusses these sources in 
terms of relevance, he relies on them so heavily that he 
effectively projects nineteenth-century English statements 
backward in time as though they provide direct evidence of the 
framing-era American understanding of the confrontation 
right.  However, I think that Kry’s reliance upon post-framing 
statements collides with the story Kry himself tells about 
evolution and change in English Marian practice.  How can 
later sources provide evidence of earlier understandings if legal 
practices and doctrine were undergoing change?  Legal history 
refutes any assumption of necessary doctrinal consistency over 
time because it provides innumerable examples of judges and 
commentators who reshaped earlier cases and authorities to 
comport with the preferred conceptions of their own times.42  
Post-framing sources reveal only post-framing understandings; 
they cannot be taken as accurate guides to earlier, framing-era 
understandings.   
Finally, in Part VI, I briefly conclude by calling 
attention to one of the most serious drawbacks of originalist 
  
 42 See, e.g., Frederic Maitland, Inaugural Lecture at Cambridge (1888), 
quoted in 3 PETER GAY & VICTORIA G. WEXLER, HISTORIANS AT WORK 301-02 (1975). 
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justifications for constitutional rulings—the absence of any 
procedure for vetting the historical validity of originalist claims 
constructed in a single justice’s chambers before those claims 
become enshrined in an opinion of the Court. 
II. WHAT BURDEN OF PROOF SHOULD ORIGINALISTS MEET? 
Much of the difference between Kry’s historical account 
and mine, and between Crawford’s account and mine, arises 
from a difference of opinion regarding the burden of proof that 
originalists should meet.  Precisely because originalists 
attribute a privileged normative position to claims about the 
original understanding of a constitutional provision, I think it 
is appropriate to insist that originalists practice originalism 
with historical discipline. 
Of course, judges often justify decisions by claiming 
continuity with the past—stare decisis is simply a claim that 
“we have done it that way before.”  If the claim is also that “we 
have done it that way for a long time,” that adds a 
traditionalist gloss.  However, traditionalism is obviously 
vulnerable to arguments that conditions have changed or that 
the evolution of legal conceptions and standards has made 
prior conceptions obsolete.  If recent developments have broken 
from an earlier traditional position, traditionalism itself does 
not provide a justification for returning to the earlier position.  
For example, Justice Scalia could hardly have justified the 
adoption of the cross-examination rule simply by noting that 
mid-nineteenth century American cases adopted such a rule 
even if recent decisions have not. 
Originalism is different.  Originalism rests on the 
premise that a constitutional provision’s original meaning—the 
public meaning when it was framed43—is the content to which 
the Framers agreed.  Thus, originalists accord original 
meaning the normative stature of the political contract itself.  
Moreover, originalists attribute a fixed content to the original 
meaning.44  Because they characterize the original meaning as 
unchanging, originalists present claims about the original 
  
 43 See Davies, supra note 2, at 105 n.1. 
 44 For example, Justice Scalia has recently declared, “There is nothing new or 
surprising in the proposition that our unchanging Constitution refers to other bodies of 
law that might themselves change. . . . This reference to changeable law poses no 
problem for the originalist.”  Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. ___, ___, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 
1540 (2006). 
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meaning as though they carry considerably more normative 
punch than a simple traditionalist claim.  
In particular, because originalism posits a fixed original 
meaning, originalism uniquely can seem to justify wiping out 
recent legal developments in order to return to the purportedly 
fixed original meaning.  For example, Crawford itself wiped out 
several decades of prior confrontation rulings.45  The unique 
platform that originalism provides for undoing precedents is 
probably the primary attraction that originalism now holds for 
justices toward the right end of the Court’s ideological 
spectrum.  Originalism provides a justification for breaching 
the norm of stare decisis that otherwise protects recent “liberal” 
doctrinal developments, and thus provides a justification for 
wiping out those developments.46  Hence, originalism today is 
often a platform for “activist” rulings.47 
If originalists are going to claim this added normative 
punch, it seems appropriate that they should invoke claims of 
original meaning with historical discipline—that is, claims 
  
 45 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), overruled Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
U.S. 56 (1980), a precedent that was just shy of lasting for a quarter of a century. 
 46 For a discussion of the recent emphasis on originalism in constitutional 
criminal procedure cases, see David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common 
Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1745-70 (2000).  See also Davies, supra note 2, at 207; 
Davies, Arrest, supra note 20, at 252-66. 
  The cross-examination rule adopted in Crawford may appear somewhat 
“liberal” in the sense that it provides a more substantial content to a criminal 
defendant’s confrontation right than prior law.  However, that is only one prong of 
Crawford; the other prong, the limitation of the confrontation right to “testimonial” 
hearsay, has a different ideological content, and—depending on how the boundary 
between testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay is ultimately defined—may yet mean 
that the strong protection afforded by the cross-examination rule applicable to 
“testimonial” hearsay will rarely apply, in which case the confrontation right will have 
little practical substance. 
  To date, Crawford and Davis have treated only statements obtained during 
police interrogation as “testimonial” statements subject to the cross-examination rule.  
Moreover, Davis has indicated that only statements made during police interrogations 
that were conducted “primarily” to obtain evidence will be deemed “testimonial,” and 
has suggested that statements obtained during interrogations will “often” be 
“nontestimonial” and not subject to the confrontation right or its cross-examination 
rule.  Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. ___, ___, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2279 (2006). 
  Davis has also limited the scope of the confrontation right, and its cross-
examination rule, by indicating that even “testimonial” hearsay statements may be 
admitted in hearings to determine whether a defendant has “forfeited” his 
confrontation right by preventing a potential witness from appearing at trial.  Id. at 
___, 126 S. Ct. at 2279-80.  Hence, it may yet turn out that Crawford’s cross-
examination rule will bar hearsay evidence only infrequently.  See also supra note 21. 
 47 It may not be coincidental that a recent study has concluded that Justices 
Scalia and Thomas are somewhat more prone to overturn prior precedents than the 
other justices.  See Lori A. Ringhand, Judicial Activism: An Empirical Examination of 
Voting Behavior on the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming 
2007). 
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about the Framers’ design should be made only in instances 
when valid and relevant historical sources provide strong 
evidence of the Framers’ understanding of a constitutional 
provision at the time the provision was framed.  After all, 
original meaning is hardly a necessary ground of decision.  
Most of the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions do not 
rest on originalist justifications.  Indeed, even those justices 
who purport to be originalists resort to originalism rather 
selectively.48  Hence, there is no excuse for fictional originalist 
claims that are based only on weak, marginal, or nonexistent 
evidence, rather than on the most direct historical evidence of 
what the Framers actually knew and thought at the time of the 
framing.49 
Mr. Kry apparently has a more relaxed view of the 
criteria for valid originalist claims.  Indeed, he defends 
Crawford’s originalist cross-examination rule claim even 
though he offers a markedly different historical account of 
Marian procedure than that which appeared in Crawford itself 
and arrives at a significantly weaker conclusion. 
III. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN KRY’S HISTORY AND 
JUSTICE SCALIA’S 
As I indicated in my previous article, I had difficulty 
deciphering precisely what historical claim Justice Scalia made 
in Crawford when he cryptically referred to the admission of 
Marian witness examinations as a “derogation” of a common-
law cross-examination rule.50  Because I thought Justice Scalia 
was most likely arguing that Marian examinations of witnesses 
who had died or had otherwise become unavailable had once 
been admitted in criminal trials without consideration of cross-
examination, but that framing-era English law had come to 
impose a cross-examination requirement as a condition for 
admitting a Marian examination as evidence in a criminal 
trial, I focused on that admissibility claim.  I found no evidence 
  
 48 See, e.g., Davies, Arrest, supra note 20, at 260-62. 
 49 As is probably clear to the reader by this point, I am not an originalist.  I 
do not research original meaning to formulate a program for returning to framing-era 
conceptions of rights or to promote an alternative originalist program to that endorsed 
by the self-described originalists on the Supreme Court.  Rather, I think that an 
authentic reconstruction of the Framers’ conception of criminal procedure can provide a 
useful perspective on the larger trajectory of constitutional criminal procedure and may 
also provide an antidote, to some degree, to the mythical conceptions that too often 
appear in United States Reports. 
 50 See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46.  
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in the framing-era authorities that an opportunity for cross-
examination had been made a criterion for admitting a Marian 
witness examination of an unavailable witness in a felony 
trial.51 
Kry now asserts that I focused on the wrong argument.  
Instead, he contends that Crawford should be read to make 
what I termed a more “nuanced” claim—that cross-examination 
emerged within Marian procedure itself, and had become a 
settled part of that procedure by the time of the framing.52  
Thus, Kry argues that when the framing-era authorities that I 
quoted stated that Marian examinations of unavailable 
witnesses were admissible as evidence in criminal trials, those 
statements implicitly incorporated an in-the-presence or cross-
examination rule as an aspect of Marian procedure itself.53 
Whether Kry’s historical analysis is actually the same 
as that which Justice Scalia advanced in Crawford is far from 
clear, however, because many of Justice Scalia’s statements 
appear to refer to admissibility rather than to any internal 
standard for Marian procedure.  Justice Scalia stated the 
historical issue as whether “the admissibility of an unavailable 
witness’s pretrial examination depended on whether the 
defendant had had an opportunity to cross-examine him.”54  
Then, when discussing seventeenth and eighteenth-century 
law, Justice Scalia stated that “[t]he [Marian] statutes did not 
identify the circumstances under which [Marian] examinations 
were admissible,” and observed that those who claimed during 
that period that “no prior opportunity for cross-examination 
was required” for admitting Marian examinations had 
acknowledged that “the statutes were in derogation of the 
common law.”55  For example, Justice Scalia noted that a 
leading authority on evidence had stated that Marian 
examinations were “admissible only ‘by Force “of the [Marian] 
Statute.”’”56  The implication in that statement is that Marian 
examinations were admissible even though they did not provide 
the opportunity for cross-examination that was usually a 
requisite for admissibility.  Likewise, Justice Scalia later wrote 
that “to the extent Marian examinations were admissible, it 
  
 51 See Davies, supra note 2, at 143-52, 182-86. 
 52 Id. at 169-78. 
 53 Kry, supra note 3, at 499-501. 
 54 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 45 (emphasis added). 
 55 Id. at 46 (emphasis added). 
 56 Id. (emphasis altered) (quoting 1 GILBERT, EVIDENCE 215). 
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was only because the statutes derogated from the common law” 
but that “the statutory-derogation view” was “rejected” by 
1791.57  That statement also implies that Marian examinations 
had been admitted despite the absence of cross-examination in 
Marian procedure (that is, despite the way in which the 
statutes “derogated” common law), but that the English courts 
later rejected that special allowance for Marian examinations 
by making an opportunity for cross-examination a requisite for 
admitting even Marian examinations into evidence in a felony 
trial. 
At least for purposes of assessing the validity of 
originalism as an approach to constitutional justification, it 
matters whether Mr. Kry is articulating the same analysis as 
that in Crawford or not.  Justice Scalia’s originalist claims are 
not salvaged by demonstrating that Justice Scalia could have 
arrived at a historical conclusion by a route he did not take.  
Likewise, even if Kry’s analysis does parallel that in Crawford, 
it is unclear how Kry’s presentation of evidence that was never 
mentioned in Crawford can rehabilitate the absence of valid 
historical evidence in the Crawford opinion itself.  
Most importantly, Kry’s historical conclusion is 
decidedly weaker than Justice Scalia’s.  In Crawford, Justice 
Scalia repeatedly invoked “the Framers,” “the founding,” and 
“1791,”58 and specifically asserted that “the Framers would not 
have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness 
who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to 
testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination.”59  In other words, Justice Scalia asserted 
  
 57 Id. at 54 n.5 (first emphasis added).  Justice Scalia also based his claim 
regarding the “reject[ion]” of the “statutory derogation” on the three English cases 
decided in 1787, 1789, and 1791 that I discuss infra notes 175-217 and accompanying 
text.  However, the issue in each of those cases was the admissibility of a witness’s 
examination. 
  Likewise, Justice Scalia described the issue in a key 1790 English decision 
in terms of whether the admissibility of Marian examinations was “a statutory 
exception to the common-law rule.”  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54-55 n.5. 
 58 Id. (passim). 
 59 Id. at 53-54.  See also id. at 54 n.5 (asserting that Chief Justice Rehnquist 
was incorrect when he claimed that “English law’s treatment of testimonial statements 
was inconsistent at the time of the framing,” and that “by 1791 even the statutory-
derogation view had been rejected with respect to [Marian] examinations”).   
  Kry suggests that I have overstated the originalist claim actually made in 
Crawford, because Justice Scalia’s opinion recognized “doubts” regarding the cross-
examination rule; and Kry also claims that I have overstated the differences between 
his account and that in Crawford.  See Kry, supra note 3, at 494 n.10, 555 n.287.  
However, I think Kry understates what Crawford actually claimed.  Moreover, if 
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that a settled rule that Marian examinations were admissible 
only if there had been an opportunity for cross-examination 
was part of the original understanding of the Confrontation 
Clause.  Although Kry may seem to endorse Justice Scalia’s 
claim in rhetorical flourishes at the beginning60 and end of his 
article,61 he does not actually defend that claim when he 
addresses the pre-framing evidence itself. 
Rather, Kry describes the English historical evidence 
regarding cross-examination as “conflicting.”62  Indeed, when 
Kry sums up the pre-framing English historical evidence, he 
asserts only “that prisoners would have been routinely present 
when witnesses were deposed at Marian committal hearings,” 
“that presence was widely viewed as a procedural right by the 
time of the framing,”63 or “that, by the framing, there was also 
an emerging consensus that presence was a procedural right,”64 
and “that many believed a prisoner had a right to cross-
examine witnesses at his committal hearing, but that the point 
was still disputed at the time of the framing.”65  Likewise, 
although Kry asserts that a cross-examination rule emerged in 
England “at some point” (without stating a date),66 the 
strongest summation he musters of the English pre-framing 
evidence is that it “suggests that, at the time of the framing, 
the right to cross-examine at a committal hearing was not 
firmly established, but nor was the absence of such a right 
firmly established.  Rather, there was disagreement . . . .”67  Kry 
does not show that a cross-examination rule had even emerged 
in England as of 1789, let alone show that such a rule was part 
of the original Sixth Amendment. 68  
Kry’s conclusions decidedly do not amount to the settled 
cross-examination rule that Justice Scalia claimed in 
  
Crawford had made only the weaker historical claims Kry now makes, it would hardly 
have presented a claim of original meaning. 
 60 Kry, supra note 3, at 494 (“Crawford is well supported by the historical 
evidence.”).   
 61 Id. at 555 (“Crawford’s cross-examination rule is therefore on solid ground.  
If the opinion is to be faulted for anything, it is only for understating the importance of 
physical presence, not for overstating the importance of cross-examination.”). 
 62 Id. at 542. 
 63 Id. at 495 (emphasis added).   
 64 Id. at 512 (emphasis added).  See also id. at 553 (“[T]he admissibility of ex 
parte committal examinations was far from settled.”). 
 65 Id. at 495 (emphasis added).  See also id. at 525. 
 66 Kry, supra note 3, at 495. 
 67 Id. at 541 (emphasis added). 
 68 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. 
2007] REVISITING FICTIONAL ORIGINALISM 577 
Crawford.  Whatever one concludes about Kry’s attacks on my 
article, they do not constitute a defense of the originalist cross-
examination rule Crawford actually claimed.  With that 
observation, let me nevertheless address Kry’s own claim of an 
English framing-era in-the-presence practice or rule. 
IV. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF KRY’S CLAIMS REGARDING PRE-
FRAMING EVIDENCE 
A claim of original meaning is, by definition, a claim in 
which the date of the framing is of the essence.  Hence, 
although Kry tends to mix together pre-framing and post-
framing materials, I think it is essential to keep them separate.  
I discuss his pre-framing claims in this Part, and reserve his 
post-framing claims for the next.  I think the important issue is 
whether Kry has identified valid evidence of the American 
Framers’ understanding of the Confrontation Clause when it 
was framed—and I think the fair conclusion is that he has not. 
Kry does not contest my basic point—that the framing-
era treatises and justice of the peace manuals that were widely 
used in framing-era America do not mention any in-the-
presence or cross-examination standards for Marian witness 
examinations.  Rather, he dismisses that consistent silence as a 
mere “negative inference.”69  Instead, he offers two broad 
inferences of the must-have variety, and also offers a variety of 
evidence regarding English Marian practice to lend credence to 
those inferences.  I begin by identifying the fallacies in Kry’s 
inferences, and then reiterate the profound silence of the 
framing-era legal authorities before moving on to the specific 
evidence of English practice that Kry offers. 
A. The Invalidity of Kry’s Must-Have Inferences 
Kry offers two inferences of the must-have variety to 
support his historical claims.  One is that because testimony in 
the presence of the defendant and subject to cross-examination 
was a requirement in other procedural contexts, especially 
criminal trials, “consistency” would require that Marian 
procedure include similar features.  The simple answer is that 
one cannot assume that Marian procedure, created by statutory 
authority, was subject to common-law norms.  Rather, because 
  
 69 Kry, supra note 3, at 500. 
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statutes trumped common law, Marian procedure was sui 
generis. 
Moreover, sworn Marian examinations of unavailable 
witnesses were not the only form of admissible evidence that 
departed from the usual principles that evidence in a criminal 
trial had to be presented in the defendant’s presence and 
subject to cross-examination.  That was equally true of a 
murder victim’s dying declaration.70  Dying declarations were 
admissible because the victim’s awareness of imminent death 
was thought to be the functional equivalent of an oath,71 and 
because such declarations often amounted to the “best 
evidence” available of the crime.72  The same was true of 
Marian witness examinations of unavailable witnesses; they 
were made under oath, and they too could provide important 
evidence, or even the best evidence, of the crime—evidence that 
would otherwise be unavailable.73  Hence, there was no reason 
why Marian procedure should comport with trial procedure.74 
  
 70 There is no dispute that dying declarations were admissible under 
framing-era law.  See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.6 (existence of dying declaration 
exception “as general rule of hearsay law cannot be disputed”); Kry, supra note 3, at 
546.  See also infra note 73 (quoting statement by English judge in 1789 confirming 
admissibility of murder victim’s dying declaration). 
 71 See 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 619 n.10 (1787 ed.) (textual note 
added by editor). 
 72 See id.  Thomas Leach added the section and note discussing the 
admissibility of a murder victim’s dying declaration immediately after the section he 
added discussing the “best evidence” rule.  See id. 
 73 As Chief Baron Eyre stated in the 1789 ruling in King v. Woodcock, one of 
the cases cited in Crawford: 
The most common and ordinary species of legal evidence consists in the 
depositions of witnesses taken on oath before the Jury, in the face of the 
Court, in the presence of the prisoner, and received under all the advantages 
which examination and cross-examination can give.  But beyond this kind of 
evidence there are also two species which are admitted by law:  The one is the 
dying declaration of a person who has received a fatal blow:  the other is the 
examination of a prisoner, and the depositions of the witnesses who may be 
produced against him, taken officially before a Justice of the Peace, by virtue 
of [the Marian statutes], which authorizes Magistrates to take such 
examinations, and directs that they shall be returned to the Court of Gaol 
Delivery.  This last species of deposition, if the deponent should die between 
the time of examination and the trial of the prisoner, may be substituted in 
the room of that viva voce testimony which the deponent, if living, could alone 
have given, and is admitted of necessity as evidence of the fact. 
Leach (1st ed. 1789) 437, 439, 1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) 500, 501-02, 168 Eng. Rep. at 352-
53 (Old Bailey 1789). 
 74 Of course, although the grand jury was an important phase of the framing-
era right to jury trial in felony cases, the defendant played no role, and was not 
permitted to cross-examine during that phase of the criminal trial.  Hence, it is hardly 
the case that cross-examination was a feature of all phases of a criminal prosecution; 
rather, it was expected to be a component of the trial before the petit jury. 
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This is also true of Kry’s second must-have inference.  
He notes that, although the Marian statutes did not say 
anything about the presence of the arrestee or about the 
arrestee having an opportunity for cross-examination during 
the taking of a witness’s information about a felony, the 
statutes did indicate that witness examinations were to be 
taken before the justice of the peace either committed the 
arrestee to jail to await trial or bailed the arrestee.75  Likewise, 
Kry infers that the statutory authority for examinations of the 
witnesses who brought the prisoner to the justice of the peace 
means that the prisoner “necessarily” would have been present 
when the witnesses were examined.76 
However, there is an obvious reason why the statute 
required the witness examination to be completed before 
committal or bail that does not depend upon the arrestee’s 
presence when a witness examination was taken.  A justice of 
the peace’s decision to commit or bail an arrestee effectively 
marked the beginning of a formal prosecution.  The warrant of 
committal that authorized jailing the arrestee to await trial 
ordered that the defendant not be released except “by due 
course of law”—that is, by court proceedings, usually trial.77  
Hence, it made sense that the Marian statutes would require a 
justice of the peace to confirm, prior to taking that serious step, 
that (1) there actually was proof that a felony had been 
committed, and (2) there were witnesses who were prepared to 
connect the defendant to the felony.  Indeed, the treatises and 
manuals indicated that a justice should release an arrestee if 
these minimal thresholds for prosecution were not met, but 
also stated that a justice had no discretion to release a felony 
arrestee if these minimal thresholds were met.78 
  
 75 Kry, supra note 3, at 512. 
 76 Id. at 523. 
 77 See Davies, Arrest, supra note 20, at 395 n.521. 
 78 See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 293 (1st ed. 1769).  (“If upon this enquiry [the Marian post-arrest procedure] 
it manifestly appears, either that no such crime was committed, or that the suspicion 
entertained of the prisoner was wholly groundless, in such cases only it is lawful totally 
to discharge him.  Otherwise he must either be committed to prison, or give bail . . . .”).  
See also infra note 246 (citing framing-era American justice of the peace manuals for 
the same point). 
  As I have previously noted, the common Bluebook rule for citing the 
“starred” edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries is inappropriate for historical 
commentary because that is the 1783 ninth London edition, the last that contains 
Blackstone’s own changes.  See Davies, Arrest, supra note 20, at 278 n.119.  However, 
because Blackstone sometimes changed the contents, that edition may be different 
from the earlier editions, including the 1771-1772 American printing that was widely 
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However, a justice of the peace could ascertain whether 
these minimum committal standards were met simply by 
listening to the witnesses.   Indeed, because a justice of the 
peace had no authority to try a felony charge, he was not 
supposed to assess the credibility of the witnesses, but simply 
to determine whether the proffered evidence supported the 
arrest.79  Hence, the justice could perform the required task 
even if the constable had escorted the arrestee out of the 
justice’s parlor to another place of temporary detention pending 
the justice’s disposition—and surely some arrestees were ill-
behaved enough to merit removal from the justice’s parlor.  The 
cryptic language of the Marian statutes and the absence of 
specific directions for taking witness examinations imply that 
the details of how the examinations were to be taken were 
simply left to the discretion of the justice of the peace.    
In addition, it is important to recognize that a Marian 
witness examination was taken for a different purpose than 
that for which depositions were taken in civil lawsuits.80  
Depositions in civil lawsuits and equity proceedings were taken 
with the expectation that they would be admitted into evidence 
as a substitute for live trial testimony.  That is, they were taken 
when it was anticipated that it would be too inconvenient, too 
  
used in framing-era America.  Hence, relying on the “star” edition can result in large 
historical errors.  For an example, see id. at 292-300 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
revisionist interpretation of the original meaning of the term “Breach of the Peace” in 
the Speech and Debate Clause, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 1, in Williamson v. United 
States, 207 U.S. 425, 435-46 (1908), in which the Court justified the result by 
erroneously treating a statement in a later edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries as 
though it had been what Blackstone initially wrote in 1765, when Blackstone had 
taken the opposite position in the editions primarily used in America). 
 79 Kry asserts, based on recent historical research, that English magistrates 
began to exercise broader discretion during the eighteenth century.  Kry, supra note 3, 
at 523, 554.  However, as far as I can determine, that change was not reflected in the 
treatises or justice of the peace manuals, including the justice of the peace manuals 
published in framing-era America.  See infra notes 245-46 and accompanying text. 
 80 To avoid confusion, I refer to Marian witness statements as “examinations” 
rather than “depositions” in this article because I think that use of the latter term 
tends to obscure the significant differences between Marian procedure and civil 
litigation depositions.  Although Marian witness statements are often called 
“depositions” in modern historical works, and Kry consistently calls Marian witness 
examinations “depositions” in his article, as I did likewise in my 2002 article, that is 
not the usual framing-era label.  The Marian statutes referred to taking the 
“information” of the witnesses.  However, it is awkward to refer to Marian witness 
informations, and the term “informations” carries other baggage in the criminal 
context.  Historical sources sometimes referred to Marian witness statements as 
“depositions” but more commonly called them “examinations” (the term the Marian 
statutes actually used for statements by the arrestee).  For an example of a historical 
source that refers to Marian witness statements as both “depositions” and 
“examinations,” see infra note 82. 
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expensive, or otherwise impossible for a witness to attend the 
civil lawsuit trial.81  Because depositions in civil proceedings 
were taken to be used as trial evidence, they were subject to a 
cross-examination rule comparable to that which applied in 
trials: depositions could be readily admitted as a substitute for 
live testimony in civil lawsuits if, but only if, the opposing 
party had an opportunity to attend and cross-examine when 
the deposition was taken.82 
  
 81 In the eighteenth century, depositions could be taken to be used as 
evidence in civil lawsuits and equity proceedings.  See, e.g., 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 
78, at 383 (1st ed. 1768) (use of depositions in lawsuits); id. at 449 (use of depositions in 
equity proceedings).  Depositions do not seem to have been taken for discovery as they 
are today, because modern discovery procedures had not yet been developed. 
  The expectation that depositions would be used as a substitute for live 
testimony in trials in civil lawsuits was the actual subject of a 1787 Letter of a Federal 
Farmer that was incorrectly quoted in Crawford as though it were a direct antecedent 
of the Confrontation Clause applicable to criminal trials.  However, the letter was so 
heavily edited that the concern with the use of depositions as evidence in civil trials 
was obscured.  Justice Scalia portrayed the Letter in Crawford as follows: 
[A] prominent Antifederalist writing under the pseudonym Federal Farmer 
criticized the use of “written evidence” while objecting to the omission of a 
vicinage right:  “Nothing can be more essential than the cross examining [of] 
witnesses, and generally before the triers of the facts in question. . . .  
[W]ritten evidence . . . [is] almost useless; it must be frequently taken ex 
parte, and but very seldom leads to the proper discovery of truth.”  The First 
Congress responded by including the Confrontation Clause in the proposal 
that became the Sixth Amendment. 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).  
  However, the quoted passage actually appeared in a passage that 
discussed the vicinage (that is, venue) aspect of “[t]he trials by jury in civil causes.”  
Letter from the Federal Farmer, No. 4 (Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in CONTEXTS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY COLLECTION ON PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 706, 710 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1999) (emphasis added).  The 
Federal Farmer stated that he did not place much weight on the need to be tried by 
one’s neighbors, but then wrote that it was important for trials in civil causes (that is, 
lawsuits) to be held in the vicinity for the convenience of obtaining oral testimony from 
witnesses so that it would not be necessary to resort to the use of depositions: 
[T]he trial of facts in the neighbourhood is of great importance in other 
respects.  Nothing can be more essential than the cross examining witnesses, 
and generally before the triers of the facts in question.  The common people 
can establish facts with much more ease with oral than written evidence; 
when trials of facts are removed to a distance from the homes of the parties 
and witnesses, oral evidence becomes intolerably expensive, and the parties 
must depend on written evidence, which to the common people is expensive 
and almost useless; it must be frequently taken ex parte, and but very seldom 
leads to the proper discovery of truth. 
Id.  Although this passage reflects the general importance attached to oral testimony 
and cross-examination, it did so while expressing concern about the expected use of 
depositions in civil cases, rather than in criminal trials. 
 82 See GILBERT, supra note 15, at 46-47, 48 (1754 ed.); id. at 61-62, 63-64 
(1777 ed.). 
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In contrast, Marian witness examinations were not 
taken with an expectation that they would be offered as 
evidence of the defendant’s guilt at trial.83  Because a Marian 
witness examination was admissible only if the witness had 
become genuinely unavailable—strictly defined as death, 
serious illness, or interference by the defendant84—there was 
little likelihood that any particular Marian examination would 
be admitted as evidence at trial.  That was especially so 
because the pace of framing-era criminal prosecutions was 
considerably speedier than modern proceedings, so there was 
little likelihood that a witness would die or become seriously ill 
during the short period between the date of the Marian 
examination and the subsequent trial.85 
In the usual course of events, the witnesses who brought 
the arrestee to the justice of the peace and were examined 
under Marian procedure would also appear and testify in 
person at the subsequent trial.  Indeed, the justice was 
supposed to assure that they would appear for trial by binding 
them to do so with a recognizance.  Hence, the expectation was 
that a felony defendant would have the opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses who had given Marian examinations 
during the course of the felony trial itself.  A Marian 
examination was not supposed to be a mini-trial. 
The probable purpose of the requirement that the record 
of Marian witness examinations be forwarded to the trial court 
was simply to provide a means by which the trial judge could 
determine whether the witness had changed his or her story in 
  
 83 As Kry notes, Marian examinations were not created to be a substitute for 
live testimony at criminal trials.  See Kry, supra note 3, at 498 n.19 (citing JOHN H. 
LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE 24-34 (1974) (“contending that 
‘the Marian draftsman did not intend to institute a system of written evidence’”)). 
 84 See 2 HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 429 (1771 ed.); 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra 
note 4, at 605 (1787 ed.) (stating that a Marian witness examination was admissible as 
evidence if the witness (called an “Informer”) “is dead, or unable to travel, or kept away 
by the Means or Procurement of the Prisoner,” and also noting that “it is not sufficient 
to authorize the Reading such an Examination, to make Oath that the Prosecutors 
have used all their Endeavours to find the Witness, but cannot find him”), quoted in 
Davies, supra note 2, at 147, nn.137-38. 
 85 For example, less than two months passed between the crime and the trial 
of the defendant in King v. Radbourne, one of the cases that Justice Scalia cited in 
Crawford.  The attack that was prosecuted as a murder occurred on May 31, 1787 (the 
“27th year” of the reign of George III), and the trial was held “[a]t the Old Bailey in 
July Session 1787.”  King v. Radbourne, 1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) 457, 168 Eng. Rep. 330 
(Old Bailey 1787), cited in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46-47.  Although the victim of the 
attack did die in the interval in Radbourne, the dates in that case still illustrate the 
speed of late eighteenth-century prosecutions. 
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response to a bribe or threat.86  To meet that purpose, as well as 
to test the validity of the charge on which the arrest had been 
made, the Marian witness examination was taken under oath 
and the witness was required to sign the written summary of 
his or her examination that was then prepared by the justice.  
However, there is no apparent reason why the arrestee’s 
presence would have been necessary for that purpose. 
In addition, it is not clear what purpose cross-
examination would ordinarily have served.87  As Kry observes, 
the written records of Marian witness examinations took the 
form of short summaries of what the witness swore to, but did 
not resemble a modern transcript.88  As a result, it is not 
apparent how cross-examination would have been recorded.  
The bottom line is that Kry’s must-have inferences simply do 
not hold up to close inspection.89 
The sui generis character of Marian procedure is also 
evident in what the framing-era legal authorities had to say 
about Marian procedure.  In fact, there is more to say on that 
score than I previously presented. 
  
 86 See Davies, supra note 2, at 129. 
 87 Kry suggests that cross-examination became relevant when English 
magistrates began to exercise an extra-legal discretion as to whether felony charges 
should be dismissed.  See Kry, supra note 3, at 523, 554-55 (noting that cross-
examination in Marian witness examinations served no purpose until this 
development).  He offers no evidence of whether American justices of the peace 
exercised similar discretion. 
 88 See id. at 535-37 nn.189-92 and accompanying text. 
 89 There are a number of features of arrest and committal procedures that 
seem to undercut an in-the-presence-of-the-arrestee rule.  For one thing, many if not 
most felony arrests were made by warrant.  See, e.g., Davies, Fourth Amendment, 
supra note 20, at 641.  A sworn, signed record of the factual allegations made by the 
complainant usually was made when an arrest warrant was issued.  See, e.g., 1 
MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 582 (Sollom Emlyn ed., 
1736).  Is it really likely that the justice retook the complainant’s information as a 
witness after the arrest?  Or is it more likely that the complainant’s sworn pre-arrest 
statement became his Marian examination?  If so, there was no apparent opportunity 
for the arrestee to cross-examine.  As I note below, in 1807, the Attorney General of the 
United States stated that an affidavit for an arrest warrant could serve as a Marian 
witness examination.  See infra note 302 and accompanying text.  
  Likewise, as I discuss below, the Marian procedure entries in framing-era 
justice of the peace manuals sometimes included material witness warrants, which 
would seem to pose some logistical problems for the examination being taken in the 
presence of the arrestee.  See infra notes 103, 108-09 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Evidence Against an In-the-Presence or Cross-
Examination Rule in the Framing-Era Authorities 
In my previous article, because I perceived the 
originalist claim in Crawford as a claim regarding the 
admissibility of Marian witness examinations,90 I noted that 
the framing-era legal authorities did not mention cross-
examination in the passages discussing the admissibility of a 
Marian examination of an unavailable witness.  In view of the 
argument that Kry now makes regarding Marian procedure 
itself, I should add that the silence also extends to the 
discussions of Marian procedure itself.  The framing-era 
authorities do not mention either an in-the-presence or cross-
examination rule in the passages in which they set out the 
requirements of a Marian witness examination.  In fact, some 
of the framing-era authorities actually contrasted Marian 
procedure to depositions in civil lawsuits which were subject to 
a cross-examination procedure.  
1. Framing-Era Descriptions of Marian Procedure 
Let me begin with the descriptions of Marian procedure 
that appeared in the prominent framing-era treatises and then 
address the somewhat more detailed statements in the justice 
of the peace manuals.91  Like the absence of detail in the 
Marian statutes themselves, the absence of detail regarding 
the taking of Marian examinations in the treatises and 
manuals suggests that those details were simply left to the 
justice of the peace’s discretion. 
a. Hale’s Treatise 
Sir Matthew Hale had been one of the judges who ruled 
in 1666 that a coroner’s Marian examination of an unavailable 
witness would be admissible in a criminal trial.92  In my 
previous article, I noted that Hale’s later treatise, The History 
of the Pleas of the Crown, which was written in the late 
  
 90 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
 91 It does not appear that Sir Edward Coke discussed Marian committal 
procedure; neither Crawford nor Kry cites any statement by Coke, and I have not 
found any. 
 92 Kry, supra note 3, at 497. 
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seventeenth century but not published until 1736,93 did not 
make cross-examination a condition of admissibility for a 
Marian examination of an unavailable witness.94  Hale’s 
treatise also said nothing about either the presence of the 
prisoner or an opportunity for cross-examination in its 
discussion of Marian procedure itself.95 
  
 93 See HALE, supra note 89.  For bibliographic information, see Davies, supra 
note 2, at 130. 
 94 Davies, supra note 2, at 129-32. 
 95 The significance of how little Hale had to say about Marian witness 
examinations comes through only if one reads his entire description of Marian 
procedure.  This is the most complete passage on that subject, with witness 
examinations being discussed in paragraphs numbered 2 and 3: 
Previous to the commitment of felons, or such as are charged therewith, there 
are required three things, 1.  The examination of the person accused, but 
without oath.  2.  The farther information [beyond the complaint for the 
arrest warrant] of accusers and witnesses upon oath.  3.  The binding over of 
the prosecutor and witnesses unto the next assizes or sessions of the peace 
[that is, the criminal trial courts], as the case requires. 
1.  The examination of the person accused, which ought not to be upon oath, 
and these examinations ought to be put in writing, and returned or certified 
to the next gaol-delivery or sessions of the peace, as the case shall require by 
[the Marian statutes] and being sworn by the justice or his clerk to be truly 
taken may be given in evidence against the offender. 
And in order thereunto, if by some reasonable occasion the justice cannot at 
the return of the [arrest] warrant take the examination, he may by word of 
mouth command the constable or any other person to detain in custody the 
prisoner till the next day, and then to bring him before the justice for further 
examination; and this detainer is justifiable by the constable, or any other 
person, without shewing the particular cause, for which he was to be 
examined, or any warrant in scriptis. 
But the time of the detainer must be reasonable, therefore a justice cannot 
justify the detainer of such person sixteen or twenty days in order to such 
examination. 
2.  He must take information of the prosecutor or witnesses in writing upon 
oath, and return or certify them at the next sessions or gaol-delivery, and 
these being upon the trial sworn to be truly taken by the justice or his clerk, 
&c. may be given in evidence against the prisoner, if the witnesses be dead or 
not able to travel. 
3.  Before he commit the prisoner he is to take surety [that is, bond] of the 
prosecutor to prefer his bill of indictment at the next gaol-delivery or 
sessions, and likewise to give evidence; but if he be not the accuser, but an 
unconcerned party, that can testify, the justice may bind him over to give 
evidence, and upon refusal in either case may commit the refuser to gaol.   
1 HALE, supra note 89, at 585-86 (citations omitted).  I submit there is no hint in this 
passage of any concern that the prisoner be present or have an opportunity to cross-
examine when the witness examinations were taken.  See also 1 id. at 372 (also 
discussing Marian procedure); 2 id. at 46, 51-52 (also discussing Marian procedure).   
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b. Hawkins’s Treatise 
Although Kry, like Justice Scalia in Crawford, tends to 
describe the rule of admissibility as “Hale’s,”96 the most 
influential eighteenth-century treatise on criminal law and 
procedure was almost certainly Sergeant William Hawkins’s 
Pleas of the Crown, first published in the early eighteenth 
century and republished into the nineteenth.97  In my previous 
article, I noted that when Hawkins discussed the admissibility 
of a Marian examination of an unavailable witness in his 
chapter on evidence, he stated that “it seems settled” that 
Marian examinations of unavailable witnesses were admissible 
in felony trials, but—like Hale—he made no mention of any in-
the-presence requirement.  The only conditions that Hawkins 
noted regarding admissibility were the genuine unavailability 
of the witness and the requirement that the justice who took 
the examination or his clerk attest that the record of the 
examination was accurate.98 
I should add here that Hawkins also never mentioned 
any in-the-presence or cross-examination rule when he 
discussed Marian committal and bail procedure itself in earlier 
entries in his treatise.  Rather, Hawkins simply quoted the 
relevant portions of the Marian statutes and noted that a 
justice of the peace should not detain a prisoner for more than 
three days before examining him.99  If Hawkins had actually 
understood that a Marian witness examination was invalid 
unless it was taken in the presence of the prisoner, would he 
not have advised justices of the peace of that requirement? 
  
 96 Kry, like Justice Scalia in Crawford, tends to place more emphasis on 
Hale’s statements than on those by Hawkins and in later treatises.  That treatment 
may create the appearance that the 1696 rulings in Paine and Fenwick altered “Hale’s” 
earlier rule of admissibility.  However, the more significant point is that 
straightforward statements of the admissibility of Marian examinations of unavailable 
witnesses appeared in the eighteenth-century treatises by Hawkins, Chief Baron 
Geoffrey Gilbert, Francis Buller, and others, as well as in the eighteenth-century 
justice of the peace manuals, and those statements tend to show that Paine and 
Fenwick did not influence the understanding of Marian procedure.  See Davies, supra 
note 2, at 143-52. 
 97 See supra note 4. 
 98 2 HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 429 (1771 ed.); 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra 
note 4, at 605 (1787 ed.), discussed in Davies, supra note 2, at 146-50. 
 99 2 HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 118-19 (1771 ed.); 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra 
note 4, at 184-85 (1787 ed.) (discussing Marian committal procedure).  See also 2 
HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 49 (1771 ed.); 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 79-80 
(1787 ed.) (discussing coroners’ examinations).  See also 2 HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 
104-05 (1771 ed.); 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 162-63 (1787 ed.) (discussing 
bailing arrestees). 
2007] REVISITING FICTIONAL ORIGINALISM 587 
c. Dalton’s Justice of the Peace Manual 
In addition to the treatises on criminal procedure, there 
was also a second category of framing-era legal authorities that 
were written or compiled to inform and guide the officials who 
were charged with committal and bail in felony arrests under 
the Marian statutes—what are now usually called justice of the 
peace manuals.  The term “manual” is somewhat misleading 
because these works were often quite substantial. 
One of the earlier justice of the peace manuals that was 
probably still in circulation to some degree in framing-era 
America was Michael Dalton’s The Country Justice, initially 
published in 1618, with subsequent editions to 1742 (though 
the latest edition I have located is 1727).100  As was often the 
case in later manuals, this work discussed Marian witness 
examinations in two entries, one dealing with Marian 
procedure itself, and one dealing with the admissibility of 
Marian witness examinations as evidence in felony trials.  The 
first entry, titled “Felonies,” noted that the Marian statutes 
required justices of the peace to take the information of 
witnesses regarding a felony arrestee, reduce the material 
contents of that information to writing, and bind the witnesses 
to appear at trial, prior to either committing or bailing the 
arrestee.  However, this entry does not mention any 
requirement that the arrestee be present for the witness 
examinations.101 
The second of Dalton’s entries, titled “Evidence against 
Felons,” contains similar statements about Marian procedure, 
but also makes two statements that seem to cut against any in-
the-presence-of-the-prisoner requirement.  One states that a 
justice of the peace can take and certify to the trial court the 
sworn “Accusation or Information by one that is decrepit or 
unable to travel”—that is, the justice can go to the witness.  
However, this statement does not mention arranging to take 
the arrestee along.102 
The other passage indicates that the justice of the peace 
can issue a warrant to a constable to bring in other persons 
  
 100 MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE (1727 ed.).  For bibliographic 
information, see 1 MAXWELL, supra note 4, at 227.    
 101 See DALTON, supra note 100, at 105-06. 
 102 See id. at 541.  The entire passage reads: “Accusation or Information by 
one that is decrepit or unable to travel, is good, and may be taken by the Justice of the 
Peace on Oath, and certified at the next general Gaol-delivery, or Sessions of the Peace, 
as the Cause shall require.”  Id. 
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who have been identified as having material information about 
a felony—that is, material witnesses.  This passage also does 
not mention making arrangements for the arrestee to be 
present when these witnesses are found and brought in and 
when their examinations are taken.103  Hence, it is fairly clear 
that there was no in-the-presence rule for Marian procedure in 
English law during the early eighteenth century.104  Moreover, 
there is similar evidence in a later, and more important, 
English justice of the peace manual. 
d. Burn’s Justice of the Peace Manual 
The leading eighteenth-century English justice of the 
peace manual, which Blackstone recommended to law students 
for the details of the role of that office in criminal procedure, 
was Richard Burn’s The Justice of the Peace, and Parish 
Officer, first published in London in 1755 and republished in 
fourteen additional editions edited by Burn to 1785, and 
another fifteen thereafter to 1869.105  Like Dalton, Burn 
discussed Marian witness examinations in two entries, one for 
“Examination” and one for “Evidence.”  The entry for 
“Examination” addressed Marian procedure itself and also 
provided relevant forms.  Like Hawkins, Burn mostly just 
quoted or paraphrased the statutes; he said nothing about 
  
 103 See id. at 542.  The full passage begins by discussing the examinations of 
the persons “who bring” the arrestee, and then continues: 
And if afterwards the said Justice shall hear of any other Persons that can 
inform any material Thing against the Prisoner to prove the Felony, whereof 
he is suspected; he may grant his Warrant for such Persons to come before 
him, and may also take their Information, &c. and may bind them to give 
Evidence against the Prisoner, for every one shall be admitted to give 
Evidence for the King. 
Id. at 542. 
 104 Note that these entries are inconsistent with, and thus cast doubt on, the 
implications that Kry and Crawford draw from the 1696 sources discussed infra notes 
125-51 and accompanying text. 
 105 RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER (1st ed. 
1755) (two volumes).  For bibliographic information, see RICHARD WHALLEY BRIDGMAN, 
A SHORT VIEW OF LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 42-43 (photo. reprint n.d.) (1807); 1 MAXWELL, 
supra note 4, at 225-26.  To show continuity, I also cite the 1764, 1776, 1785, and 1797 
editions.  
  Blackstone recommended that students interested in criminal procedure 
consult “Dr Burn’s justice of the peace; wherein [the student] will find every thing 
relative to this subject, both in ancient and modern practice, collected with great care 
and accuracy, and disposed in a most clear and judicious method.”  1 BLACKSTONE, 
supra note 78, at 343 (1st ed. 1765). 
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taking the witness examinations in the presence of the prisoner 
or about cross-examination.106   
The forms that accompanied the “Examination” entry 
are also significant.  Although a form was provided for 
“Information of a witness,” it simply tracked the prefatory 
format of the form for “Examination of a felon”—it did not 
include any statement that the prisoner was present when the 
examination was taken.107  That silence is significant.  If there 
had been an in-the-presence requirement, one would expect 
that a statement that the witness’s information was taken in 
the presence of the prisoner would have been made a 
boilerplate aspect of the form, but there was no such statement. 
The “Examination” entry also contained a form for a 
warrant for a “material witness”—that is, for a warrant 
comparable to the one discussed by Dalton for a constable to go 
out and bring in a person who was thought to possess relevant 
information about the felony, so that the justice could examine 
that person and record his information under oath.108  Because 
this warrant pertained to a person who was not among “those 
who brought” the prisoner to the justice at the time of arrest, 
its inclusion also undercuts any in-the-presence legal 
requirement for Marian witness examinations.  If there had 
been such a rule, one would expect that Burn would have said 
something about the need to retrieve the defendant and bring 
him in at the same time as the material witness, but Burn did 
not say that.  The material witness form still appears at least 
as late as the 1797 edition of Burn’s manual.109  
Burn’s manual is especially relevant because the justice 
of the peace manuals published in America prior to the framing 
borrowed heavily from it.  The principal manuals reprinted his 
passages on Marian procedure as well as the accompanying 
forms for witness examinations and material witnesses.110 
  
 106 1 BURN, supra note 105, at 295-97 (1755 ed.) (discussing Marian 
procedure); 1 id. at 536-38 (1785 ed.) (same); 1 id. at 671-73 (1797 ed.) (same). 
 107 1 BURN, supra note 105, at 297 (1755 ed.) (setting out forms for 
examination of prisoner and information of witnesses); 1 id. at  538 (1785 ed.) (same); 1 
id. at 673-74 (1797 ed.) (same). 
 108 1 BURN, supra note 105, at 298-99 (1755 ed.) (setting out form for material 
witness warrant); 1 id. at 539-40 (1785 ed.) (same). 
 109 1 BURN, supra note 105, at 675 (1797 ed.) (setting out same form for 
material witness warrant as in previous editions). 
 110 Several American manuals closely tracked Burn’s manual.  See JOSEPH 
GREENLEAF, AN ABRIDGMENT OF BURN’S JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER 
118 (Boston 1773) (reprinting Burn’s discussion of Marian procedure and forms); JOHN 
FAUCHERAUD GRIMKE, THE SOUTH-CAROLINA JUSTICE OF PEACE 199-202 (Phila. 1788) 
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The consistent silences in the framing-era authorities 
are powerful evidence of the “dog-that-did-not-bark-in-the-
night” sort that there was no in-the-presence rule for Marian 
examinations.  However, there is more evidence than silence.  
Several framing-era authorities juxtaposed Marian witness 
examinations to depositions in civil lawsuits which were 
subject to a cross-examination rule. 
2. Contrasting Treatments of Marian Procedure and 
Civil Litigation Deposition Procedure 
a. Gilbert’s Treatise 
Chief Baron Geoffrey Gilbert authored a leading 
treatise, The Law of Evidence.111  As I pointed out in my prior 
article, he contrasted Marian examinations to the cross-
examination rule that applied in non-Marian depositions in a 
passage regarding the implications of the 1696 ruling in King 
v. Paine112 by writing that the judges in that misdemeanor libel 
trial “would not allow the Examinations . . . to be given in 
Evidence, because Paine was not present to cross-examine 
[when the deposition at issue was taken], and tho’ tis Evidence 
in Indictments for Felony in such Case, by Force of [the Marian 
statutes], yet ‘tis not so in Informations for 
Misdemeanors . . . .”113  In other words, a Marian witness 
examination was admissible as “Evidence” in a felony trial 
regardless of cross-examination, but a deposition was 
  
(manual published anonymously but attributed to Judge Grimke; see Davies, supra 
note 2 at 185 n.256); THE CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 145-47 (printed by Hugh Gaine, N.Y. 
1788) [hereinafter GAINE’S CONDUCTOR]; CONDUCTOR GENERALIS 177-78 (printed for 
Robert Hodge, N.Y. 1788) [hereinafter HODGE’S CONDUCTOR]; ELIPHALET LADD, BURN’S 
ABRIDGMENT, OR THE AMERICAN JUSTICE 156-58 (Dover, N.H. 1792) (reprinting Burn’s 
discussion of Marian procedure; however, this manual omits all forms).  The other 
American manuals that did not track Burn as closely also included his forms for 
examination of a witness and for a material witness warrant.  See RICHARD STARKE, 
THE OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE 116 (Williamsburg 1774) (forms for 
“Information of A Witness” and “Summon For [Material] Witness”); JAMES DAVIS, THE 
OFFICE AND AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE 159 (New Bern, N.C. 1774) (“Summons 
for a Witness Against a Felon,” followed by a passage on the authority of a justice 
under the Marian statutes). 
 111 GILBERT, supra note 15. 
 112 See infra notes 125, 127-41 and accompanying text.  
 113 GILBERT, supra note 15, at 100 (1754 ed.) (emphasis added); id. at 139 
(1777 ed.) (emphasis added), quoted in Davies, supra note 2, at 145. 
  In Crawford, Justice Scalia cited this passage for the point that Marian 
examinations of unavailable witnesses were “admissible only ‘by Force “of the [Marian] 
Statute,”’” but he omitted the contrasting “though” aspect of the statement.  Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 46. 
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inadmissible in a misdemeanor trial (to which the Marian 
statutes did not apply) unless the defendant had had an 
opportunity to cross-examine the deponent.  That statement 
appeared in later editions, including the 1788 American edition 
of Gilbert’s treatise, and was still unaltered as late as the 
expanded and updated 1791 London edition.114 
Gilbert also implicitly drew a contrast between civil 
lawsuit depositions and Marian witness examinations when he 
explicitly noted that an opportunity for cross-examination was 
required in the former, but made no comparable statement 
about the latter.115  Gilbert’s contrasting treatment was also 
echoed in later works. 
b. The Theory of Evidence 
Another evidence treatise, The Theory of Evidence, was 
published anonymously in London in 1761.116  This treatise 
stated that a deposition could be admitted into evidence in a 
variety of civil proceedings if, but only if, the other party had 
been given an opportunity to cross-examine when the 
deposition was taken.  However, when this treatise discussed 
the admissibility in felony trials of Marian witness 
examinations taken by coroners or justices of the peace, it 
simply stated that Marian witness examinations could be 
admitted in evidence if the witness had become unavailable.  
The contrasting treatment is especially evident because this 
treatise connected these two subjects with the disjunctive “yet”: 
It is a general Rule, that Depositions taken in a Court not of Record 
shall not be allowed in Evidence elsewhere.  So it has been holden in 
Regard to Depositions in the Ecclesiastical Court, though the 
Witnesses were dead.  So where there cannot be a cross 
Examination, as Depositions taken before Commissioners of 
Bankrupts, they shall not be read in Evidence, yet if the Witnesses 
examined on a Coroner’s Inquest are dead, or beyond Sea, their 
Depositions may be read; for the Coroner is an Officer appointed on 
behalf of the Public, to make Inquiry about the Matters within his 
Jurisdiction; and therefore the Law will presume the Depositions 
  
 114 Davies, supra note 2, at 145-46.   
 115 Compare GILBERT, supra note 15, at 46-47, 48 (1754 ed.) (indicating that 
an opportunity for cross-examination was a requirement for a deposition in civil 
lawsuits), with id. at 100 (1754 ed.) (not mentioning cross-examination regarding 
Marian examinations). 
 116 HENRY BATHURST, THE THEORY OF EVIDENCE (Dublin 1761).  There was no 
later edition of this work, which, though originally published anonymously, is now 
attributed to Henry Bathurst.  See 1 MAXWELL, supra note 4, at 378. 
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before him to be fairly and impartially taken.—And by [the Marian 
statutes] Justices of the Peace shall examine of Persons brought 
before them for Felony, and of those who brought them, and certify 
such Examination to the next Gaol-Delivery; but the Examination of 
the Prisoner shall be without Oath, and the others upon Oath, and 
these Examinations shall be read against the Offender upon an 
Indictment, if the Witnesses be dead.117 
The contents of The Theory of Evidence, including the 
above passage, were subsequently restated in a 1767 treatise, 
An Introduction to the Law Relative to Trials at Nisi Prius,118 
which I quoted in my previous article.119  The quoted passage 
then appeared in later editions of the Nisi Prius treatise that 
were published as late as 1793, including a New York edition 
published in 1788.120 
c. Burn’s Justice of the Peace Manual 
Burn’s leading English justice of the peace manual 
similarly contrasted Marian examinations in felony 
prosecutions with depositions in civil lawsuits.  In addition to 
the description of Marian procedure noted above,121 Burn also 
discussed the admissibility of depositions in civil proceedings 
and the admissibility of Marian witness examinations of 
unavailable witnesses in a subpart of his entry for “Evidence” 
headed “Of written evidence.”  In that discussion, Burn also 
contrasted the rule that an opportunity for cross-examination 
was a condition for admitting a deposition in a civil lawsuit to 
the admissibility of Marian witness examinations of 
unavailable witnesses. 
  
 117 BATHURST, supra note 116, at 33-34 (emphasis added).  Kry concedes that 
the “yet” in the quoted passage “arguably” applies to Marian committal examinations 
as well as to coroners’ examinations, but suggests that it might apply only to coroners’ 
examinations.  See Kry, supra note 3, at 500 n.28. 
 118 HENRY BATHURST, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT 
NISI PRIUS (n.p. 1767).  The incorporation of the contents of The Theory of Evidence into 
the Nisi Prius treatise and other later treatises was well known.  See BRIDGMAN, supra 
note 105, at 230-31 (noting that the contents of The Theory of Evidence were “generally 
understood to have been engrafted on” the Nisi Prius treatise); 1 MAXWELL, supra note 
4, at 378 (entry 1) (The Theory of Evidence incorporated into An Introduction to the 
Law Relative to Trials at Nisi Prius); 1 MAXWELL, supra note 4, at 335 (attributing the 
1767 edition of the Nisi Prius treatise—first published anonymously—to Henry 
Bathurst and the 1772 edition to Francis Buller). 
 119 Davies, supra note 2, at 151 n.148 (quoting the passage in the text 
immediately after the “yet” cited supra text accompanying note 117). 
 120 Davies, supra note 2, at 151 n.147. 
 121 See supra text accompanying note 106. 
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Beginning in the 1764 edition of his manual, Burn 
apparently combined the statements about the requirement of 
cross-examination in depositions in civil proceedings that 
preceded the “yet” in the passage from The Theory of Evidence, 
with the sections from Hawkins’s criminal procedure treatise 
that discussed the admissibility of a Marian witness 
examination of an unavailable witness in a felony trial.  Burn 
joined these two subjects with the disjunctive “but”: 
So [in civil matters] where there cannot be a cross-examination, as 
depositions taken before commissioners of bankrupts, they shall not 
be read in evidence. 
But it seems to be settled, that [a Marian examination of an 
unavailable witness] may be given in evidence at the [felony] 
trial . . . .122 
Thus, Burn’s passage seems to indicate that cross-examination 
was a condition for the admission of depositions in the trial of 
civil lawsuits, “[b]ut” that it was not a requirement for the 
admission of Marian witness examinations in felony trials. 
The contrasting treatment of these subjects in Burn’s 
manual is especially important because the passage quoted 
above was reprinted in several framing-era American justice of 
the peace journals.123  Other American manuals simply 
discussed the admissibility of a Marian examination of an 
unavailable witness separately from the admissibility of civil 
depositions.124  None mentioned either the presence of the 
prisoner or an opportunity for cross-examination as conditions 
for admitting a Marian examination of an unavailable witness. 
3. Summary 
The bottom line is that there were no statements in the 
framing-era authorities widely used in England and America—
including the justice of the peace manuals that were intended 
  
 122 1 BURN, supra note 105, at 336 (1764 ed.).  Note that the material 
preceding “but” came from The Theory of Evidence, BATHURST, supra note 116, at 34, 
while the material following “but” came from Hawkins’s treatise, 2 HAWKINS, supra 
note 4, at 429 (1771 ed.).  The same passage is repeated in subsequent editions of 
Burn’s manual.  See, e.g., 1 id. at 516 (1785 ed.); 1 id. at 645 (1797 ed.). 
 123 See, e.g., GREENLEAF, supra note 110, at 118; GRIMKE, supra note 110, at 
184; LADD, supra note 110, at 131-32.  See Davies, supra note 2, at 182-86.  
 124 HODGE’S CONDUCTOR, supra note 110, at 168 (discussing the admissibility 
of Marian examinations of unavailable witnesses before very briefly touching on the 
admissibility of civil depositions); GAINE’S CONDUCTOR, supra note 110, at 137-38 
(same). 
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to inform the very officials who administered Marian 
examinations—that stated any in-the-presence or cross-
examination rule applicable to Marian witness examinations.  
Rather, the treatises and justice of the peace manuals 
contrasted the cross-examination standard for civil depositions 
to the absence of such a rule for Marian witness examinations. 
Nevertheless, Kry discounts the published framing-era 
authorities that almost certainly informed the American 
Framers’ understanding of Marian procedure.  Instead, he 
discusses English sources and practices that either could not 
have informed the Framers’ thinking, or were unlikely to have 
done so.  Let me turn to these sources and practices. 
C. Kry’s Pre-Framing Evidence for an In-the-Presence 
Practice 
Like Crawford, Kry relies heavily on reports of two 1696 
cases.  He also goes beyond Crawford by describing Marian 
practices in eighteenth-century London, and then invokes the 
same three English cases from 1787, 1789, and 1791 that 
Crawford heavily relied upon—that is, the three cases that 
were published too late to have come to the Framers’ attention.  
I continue to doubt that any of this sheds much light on the 
original American understanding of the Confrontation Clause. 
1. The 1696 Sources 
Both Crawford and Kry rely heavily upon statements in 
two 1696 proceedings, the misdemeanor libel trial in King v. 
Paine,125 and a single colloquy in the attainder proceeding for 
treason in Parliament in Fenwick’s Case.126  The first said 
nothing material, while the second was too obscure to have 
mattered. 
a. Paine 
Kry says that the 1696 ruling in Paine is “Professor 
Davies’ other line of authority.”127  That is an odd way to put it.  
Justice Scalia asserted in Crawford that Paine had created an 
  
 125 5 Mod. 163, 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (K.B. 1696), discussed in Crawford, 541 U.S. 
at 45-46. 
 126 13 How. St. Tr. 537 (H.C. 1696), discussed in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 45-46. 
 127 Kry, supra note 3, at 505. 
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across-the-board common-law cross-examination rule.128  I only 
responded, in criticizing that claim, that Justice Scalia had 
ignored the fundamental point that Marian procedure applied 
only to felony prosecutions, not to misdemeanor prosecutions.129  
Thus, the ruling in the misdemeanor trial in Paine was not 
about Marian witness examinations.  Instead, because all five 
of the reports of Paine explicitly indicated that the ruling in 
that case did not affect the admissibility of a Marian witness 
examination, and seemed to affirm the admissibility of Marian 
examinations of absent witnesses, I concluded that Paine could 
not have stated a general cross-examination rule.130  I also 
noted that the discussions of Paine that appeared in the 
framing-era treatises drew the same distinction between the 
deposition in that misdemeanor prosecution and Marian 
procedure in felonies.131  Hence, regardless of how one might 
tease out what Paine meant about the admissibility of non-
Marian depositions in misdemeanor cases, there is no reason to 
think that a framing-era American would have viewed Paine as 
an authority that had any bearing on the admissibility of a 
Marian witness examination in a felony trial. 
Indeed, as noted above, Gilbert (who was a 
contemporary of the Paine ruling132) actually contrasted the 
inadmissibility of the deposition in that misdemeanor case with 
the admissibility of Marian examinations in felony trials when 
he wrote: “[T]ho’ tis Evidence in Indictments for Felony in such 
case by Force of [the Marian statutes], yet ‘tis not so in 
Informations for Misdemeanors.”133  Kry concedes that the 
“more natural[]” reading of this passage is that cross-
examination was not a condition for admitting Marian 
depositions in felony trials,134 and that a similar interpretation 
  
 128 541 U.S. at 45, 46. 
 129 See Davies, supra note 2, at 135-43.  After reading Kry’s article, I wonder if 
I unnecessarily muddied the waters by speculating what Paine meant regarding the 
use of depositions in misdemeanor cases.  See id. at 137-40.  That really was beside the 
more basic point that Paine did not raise any doubt about the admissibility in a felony 
trial of a Marian witness examination of an unavailable witness.  See id. at 140-42 
(noting that all four versions of Paine that appear in the five reports indicated that the 
ruling against the admissibility of the deposition in the misdemeanor prosecution “had 
no effect on the rule that Marian [examinations] of unavailable witnesses were 
admissible in felony trials”).   
 130 Id. at 140-43.  See also supra note 40. 
 131 Davies, supra note 2, at 143-49. 
 132 Gilbert died in 1726.  BRIDGMAN, supra note 105, at 132. 
 133 See supra text accompanying note 113. 
 134 Kry, supra note 3, at 510-11. 
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of Paine is also evident in English decisions announced in 1739 
and 1790.135  It seems likely that framing-era Americans also 
understood the “more natural[]” reading of Gilbert’s statement. 
Nevertheless, Kry insists that Paine may have said 
something about Marian examinations.  Although he concedes 
that the case is “ambiguous on its face,” Kry places weight on a 
variety of post-framing constructions of the case in English 
commentaries published in 1814 and 1816136 and on statements 
about Paine in American state cases decided in 1835, 1842, and 
1844.137  On the basis of these post-framing constructions, he 
concludes that Crawford’s “interpretation [of Paine] cannot be 
dismissed as ‘fictional’ when that same interpretation was 
ultimately adopted as settled law.”138  I disagree. 
As I discuss below, legal historians have long recognized 
that commentators and judges frequently shoehorn old cases 
into new conceptions without admitting as much.139  Indeed, 
Kry effectively concedes that Paine could not have been 
understood to create a cross-examination rule for Marian 
felony examinations during the eighteenth century when he 
concludes that there was only an “emerging consensus” 
regarding an in-the-presence rule “by the time of the framing” 
while a cross-examination rule was still a matter “of dispute” 
and emerged only “at some [later] point.”140  Hence, Paine 
plainly was not regarded as having created a cross-examination 
rule for Marian examinations during the eighteenth century.  
Rather, that gloss was applied only after the 1789 framing. 
The fact that later nineteenth-century English 
commentators and American judges subsequently “widely read” 
Paine so that it fit then-prevailing conceptions141 simply does 
not constitute evidence that Paine would have been understood 
that way in framing-era America. Nineteenth-century judicial 
interpretations of earlier cases can be every bit as fictional as 
contemporary judicial interpretations of prior doctrines.  The 
  
 135 Id. at 511 n.78 (discussing King v. Westbeer, 1 Leach 12, 12, 168 Eng. Rep. 
108, 109 (K.B. 1789), and King v. Eriswell, 3 T.R. 707, 722-23, 100 Eng. Rep. 815, 823-
24 (K.B. 1790)). 
 136 Id. at 511. 
 137 Id. at 509. 
 138 Id. at 511 (emphasis added). 
 139 See infra text accompanying notes 309-10.  See also supra note 26 
(discussing unacknowledged judicial relaxation of arrest standard); infra notes 317-19 
and accompanying text (discussing unacknowledged judicial invention of hearsay 
exceptions). 
 140 See supra text accompanying notes 66-67. 
 141 Kry, supra note 3, at 511. 
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important fact is that framing-era authorities consistently 
described Paine as simply indicating that Marian witness 
examinations constituted a distinct form of evidence subject to 
distinct rules. 
b. Fenwick 
Like Justice Scalia in Crawford, Kry also asserts that a 
colloquy that occurred during the 1696 attainder proceeding for 
treason in Fenwick indicated that Marian depositions had to be 
taken in the presence of the party.142  However, the mere fact 
that a statement was made sometime prior to the framing does 
not mean that framing-era Americans would have been 
familiar with the statement.  One can safely assume that 
framing-era American lawyers and judges consulted the 
leading legal treatises and manuals.  Conversely, it seems 
doubtful that they would have been conversant with the details 
of English treason trials or attainder proceedings that were 
reported at length in the State Trials case reports.  Thus, I 
dismissed the Fenwick colloquy because it seemed improbable 
that the Framers would have been conversant with it.143 
Kry insists that I dismissed the Fenwick colloquy too 
quickly.  He asserts that “[s]everal colonial libraries had copies 
of the State Trials,” that modern “scholars have assumed the 
Framers were familiar with their contents,” and that both 
Blackstone and Hawkins “discussed and cited” Fenwick.144  
Really? 
Access to the State Trials set of reports, as well as to 
other specific sets of English case reports, was problematic in 
framing-era America.  Law libraries were still privately owned, 
not public.  Moreover, the State Trials set of reports was a 
multi-volume collection that grew from four volumes in 1719 to 
eleven in the fourth edition published over the period 1776-
  
 142 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 45-46; Kry, supra note 3, at 501. 
 143 Cf. Kenneth Graham, Confrontation Stories: Raleigh on the Mayflower, 3 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 209 (2005) (questioning the relevance of English treason trials to 
the American confrontation right).  The ready availability of Howell’s 1816 edition of 
State Trials, complete with a comprehensive subject index, in modern law libraries 
may lead contemporary academics, lawyers, and judges to place undue emphasis on the 
State Trials as evidence of original meaning.  For an early example of a false originalist 
claim based on Howell’s edition, see Davies, Fourth Amendment, supra note 20, at 726-
27 (discussing Justice Bradley’s mistaken reliance on a report in State Trials for a 
novel claim in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)). 
 144 Kry, supra note 3, at 502 (emphasis added). 
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1781.145  It was also an expensive set of reports.146  Hence, 
because it is unclear that reports of treason trials or attainder 
proceedings in Parliament would have been of much practical 
value for American lawyers or judges, especially after 1775, it 
seems doubtful that many Americans obtained these reports 
prior to the framing. 
Moreover, even if one had access to the set, finding 
material regarding a particular procedural point in the 
multiple volumes of the State Trials reports was no small feat 
because the indexes in the pre-framing editions were very 
limited.147  Reading these accounts was also no small 
undertaking; Fenwick’s attainder proceeding ran to ninety-six 
double-columned pages in the 1719 folio (large page) edition.148 
What about the references to Fenwick in Blackstone’s 
and Hawkins’s treatises that Kry refers to?  They did mention 
Fenwick by name—but not for the point that was germane to 
the claim made by Kry or in Crawford.  Because the English 
treason statutes required evidence of two witnesses for overt 
acts of treason, but the prosecutors could produce only one 
  
 145 See 1 MAXWELL, supra note 4, at 369 (indicating that State Trials consisted 
of four volumes in the 1719 first edition, six in 1730, eight in 1735, ten in 1766, and 
eleven in Hargrave’s edition published over the period 1776-1781).  No further edition 
was published until Howell’s edition, published 1809-1826.  Id. at 370. 
 146 See BRIDGMAN, supra note 105, at 312-13 (commenting that Hargrave 
undertook to republish the set in eleven volumes in 1776 because “this work ha[d] 
become very scarce, and s[old] at a high price”).  It may also be significant that 
Hargrave’s later edition was published during the years 1776-1781, the years of the 
Revolutionary War.  See supra note 145. 
 147 There were four eighteenth-century editions of State Trials (or Tryals); the 
first folio edition in 1719, a second edition in 1730, a third in 1742, and Francis 
Hargrave’s fourth edition in 1776-1781.  See 1 MAXWELL, supra note 4, at 369.  Each 
edition had an alphabetical topical index at the end of the final volume (none of the 
indexes had numbered pages).  However, the indexes were quite superficial.  In all of 
the editions, the entries for “Depositions” and “Examination” refer the reader to the 
entry for “Evidence.”  In the “Evidence” entry, each of the indexes had a subentry for 
“Depositions of a Person absent read in Evidence in a capital Case” and each also had a 
subentry for the specific point in Fenwick that “No Evidence to be given in capital 
Cases but in the Prisoner’s Presence,” identifying the page discussing the presentation 
of evidence at trial, as discussed infra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing 
Hawkins’s citation to page “277”).  However, none of the “Evidence” entries in the 
alphabetical tables had a subentry that led to the colloquy regarding the deposition of a 
witness having been taken in the absence of the defendant that Mr. Kry and Justice 
Scalia rely upon.  Thus, a framing-era reader would not have identified Fenwick as a 
case discussing that point by using the indexes. 
  It is easy to overlook these deficiencies when doing research today, because 
Howell’s nineteenth-century edition of State Trials that is now commonly found on law 
library shelves does have a useful comprehensive subject index in which the colloquy in 
Fenwick can be identified—but that is only a post-framing development. 
 148 See The Tryal of Sir John Fenwick, 4 St. Tr. (1719 ed.) 232, 232-328 (H.C. 
1696). 
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living witness against Fenwick, they could not prosecute him 
for treason in the law courts.  Instead, he was prosecuted in an 
attainder proceeding in Parliament, where the admission of 
evidence was decided by vote.  Fenwick was convicted on the 
basis of one live witness and one deposition of another person.  
Thus, Blackstone and Hawkins both discussed Fenwick simply 
as a departure from the two-witness treason standard—but 
neither discussed the point that the deposition in question was 
taken in Fenwick’s absence. 
Blackstone did not mention a deposition at all.  He 
wrote only that “in Sir John Fenwick’s case, in king William’s 
time, where there was but one witness, an act of parliament 
was made on purpose to attaint him of treason, and he was 
executed.”149  Hawkins also discussed Fenwick simply as a 
departure from the two-witness rule.  He mentioned that a 
deposition of a witness taken by a justice of the peace had been 
used as a substitute for a second live witness, but said nothing 
about whether the deposition was taken in the presence or 
absence of the prisoner.150  Thus, neither Blackstone’s nor 
Hawkins’s passage would have alerted a framing-era American 
that the requisites of valid Marian examinations were 
discussed in Fenwick.151  That said, however, I concede that Kry 
  
 149 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, at 351 (1st ed. 1769). 
 150 Hawkins wrote: 
[I]t was agreed in Sir John Fenwick’s Case, that the Information of a Witness 
taken upon Oath before a Justice of Peace, being joined with the Evidence of 
one other Witness only viva voce, could not in the ordinary Course of Justice, 
amount to sufficient Evidence within the [treason statute] which requires two 
Witnesses in High Treason; and therefore it was thought necessary to proceed 
in that Case by Bill of Attainder in Parliament, whose Power can be 
restrained by no Rules but those of natural Justice. 
2 HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 430 (1771 ed.) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); 2 
LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 606 (1787 ed.) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 151 Like Blackstone and Hawkins, Capel Lofft also did not mention that 
Fenwick was absent when the deposition was taken when Lofft added a discussion of 
Fenwick to Gilbert’s evidence treatise in 1791.  2 GILBERT, supra note 15, at 895-97 
(Capel Lofft ed., 1791) (discussing evidence in attainder proceedings in Parliament).  
Lofft commented that the admission of a deposition of an “absent Witness” as evidence 
during Fenwick’s attainder trial in Parliament deprived Fenwick of meeting the 
witness “face to face” and of “cross-examining” the witness.  However, he did not 
mention Fenwick’s absence when the deposition was taken.  Id. at 897. 
  Thus, the important point about Dean Wigmore’s claim, which Justice 
Scalia quoted in Crawford, that Fenwick “‘must have burned into the general 
consciousness the vital importance of the rule securing the right of cross-examination,’” 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46 (quoting 3 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1364 (2d ed. 
1923)), is that the salient abuse associated with Fenwick in the accounts by Blackstone, 
Hawkins, and Lofft was the admission of a deposition of a witness who was merely 
absent from a trial rather than dead, and the associated loss of Fenwick’s opportunity 
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does identify a citation to Fenwick in Hawkins’s treatise that I 
overlooked, and it bears closer attention. 
c. Hawkins’s Margin Citation to “4 State 
Trials . . . 310” 
At the outset of Hawkins’s chapter on evidence in 
criminal cases, he wrote: “As to the nature of evidence, so far as 
it more particularly concerns criminal cases, having premised 
that it is a settled rule, That in cases of life no evidence is to be 
given against a prisoner but in his presence . . . .”152  When I 
read this passage, I assumed it referred simply to the 
“evidence” admitted at a felony trial.  I assumed this because 
framing-era sources typically used the term “evidence” to refer 
to the proof offered at trial; hence, Marian witness 
examinations were not usually denoted as “evidence” unless 
they were admitted at trial.  I did not notice that a citation in 
the margin next to the quoted passage (the eighteenth-century 
equivalent of a footnote) to “State Trials vol. 4 f. 277. 310” was 
a citation to Fenwick.153  
The statements on page 277 do relate to presenting 
evidence in the prisoner’s presence at trial.154  However, page 
310 includes an argument that a witness’s deposition should 
have been taken in the prisoner’s presence.  Specifically, there 
is an argument against the validity of “a Deposition of a Person 
that was absent [from trial], taken before a Justice of the 
Peace, when the Person accused, had no opportunity to 
interrogate him.”155  This argument was not successful; the 
  
to cross-examine the witnesses against him during Fenwick’s attainder trial itself.  In 
contrast, none of those accounts mentioned Fenwick’s absence when the deposition at 
issue was taken.   
 152 2 HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 428 (1771 ed.); 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra 
note 4, at 602 (1787 ed.) (citation omitted).  Of course, this passage presents serious 
problems for Justice Scalia’s other originalist claim in Crawford to the effect that the 
Framers would not have objected to the admission in criminal trials of unsworn out-of-
court statements involving “nontestimonial hearsay.”  See Davies, Not the Framers’ 
Design, supra note 17. 
 153 2 HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 428 n.(a) (1721 ed.), cited in Kry, supra note 3, 
at 502 n.38.  Hawkins’s margin citation did not refer to Fenwick by name.  
 154 The Tryal of Sir John Fenwick, 4 St. Tr. (1719 ed.) 232, 277 (H.C. 1696) 
(referring to the “Evidence” that was introduced when a man was “upon Tryal for his 
Life”). 
 155 Sir Christopher Musgrave, speaking on Fenwick’s behalf during the 
attainder proceeding in the House of Commons, argued as follows: 
It now will appear upon your Journals that you have caused to be read, a 
Deposition of a Person that was absent, taken before a Justice of Peace, when 
the Person accused, had no opportunity to interrogate him; and likewise that 
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House of Commons voted to admit the deposition, and also 
voted to condemn Fenwick.156 
What is the significance of Hawkins’s margin citation to 
page 310?  The cited passage in Fenwick does not refer to 
Marian authority as such.157  Moreover, it seems unlikely that 
Hawkins meant to indicate that it was settled law that Marian 
witness examinations had to be conducted in the presence of 
the prisoner, because Hawkins had not mentioned any such 
requirement in the earlier sections of his treatise that had 
discussed Marian procedure itself.158  Hence, it seems doubtful 
that the margin citation to page 310 in the report of Fenwick 
was meant to indicate that Marian witness examinations had 
to be taken in the presence of the arrestee. 
Additionally, whatever Hawkins intended, there are 
reasons to discount the likelihood that Americans would have 
noticed the margin citation to Fenwick.  For one thing, 
assessing the meaning of the margin citation was problematic 
insofar as it required access to the 1719 folio edition of State 
Trials reports—the page cite does not work for the later 
  
you have heard a Witness as to what a Man swore in the Tryal of another 
Man:  All this will appear upon your Books. 
And truly, I would be glad to know if another Age may not be apt to think 
that you took these to make good the Defect of another Witness; and then I 
must appeal to you, if you have not admitted of a Testimony, which according 
to no Law is admitted. 
They say you are not tied to the Rules of Westminster-Hall [the common-law 
courts], nor their Forms: Is there any Law in Being, that says a Judge may 
hear a Witness as to what was sworn upon the Tryal of another Person, to 
condemn him that was not Party to that Tryal.  If there be no such Law, then 
the Rule is founded upon Justice and common Right, that nothing shall be 
brought against a Man when a Man was not a Party when the Oath was 
made, and he had no Opportunity to examine him. 
Id. at 310.  Note that Justice Scalia did not cite this passage in Crawford; rather, he 
cited a colloquy that Hawkins did not cite.  541 U.S. at 45-46. 
 156 Fenwick, 4 St. Tr. at 310, 327. 
 157 Hawkins discussed the admission of depositions in treason cases in a 
subsequent section to his discussion of the admissibility of Marian witness 
examinations.  That latter section does not mention the Marian statutes (which did not 
apply to treason as such).  The passage on depositions focused on the inadmissibility of 
depositions of available witnesses who could have been produced in person.  See 2 
HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 429-30 (1771 ed.) (Sections 6 and 9); 2 LEACH’S HAWKINS, 
supra note 4, at 605 (1787 ed.) (same). 
 158 Hawkins’s “premise[]” appeared in volume 2, chapter 46, 2 HAWKINS, supra 
note 4, at 428 (1771 ed.), but his discussions of Marian coroners’ examinations, bail 
procedure, and committal procedure were in volume 2, chapters 9, 15, and 16, id. at 49, 
104-05, 118-19.  See also supra note 99 and accompanying text.  Hence, there was no 
indication in Hawkins’s treatise itself that the in-the-presence premise applied to 
Marian procedure. 
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editions.  In fact, unless one has access to the 1719 edition, one 
cannot even identify the citation as one to Fenwick (Hawkins 
cited only the pages, not the case name).  Perhaps because of 
the limited usefulness of Hawkins’s citation, the framing-era 
justice of the peace manuals did not repeat Hawkins’s page 
cites to Fenwick. 
Burn’s leading English justice of the peace manual 
repeated Hawkins’s “premise[]” that evidence be taken in the 
presence of the prisoner, but not in either of the entries that 
discussed Marian examinations.  Rather, Burn quoted that 
passage only in a later part of his entry on “Evidence” under 
the heading “Of the manner of giving evidence” which related to 
testimony at trial, and he omitted Hawkins’s margin citation to 
Fenwick.159 
Framing-era American justice of the peace manuals 
followed Burn’s presentation of Hawkins’s in-the-presence 
premise—they also quoted Hawkins’s passage in the discussion 
of trial testimony without the margin citation to Fenwick.160  
Hence, it seems unlikely that Hawkins’s margin citation would 
have alerted American readers to the colloquy in Fenwick that 
was cited in Crawford. 
In sum, it does not appear that either Paine or Fenwick 
would have led framing-era Americans to think that Marian 
procedure involved either an in-the-presence or cross-
examination rule.  What about English practice? 
2. Eighteenth-Century English Practice 
After discussing the 1696 sources, Kry turns to English 
Marian practice during the eighteenth century.  Although the 
English historian James Fitzjames Stephen previously 
reported that the prisoner was not present during Marian 
witness examinations,161 and Justice Scalia endorsed that 
  
 159 1 BURN, supra note 105, at 293-94 (1755 ed.) (quoting Hawkins’s passage 
but citing only “2 Haw. 248”); 1 id. at 533 (1785 ed.) (same); 1 id. at 668 (1797 ed.) 
(same). 
 160 See, e.g., GREENLEAF, supra note 110, at 128 (quoting Hawkins’s text but 
citing only “2 Haw. 428.”); GRIMKE, supra note 110, at 197 (same); HODGE’S 
CONDUCTOR, supra note 110, at 174 (same); GAINE’S CONDUCTOR, supra note 110, at 
144 (same); LADD, supra note 110, at 154 (same). 
 161 1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF 
ENGLAND 221 (London, MacMillan 1883) (“The prisoner had no right to be, and 
probably never was, present [at a Marian witness examination].”).  I mentioned 
Stephen’s assertion in my 2005 article but pointed out that he had presented no 
evidence to support it.  See Davies, supra note 2, at 170. 
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account prior to Crawford,162 Kry indicates that Stephen’s 
account was erroneous.163  He reports that recent historical 
research, especially that by Professor John Beattie, has 
disclosed that during the eighteenth century, prisoners were 
routinely present for Marian examinations in London.164  Kry 
first argues that Marian witness examinations were routinely 
taken in the presence of the arrestee.165  He reports that “more 
than 80%” of a small sample of twenty-seven London Marian 
witness examinations from 1789 clearly reveal that the 
arrestee was present, and Kry interprets this to mean that the 
presence of the arrestee was a “near-universal” feature of 
London Marian procedure166 (though Kry concedes that these 
Marian examinations “provide little evidence of cross-
examination”167). 
I do not intend to quarrel with Kry’s general description 
of the evolution of English Marian practice, which seems 
plausible.  Rather, I identify three objections to treating Kry’s 
description of English practice as though it were evidence of 
the original American understanding of the confrontation right: 
First, a routine practice is hardly the same as a legal rule, 
requirement, or right, and Kry does not establish that the 
routine practice became a legal rule or right even in England 
prior to the framing of the Confrontation Clause in 1789.  
Second, there is no basis to assume that English Marian 
practice—indeed, London practice—provides a window on 
American Marian practice.  And third, Kry does not provide a 
plausible explanation as to how framing-era Americans would 
have been aware of English Marian practice in the absence of 
published accounts of that practice. 
The important question regarding original meaning is 
not what English Marian practice was, but how framing-era 
Americans understood Marian procedure.  The work of 
contemporary historians of English criminal justice is certainly 
  
 162 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 361 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“‘The prisoner had no right to be, and probably never was, present’ [at a Marian 
witness examination].” (quoting 1 STEPHEN, supra note 161, at 221)).  Justice Scalia 
joined Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion.  Id. at 358.  Stephen’s claim is not repeated 
in Crawford.  However, neither is there a statement in Crawford that earlier reliance 
on that claim was misplaced. 
 163 See Kry, supra note 3, at 516. 
 164 Id. at 516 n.93, 527-28, 531. 
 165 Id. at 512-16. 
 166 Id. at 514-16. 
 167 Id. at 535. 
604 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2 
interesting in its own right, but it does not illuminate the 
original American understanding of the confrontation right. 
3. “Routine” Practices Do Not Constitute Legal Rules 
Although Kry at one point asserts that the prisoner 
would “necessarily” be present for Marian witness 
examinations,168 he usually describes English practice in terms 
of what was “routinely” or “almost invariably” done.169  For 
example, he states that “Marian examinations [in England] 
were routinely conducted in the prisoner’s presence[,] . . . [and] 
by the framing, there was an emerging consensus that presence 
was also a procedural right.”170  However, “routinely” and 
“emerging consensus” do not connote a settled legal rule, 
requirement, or right.171  Kry labels the practice he describes as 
a “procedural right,” but that is merely his own label; he does 
not identify any authoritative statement of such a “right” even 
in English law prior to 1789. 
It may well be that the arrestee was often present, 
especially in London, when Marian witness examinations were 
taken.  That practice, in turn, may have spawned an issue as to 
whether an arrestee should have a right to be present at such 
examinations.  However, the only reference to the prisoner’s 
presence at Marian examinations that I have located in any 
English publication that Americans could have been aware of 
at the time of the framing merely posed a query as to whether a 
Marian examination should be admissible if the defendant was 
not present when it was taken.172  That query would seem to 
  
 168 Id. at 523. 
 169 See, e.g., Kry, supra note 3, at 495 (defendant “routinely present”); id. at 
516 (defendant “almost invariably present” in London Marian procedure). 
 170 Id. at 512 (emphasis added). 
 171 Although Kry indicates that the arrestee initially had no right to be 
present for the Marian examinations of witnesses, id. at 516 n.93, he quotes modern 
studies of English criminal procedure to the effect that presence and a cross-
examination requirement were accepted “in its most general terms” in London “by 1790 
or soon thereafter” or by “the end of the eighteenth century.”  Id. at 542 n.225.  
However, the significant point for the present inquiry is that none of those studies 
assert any legal rules to those effects by 1789. 
 172 See 4 THOMAS WOOD, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 671 (9th ed. 
1763) (stating, regarding Marian witness examinations, “that they may be read [if it is 
proved the witness is dead, or unable to travel, or kept away by the Prisoner]; but Qu. 
If the Defendant must not be present at the Time they are taken in order to make them 
good Evidence.” (“Qu.” being an abbreviation of “Quare” or “Query”)).  The 
“Advertisement” in the material at the front of this edition indicates that it was revised 
by “an eminent Barrister.”  No query appeared in the previous edition.  See 4 id. at 
676-77 (8th ed. 1754).  The query was repeated without change in the tenth edition 
 
2007] REVISITING FICTIONAL ORIGINALISM 605 
confirm that there was no recognized in-the-presence “rule.”  It 
would also seem to confirm that neither of the 1696 rulings in 
Paine or Fenwick had created any such “rule.” 
Indeed, there is a glaringly large gap in the English 
legal authorities that Kry construes as evidence of an in-the-
presence rule.  Kry does not cite any such authority after the 
two 1696 sources discussed above until the 1787 ruling in King 
v. Radbourne,173 the earliest of the three cases that Justice 
Scalia relied heavily upon in Crawford.174  That gap strongly 
suggests that no in-the-presence rule or right was recognized in 
English Marian procedure during the eighteenth century.  
Moreover, it is not that clear what Radbourne stands for. 
a. The 1787 Ruling in Radbourne 
In the 1787 Radbourne case, a justice of the peace’s 
examination of a murder victim prior to her death was 
admitted in a trial in the Old Bailey, notwithstanding that it 
did not constitute a dying declaration, and notwithstanding 
that it was not taken in connection with Radbourne’s arrest.175  
The Twelve Judges then upheld that ruling.  Radbourne was 
present for something in connection with the victim’s 
examination, but exactly what she was present for is uncertain 
because there are two different versions of the case report.176 
  
(described in the “Advertisement” as having been revised by “a Serjeant at Law”).  See 
4 id. at 642 (10th ed. 1772).  However, that was the last edition published.  See 1 
MAXWELL, supra note 4, at 38. 
  Some of the relevant editions of Wood’s Institutes were imported by 
Americans, though apparently not in large numbers.  A search of the online catalogs of 
public libraries in the United States reveals twenty-five copies of the 1763 edition and 
nineteen of the 1772 edition.  I am indebted to my colleague Professor Sibyl Marshall 
for this information. 
 173 The description of the evidentiary issue in Radbourne varies depending on 
which edition of Leach’s reports is consulted, as discussed in the text infra Part 
IV.C.3.a. 
 174 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46-47 (citing King v. Radbourne, 1 Leach (4th ed. 
1815) 457, 459-61, 168 Eng. Rep. 330, 331-32 (Old Bailey 1787)). 
 175 The victim’s examination in Radbourne was not a dying declaration 
because, at the time, the victim did not appreciate that she was dying.  Additionally, 
the examination does not appear to have been taken in connection with Radbourne’s 
arrest or committal.  The initial report lends that impression because it mentions that 
the victim’s examination was taken during the interval of several weeks that she 
lingered after the attack.  Radbourne, Leach (1st ed. 1789) 399, 400 (Old Bailey and 
Twelve Judges 1787) [the first page is misnumbered “993”].  (According to the later 
1800 version, the crime was committed on May 31st, but the examination was taken on 
June 9th.  Radbourne, Leach (4th ed. 1815) at 459, 168 Eng. Rep. at 331.) 
 176 Like everyone else, when I wrote my 2005 article on Crawford, I 
erroneously assumed that the reports of Radbourne in the various editions of Leach 
would be the same.  However, Professor Robert Mosteller subsequently called my 
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A short report of Radbourne was initially published in 
the first edition of Thomas Leach’s Cases in Crown Law in 
1789177 (though too late to have come to the American Framers’ 
attention178).  That version was reprinted, with only a small 
change, in Leach’s 1792 second edition.179  However, the 
Radbourne report was substantially enlarged and altered in 
Leach’s 1800 third edition.180  This later version was then 
reprinted in Leach’s 1815 fourth edition, which is now 
reprinted in the English Reports.181  Thus, the version of 
Radbourne cited in Crawford was not actually published until 
1800.182 
There are several significant differences between the 
initial report and the 1800 version.  One difference is that the 
1789 report never mentioned the Marian statutes, but the 1800 
version did.183  Hence, it is not altogether clear that Radbourne 
addressed a Marian witness examination at all, particularly 
because the examination in Radbourne does not seem to have 
  
attention to differing versions of another case in the various editions of Leach.  Thus, I 
examined the Radbourne case report in the first edition of Leach’s reports and 
discovered the difference.  I also found the enlarged version in the 1800 third edition.  
However, I could not locate a copy of the second edition.  When I brought the 
differences to Mr. Kry’s attention, he succeeded in locating a copy of the second edition, 
and I am indebted to him for a copy of the relevant pages from the second edition. 
 177 Radbourne, Leach (1st ed. 1789) at 399. 
 178 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text. 
 179 Radbourne, Leach (2d ed. 1792) 363 (Old Bailey and Twelve Judges 1787).  
The report in the second edition is the same as the first, except that the phrase “to [the 
victim] in the presence and hearing of the prisoner” was italicized in the second edition.  
Id. at 363. 
 180 Radbourne, 2 Leach (3d ed. 1800) 512 (Old Bailey and Twelve Judges 
1787). 
 181 Radbourne, 1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) 457, 168 Eng. Rep. 330 (Old Bailey and 
Twelve Judges 1787). 
 182 See supra note 13. 
 183 The 1800 version, reprinted in Leach’s 1815 edition and in the English 
Reports, does quote the prosecutor William Garrow as saying that the victim’s 
statement “was admissible as an information taken by a regular magistrate, under the 
statutes of Philip & Mary; for it had been given in the presence and hearing of the 
prisoner, upon an oath lawfully administered.”  Radbourne, 2 Leach (3d ed. 1800) at 
518, 168 Eng. Rep. at 332. 
  In contrast, there is no mention of the Marian statutes in the initial report 
of the case, which does not quote Garrow at all.  See Radbourne, Leach (1st ed. 1789) 
399 (Old Bailey 1787).  Moreover, the absence of any mention of the Marian statutes in 
the first edition of Leach corresponds to the account of Garrow’s statement about the 
examination in the Proceedings of the Old Bailey account of Radbourne, in which he 
makes no mention of the Marian statutes, but seems to suggest that the victim’s 
examination should be admissible because Radbourne’s failure to object to it when she 
heard it was proof of her guilt.  See Trial of Henrietta Radbourne (Old Bailey July 
1787), The Proceedings of the Old Bailey, Ref: t17870711-1, 
http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/ html_units/1780s/t17870711-1.html. 
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been taken in the post-arrest window for Marian procedure 
defined in the 1789 and 1791 cases.184  Radbourne’s relevance to 
Marian procedure is also clouded because the defendant was 
charged with petty treason as well as murder, and the treason 
statutes, unlike the Marian statutes, explicitly required that 
all evidence be taken in the presence of the prisoner.185 
A second difference between the reports relates to 
exactly what happened.  The 1800 version that Justice Scalia 
cited states that two magistrates “in the presence of the 
prisoner, took down [the victim’s] deposition,” and “[t]he whole 
of this examination . . . was heard by the prisoner,” and 
“distinctly read over to her.”186  Likewise, Kry cites the 1800 
version when he writes that the examination “was taken” in the 
presence of the prisoner.187 
However the initial report published in 1789 indicated 
only that “[the victim] gave an information upon oath, before a 
Justice of the Peace, which was read deliberately over to her in 
the presence and hearing of the prisoner, then signed by her, 
and authenticated by the magistrate.”188  The prosecuting 
attorney is quoted even in the later version as saying only that 
the examination was “given” in the prisoner’s presence,189 a 
  
 184 See infra note 197.  There is a possibility that Thomas Leach may have 
purposely added the reference to the Marian statutes in the 1800 version as part of a 
campaign for a cross-examination rule.  See infra note 191. 
 185 The defendant servant was charged with petty treason because the victim 
was her mistress, and petty treason, as a form of treason, would have been subject to 
the explicit requirement in the treason statutes, unlike the Marian statutes, that all 
evidence be taken in the presence of the prisoner.  See Davies, supra note 2, at 165.  
 186 Radbourne, 2 Leach (3d ed. 1800) at 516; 1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) at 459, 168 
Eng. Rep. at 331-32 (emphasis added). 
 187 Kry, supra note 3, at 517 & n.101. 
 188 Radbourne, Leach (1st ed. 1789) at 400 (emphasis added).  The relevant 
passage in the 1789 version read as follows: 
The deceased survived for several weeks the blows and wounds which were 
the cause of her death.  During this interval, and before she was 
apprehensive of, or, from the evidence of the surgeon who attended her, had 
any reason to apprehend her approaching dissolution, she gave an 
information upon oath, before a Justice of the Peace, which was read 
deliberately over to her in the presence and hearing of the prisoner, then 
signed by her, and authenticated by the magistrate; and he was the only 
subscribing witness to it.  This information, being regularly proved, was 
admitted in evidence against the prisoner [at trial] . . . . 
Id. 
 189 1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) at 461, 168 Eng. Rep. at 332.   
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somewhat ambiguous verb that also appears in the account in 
the Proceedings of the Old Bailey.190 
Although saying that an examination was “taken” in the 
prisoner’s presence might imply some room for prisoner 
participation, merely “reading” the already written-out record 
of a witness examination in the presence of a defendant would 
not.  Whichever version is more accurate (which is not clear191), 
the emphasis in both is on the defendant’s having “heard” the 
examination; neither version indicates that Radbourne, the 
defendant, was allowed an active role in the victim’s 
examination.192  Thus, whatever Radbourne stood for, it did not 
involve cross-examination.  There is also more than a little 
  
 190 Trial of Henrietta Radbourne (Old Bailey July 1787), The Proceedings of 
the Old Bailey, Ref: t17870711-1, http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/html_units/1780s/ 
t17870711-1.html.  The report of Radbourne in the Proceedings of the Old Bailey 
quotes prosecuting barrister William Garrow as stating that the victim’s examination 
“was given in the presence of the prisoner; she heard it, she saw it sworn to, she saw 
the deceased subscribe to it; and she heard her solemnly call God to witness, that it 
was true,” and further, that the defendant revealed her guilt because she “did not 
object to it when [she] heard it.”  Id.  Garrow’s verb “was given” is ambiguous because 
it could refer either to the taking or reading of the examination.  James Crofts, the 
magistrate who administered the examination of the victim, said “the prisoner was 
there at the time, and heard the whole of this account, it was afterwards distinctly read 
over to the prisoner in the presence of [the victim], it was signed by [the victim].”  Id. 
 191 Some of the changes between the initial report of Radbourne and the 1800 
version suggest the possibility that Thomas Leach, who was not an official reporter, 
may have been creatively campaigning for a cross-examination rule.  For example, the 
initial report used the more traditional term “examination” when referring to the 
victim’s statement, while the 1800 version used the term “deposition,” which carried 
the baggage that Marian examinations were not really sui generis.  See supra note 80.  
Likewise, it is curious that the change from “read” to “taken down” was not made 
promptly in the 1792 second edition.  Instead, Leach italicized the phrase “in the 
presence and hearing of the prisoner” in that edition.  Radbourne, Leach (2d ed. 1792) 
at 363.  Why did he add that emphasis?  (One possibility is that it was a reaction to 
Justice Buller’s 1790 comments in Eriswell, discussed infra text accompanying notes 
223-27.)  In addition, as discussed supra note 183, there was no mention of the Marian 
statutes in the 1789 report of Radbourne, and there is also none in the account in the 
Proceedings in the Old Bailey. 
  It may also be significant that Thomas Leach’s 1795 edition of Hawkins’s 
treatise was the first commentary to assert that a Marian deposition of a deceased 
witness was inadmissible unless it had been taken in the presence of the prisoner and 
the prisoner had an opportunity to cross-examine.  See 4 LEACH’S HAWKINS, supra note 
4, at 423 (1795 ed.) (basing a new section on Woodcock and Dingler, but not mentioning 
Radbourne).  As Kry indicates, no other commentary seems to have mentioned “cross-
examination” until 1816.  See Kry, supra note 3, at 495 n.11.  Leach seems to have been 
a bit ahead of his time. 
 192 Justice Buller, who participated in the Twelve Judges’ review of 
Radbourne, later made comments about Radbourne that seem to comport with the 
examination only having being read in the prisoner’s presence.  See infra text 
accompanying note 223. 
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uncertainty as to what the later 1789 case that Kry discusses 
(and on which Crawford also heavily relied193) stood for. 
b. The 1789 Ruling in Woodcock 
The 1789 Old Bailey ruling in King v. Woodcock194 
refused to admit the examination of a murder victim because 
the examination was not taken in connection with the 
defendant’s arrest.  Unfortunately, the report never says 
whether the defendant was arrested and committed before or 
after the examination.195   The trial judge, Chief Baron Eyre 
(the chief judge of the Court of Exchequer), stated that the 
examination was not “of the nature” of a Marian examination 
because “[i]t was not taken, as the statute directs, in a case 
where the prisoner was brought before [the justice of the peace] 
in custody; the prisoner therefore had no opportunity of 
contradicting the facts it contains.”  He went on to state that 
the examination was not taken in the discharge of a justice of 
the peace’s duty “by which he is, on hearing the witnesses, to 
bail or commit the prisoner; but it was a voluntary and 
extrajudicial act”—that is it was not within Marian authority.  
Thus, because the victim’s examination was taken in 
“circumstances where the Justice was not authorized to 
administer an oath,” Eyre ruled that the examination “cannot 
  
 193 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46-47, 54 n.5. 
 194 Leach (1st ed. 1789) 437; 1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) 500, 168 Eng. Rep. 352 
(Old Bailey 1789).  Unlike Radbourne, the version of the report of the 1789 ruling in 
Woodcock that now appears in the English Reports is essentially unchanged from that 
in Leach’s first and second editions, except for the addition of a final sentence 
pertaining to the judge’s leaving to the jury the question of whether the deceased 
victim’s statement constituted a dying declaration.  See Woodcock, 1 Leach (4th ed. 
1815) at 504, 168 Eng. Rep. at 354. 
  However, there is other evidence that Leach apparently misunderstood the 
ruling in Woodcock when he published his first edition of Cases in Crown Law in 1789.  
The initial report of Radbourne in that volume contained a marginal note to Woodcock 
that erroneously indicated that the statement had been admitted in evidence even 
though it was not a dying declaration.  Radbourne, Leach (1st ed. 1789) 399, 400 n.(a) 
(Old Bailey and Twelve Judges 1787).  Actually, the jury’s conviction of the defendant 
indicates that they must have decided the victim’s statement was a dying declaration, 
and the text of the Leach’s original note was deleted in the 1792 second edition report 
of Radbourne.  I am indebted to Mr. Kry for a copy of the 1792 report. 
 195 The justice went to the local poorhouse to take the victim’s examination.  
The case report does not state when the defendant (her husband) was arrested in 
relation to the victim’s examination, or whether her allegations were known when the 
defendant’s own examination was recorded. 
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be admitted before a Jury as evidence; for no evidence can be 
legal unless it be given upon oath, judicially taken.”196 
The thrust of Eyre’s statement seems to be that an 
examination of a deceased witness could be admissible under 
Marian authority only if it were taken in connection with the 
defendant’s arrest and committal.  Indeed, the logic he 
expressed would seem to indicate that the victim’s examination 
would have been inadmissible as being outside Marian 
authority even if the prisoner had been present.  (However, it is 
difficult to square Eyre’s logic with the admission of the victim 
examination in Radbourne—that is, assuming the latter had 
involved Marian authority.197) 
It may also be significant that Eyre referred only to the 
prisoner’s loss of an opportunity to “contradict,” rather than to 
a loss of an opportunity to cross-examine.198  Eyre’s use of 
“contradict” suggests that his concern was that the defendant 
lost the opportunity to have his response to the victim’s 
allegation recorded for use at trial, rather than any opportunity 
for the defendant to cross-examine or otherwise participate in 
the victim’s examination.199 
Marian procedure did not call only for the justice of the 
peace to record the witness’s sworn information; in addition, 
the justice of the peace was required to record the 
“examination” of the prisoner as well.  Unlike the witness 
examinations, the written record of the prisoner’s examination 
  
 196 Leach (1st ed. 1789) at 440, 1 Leach (4th ed. 1815) 457, 502, 168 Eng. Rep. 
330, 353 (Old Bailey 1787). 
 197 The victim’s examination that was admitted in Radbourne does not seem 
to have been taken in connection with Radbourne’s arrest; hence, it does not seem to fit 
Woodcock’s definition of the scope of Marian authority.  That calls into question 
whether Radbourne was actually understood to involve admission of a Marian 
examination.  See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text. 
  Note, too, that there is also a tension between Woodcock and the “material 
witness warrants” that were still appearing in the discussion of Marian procedure in 
Burn’s justice of the peace manual, discussed supra notes 108-10 and accompanying 
text.  Those warrants seemed to imply a wider window for the exercise of Marian 
examination authority.  These tensions suggest to me that Marian procedure was 
unsettled and undergoing change in England in 1789, not that it was settled as Kry 
suggests.   
 198 I previously discussed the judge’s use of the term “contradict” rather than 
“cross-examine.”  See Davies, supra note 2, at 167 n.196. 
 199 Professor Langbein has described Woodcock as the first “judicial mention” 
of the loss of cross-examination as a ground for excluding hearsay statements, but he 
refers to a general statement of the reasons why hearsay statements were excluded 
from evidence, not to Eyre’s specific reference to the defendant’s loss of an opportunity 
to “contradict.”  JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 238 
(2003).  I fear I previously misstated his view of Woodcock.  See Davies, supra note 2, at 
167 n.196.  
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was always admissible evidence in his trial and was routinely 
read to the jury.200  Hence, if the defendant failed to deny 
factual accusations at the time of his arrest—that is, failed to 
“contradict” them—the record of his examination could 
undercut the credibility of any denial he made for the first time 
later at trial, by which time he had had more time to arrange a 
story.201  For example, according to the report of Radbourne in 
the Proceedings of the Old Bailey, the prosecutor Garrow 
argued that Radbourne’s guilt was shown by the fact that she 
did not object when she heard the victim’s accusations, and 
thus did not behave like an innocent person would have 
behaved.202 
Thus, when Eyre referred to the loss of the defendant’s 
opportunity to “contradict” allegations, he may have meant 
that the victim’s statement had been taken after the 
defendant’s post-arrest examination had already been taken 
and recorded, so the defendant had no opportunity to have his 
contemporaneous denial of the victim’s allegations recorded for 
possible use later in his defense at trial.203  If that is what Eyre 
meant, his statement would not necessarily imply that the 
prisoner should have been present for the victim’s examination.  
Although the prisoner could have learned of the victim’s 
allegations by hearing the witness examination in person, the 
justice of the peace could also have informed the prisoner of the 
allegations when he took the prisoner’s examination 
separately—provided the victim’s examination had been taken 
before the prisoner’s.204 
  
 200 See, e.g., 2 HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 429, 431 (1771 ed.); 2 LEACH’S 
HAWKINS, supra note 4, at 603-04, 606-07 (1787 ed.). 
 201 See supra note 190. 
 202 The importance attached to an arrestee’s immediate denial of a charge is 
also evident in contemporary English procedure.  See, e.g., Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60 (Eng.) (directing English police to caution suspects at the 
start of an interrogation that “[i]t may harm your defense if you do not mention when 
questioned something which you later rely on in court”). 
 203 The fact that the Dingler ruling was based on Woodcock suggests that the 
scenario in Woodcock also involved a situation in which the victim’s examination was 
conducted after the defendant had already been arrested and committed.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 212-13. 
 204 Kry suggests that the defendant in Woodcock  
was not literally denied an opportunity to “contradict” the witness; he could 
have given a contradictory account at trial after the deposition was read.  
Implicit in the court’s holding is that the defendant was denied an 
opportunity to contradict the witness at a time when the witness could be 
required to respond to the contradictions—which is, in substance, an 
opportunity to cross-examine. 
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Thus, it is not clear that Eyre was actually referring to 
any departure from an in-the-presence Marian practice when 
he referred only to the loss of the defendant’s opportunity to 
“contradict.”205  As with Radbourne, we can only guess at 
critical aspects of Woodcock. 
c. The 1791 Ruling in Dingler 
The 1791 Old Bailey ruling in King v. Dingler,206 which 
Crawford and Kry both invoke as evidence,207 now turns out to 
be even more distant from the American framing than I 
suggested in my 2005 article.  Because I could not locate a copy 
of Leach’s 1792 second edition, in that article I assumed that 
Dingler would have been included in that edition, and simply 
noted that it could not have been published prior to even the 
ratification of the Sixth Amendment in 1791.208  However, Mr. 
Kry located a copy of the second edition and discovered that 
Dingler was not included in it.209  Instead, Dingler was never 
reported until Leach’s third edition in 1800.210    
The delay in the publication of Dingler is significant 
because Dingler is the only one of the three cases cited by 
Justice Scalia in Crawford that actually mentions “cross-
examin[ation].”  Even there, that term appeared only in an 
argument by the defense counsel,211 not in a statement by the 
court.   
  
Kry, supra note 3, at 532. 
  The response to his first point is that a denial at trial would not be as 
credible as a contemporaneous denial.  See supra note 190.  Kry’s claim as to what is 
“implicit” in the court’s holding ignores the various ways that a defendant could 
“contradict” allegations. 
 205 The interpretation I offer of Eyre’s comments would also explain why 
Justice Ashhurst, who was also on the bench during Woodcock, did not object to a later 
statement made by Justice Buller to the effect that there was no in-the-presence 
requirement for Marian examinations.  See infra text accompanying notes 229-30. 
 206 2 Leach (4th ed. 1815) 561, 168 Eng. Rep. 383 (Old Bailey 1791). 
 207 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 46, 54 n.5; Kry, supra note 3, at 519-23. 
 208 Davies, supra note 2, at 157 n.164. 
 209 See Kry, supra note 3, at 519 n.107. 
 210 Dingler, 2 Leach (3d ed. 1800) 638 (Old Bailey 1791).  However, Leach did 
mention the still-unreported decision in Dingler in a passage he added in his 1795 
edition of Hawkins’s treatise.  See supra note 191. 
 211 See Dingler, 2 Leach (4th ed. 1815) at 562, 168 Eng. Rep. at 383-84 
(indicating that “cross-examination” was mentioned by “Garrow, for the prisoner”).  
Kry suggests that the fact that the counsel was William Garrow was significant 
because he was “the most famous criminal defense lawyer of his time” and if he 
thought cross-examination was a right, that indicates that others also would have 
thought that.  Kry, supra note 3, at 533-34.  However, Garrow could just as easily have 
been on the cutting edge of the argument.  Professor Langbein also describes Garrow 
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Most of counsel’s arguments dealt with the issue of 
whether the examination had been taken within the window of 
Marian post-arrest authority.  The only statement attributed to 
the court was that the victim examination at issue was 
inadmissible “on the authority of [Woodcock].”212  Because the 
report in Dingler does clearly state that the defendant had 
already been committed to jail to await trial when the victim’s 
examination was taken, it seems fairly clear that the victim’s 
statement was inadmissible because it was taken outside of the 
window for the exercise of Marian authority created by a felony 
arrest.213  Moreover, the court’s treatment of Woodcock as the 
controlling authority in that setting would seem to imply that a 
similar situation had occurred in Woodcock, as I speculated 
above.   
Radbourne, Woodcock, and Dingler indicate that Marian 
procedure in England was unsettled around the time of the 
American framing.  Woodcock and Dingler also appear to 
indicate that English judges were beginning to take a more 
restrictive view of the post-arrest window for exercising Marian 
examination authority than had previously been the case.  For 
example, the rulings in Woodcock and Dingler do seem to rule 
out taking examinations of material witnesses after the 
committal of the prisoner, even though forms for such warrants 
were still appearing in the justice of the peace manuals.214 
However, Kry insists that these cases reflect a settled 
in-the-presence rule for Marian examinations.215  He even 
asserts that the 1789 ruling in Woodcock and the 1791 ruling 
in Dingler “simply confirm what [Marian] procedure already 
was.”216  However, that assertion seems to collide with Kry’s 
  
as a “dominant figure” in that period, but characterizes him as “the trickster.”  
LANGBEIN, supra note 199, at 332. 
 212 2 Leach (3d ed. 1800) at 641; 2 Leach (4th ed. 1815) at 563, 168 Eng. Rep. 
at 384. 
 213 The report in Dingler indicates that the victim’s examination was taken 
the day after the defendant was arrested and “committed . . . to take his trial at the 
next gaol delivery.”  2 Leach (4th ed. 1815) at 561, 168 Eng. Rep. at 383.   
 214 See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text. 
 215 Kry, supra note 3, at 535 (citing Leach’s claims about Woodcock and 
Dingler in the passage Leach added to the 1795 edition of Hawkins’s treatise, discussed 
supra note 191, and noting that “[l]ater treatises and cases that conditioned 
admissibility on an opportunity for cross-examination often similarly traced that 
requirement to Woodcock and Dingler”).  
 216 Id. at 522.  He also notes that those rulings “do not purport to change 
Marian committal procedure in any way.”  Id.  However, the absence of a statement of 
novelty would be significant only if one naively expects judges to announce what they 
are doing whenever they innovate.   
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own account of the evolution of Marian practice during the 
eighteenth century.217  Indeed, if there was already a well-
established in-the-presence legal rule for Marian witness 
examinations in 1789 or 1791, why did the justices of the peace 
who took the victims’ examinations in Woodcock and Dingler 
think they were authorized to take witness examinations in the 
absence of the arrestee?  It is one thing to say that Woodcock 
and Dingler indicate movement toward the creation of an in-
the-presence rule; it is quite another to assume they merely 
announced the continuation of an existing doctrine that 
somehow had remained unstated. 
d. The Statements of the King’s Bench Judges in 
Eriswell 
Kry’s suggestion that the 1789 Old Bailey ruling in 
Woodcock reflected a settled in-the-presence rule is also 
undermined by statements that the judges of King’s Bench 
made in the 1790 ruling in King v. Inhabitants of Eriswell 
(“Eriswell”).218  Eriswell was not a criminal case; it was a Crown 
suit charging a town’s inhabitants with the care of a pauper 
who had become insane.219  The issue was the admissibility of a 
sworn examination of the pauper taken by justices of the peace 
when the villagers of Eriswell were not represented.220  The 
topic of Marian examination procedure came up only indirectly 
as the judges discussed whether the pauper’s sworn statement 
of residence constituted admissible evidence, but what the four 
judges of King’s Bench said is significant because, by virtue of 
that court’s jurisdiction, they had primacy in matters of 
  
 217 See supra notes 34-35, 164-65 and accompanying text. 
 218 3 T.R. 707, 100 Eng. Rep. 815 (K.B. 1790).  The report of this case in the 
Term Reports, as reprinted in the English Reports, appears to be the same, with one 
exception, to the report initially published in 1790 by Charles Durnford and Edward 
Hyde East under the title, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Court of 
King’s Bench from Hilary Term, 29th George III. to Trinity Term, 30th George III 
(London, A. Strahan & W. Woodfall).  Durnford and East, the editors, added a footnote 
in the 1797 edition to the effect that a Marian witness examination was not admissible 
“unless the accused be present,” even though a coroner’s Marian examination was 
admissible regardless.  Eriswell, 3 T.R. (1797 ed.) at 710 n.(c), 100 Eng. Rep. at 817 
n.(c).  No such footnote appears in the 1790 edition.  See 3 T.R. (1790 ed.) at 710.  
  However, Kry cites the “case report” in Eriswell as having “expressly 
conditioned admissibility on either an opportunity to cross-examine or the prisoner’s 
presence at the examination,” but he refers only to the 1797 footnote that was added by 
the authors, not to any statement by the judges.  See Kry, supra note 3, at 496 n.12 
(citing Eriswell, 3 T. R. (1797 ed.) at 710 n.(c), 100 Eng. Rep. at 817 n.(c)). 
 219 Eriswell, 3 T.R. at 707-08, 100 Eng. Rep. at 815-16. 
 220 Id. at 708, 100 Eng. Rep. at  816. 
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criminal law and procedure.221  Indeed, Americans understood 
that rulings by the King’s Bench were more authoritative than 
those in the Old Bailey itself.222 
Two of the justices, Buller and Ashhurst, ruled that the 
deposition was admissible.  In the course of the discussion, 
Justice Buller made the following statement about Marian 
examinations: 
Where an act is judicially done, it is not necessary that the person to 
be affected by it should be present in order to make it evidence 
against him, and therefore depositions taken . . . in the absence of 
the prisoner must be read.  So it was determined by all the Judges in 
Radburn’s case, Mich[aelmas Term] 1787.223 
In Crawford, Justice Scalia dismissed Buller’s statement by 
noting that an 1826 English commentary had criticized Buller 
as misstating the fact that the deposition in Radbourne was 
taken in the prisoner’s presence.224  Kry also asserts that 
Radbourne “squarely refutes [Buller’s] position,” and cites 
similar criticisms in 1801, 1802, and 1824 commentaries.225 
However, Buller’s view of Radbourne cannot be so 
readily dismissed because he had participated when the Twelve 
Judges reviewed Radbourne’s conviction in December 
[Michaelmas Term] 1787.226  Moreover, his statement in 
Eriswell is not actually inconsistent with Leach’s initial report 
  
 221 There were four central or “superior” courts at Westminster in London: 
King’s Bench, Common Pleas, Exchequer, and Chancery.  Although judges from these 
central courts sometimes sat for trials in the Old Bailey, the felony trial court for 
London, the King’s Bench had exclusive jurisdiction over criminal cases in the 
allocation of subject matter jurisdiction among the central courts.  See 3 BLACKSTONE 
(1st ed. 1768), supra note 78, at 42. 
 222 For example, in an 1807 Supreme Court argument, counsel cited 
statements from the King’s Bench ruling in Eriswell but not from the Old Bailey 
rulings in Woodcock or Dingler.  See infra text accompanying note 300. 
 223 Eriswell, 3 T.R. at 713-14, 100 Eng. Rep. at 819.  Buller was also identified 
as the author of some editions of the treatise An Introduction to the Law Relative to 
Trials at Nisi Prius, discussed supra note 118. 
 224 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54-55 n.5. 
 225 Kry, supra note 3, at 526.  Kry also says that nineteenth-century 
commentators’ negative reception of Buller’s view suggests that “even around the time 
Eriswell was decided, the prevailing view in the legal community was that Buller’s 
dictum had misstated the law.”  Id. at 527.  However, the only evidence he offers for 
that assessment are statements by commentators that appeared years later in 1797 
and 1801.  See id. at 526-27.  Do commentators have more to do with “the prevailing 
view” of criminal evidence doctrine than the judges of the King’s Bench? 
 226 Buller was appointed to the Court of King’s Bench in 1778.  EDWARD FOSS, 
JUDGES OF ENGLAND 252-53 (1864; reprinted 1966).  The report of Radbourne shows all 
of the Twelve Judges participated except Mansfield.  King v. Radbourne, Leach (1st ed. 
1789) 399, 401 (Old Bailey and Twelve Judges 1787). 
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of Radbourne to the effect that the examination was simply 
“read” in the defendant’s presence, rather than being “taken” in 
her presence, which could be how Radbourne was argued to the 
Twelve Judges.  As noted above, the term “taken” did not 
appear until the 1800 version of Radbourne.227  Thus, the 
criticism of Buller seems to be based only on the revised 1800 
version of Radbourne, which was not published until a decade 
after Buller made his statement in Eriswell. 
Justice Ashhurst said nothing in Eriswell about Marian 
examinations, but simply expressed a reluctance to alter prior 
law and concurred with Buller’s remarks in a general way.228  
His silence is noteworthy because he had been on the Old 
Bailey bench with Chief Baron Eyre during the trial in 
Woodcock a year earlier.229  The fact that Ashhurst did not take 
issue with Buller’s statement may indicate that Woodcock had 
not ruled that the prisoner had to be present at the taking of a 
Marian witness examination, but only had to have a chance to 
“contradict” witnesses’ allegations in his own examination.230 
The other two King’s Bench justices who participated in 
Eriswell expressed the view that the pauper’s deposition should 
be inadmissible.  The significant point for present purposes is 
that neither suggested that there was an in-the-presence rule 
in Marian examinations themselves.  Justice Grose stated that 
Before the [Marian statute], a deposition taken before the justice of 
the county where the murder was committed was not evidence, even 
though the party died or was unable to travel.  Why?  Because 
although the justice had jurisdiction to enquire into the fact, the 
common law did not permit a person accused to be affected by an 
examination taken in his absence, because he could not cross 
examine; and therefore that statute was made.231 
Note that Grose indicated that the Marian statute had been 
enacted to permit the admission of ex parte examinations. 
  
 227 See supra note 191. 
 228 Eriswell, 3 T.R. at 720-21, 100 Eng. Rep. at 822-23. 
 229 Unlike modern American trials, it was common for more than one judge to 
be on the bench during a criminal trial in the Old Bailey.  See King v. Woodcock, 1 
Leach (4th ed. 1815) 500, 500, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 352 (Old Bailey 1789) (stating that 
“Woodcock was tried before Lord Chief Baron Eyre, present Mr. Justice Ashhurst, and 
Mr. Sergeant Adair, Recorder”). 
 230 See supra notes 198-205 and accompanying text. 
 231 Eriswell, 3 T.R. at 710, 100 Eng. Rep. at 817 (emphasis added) (notes 
omitted).  This was the point to which the authors of Term Reports addressed the 
footnote described supra note 218. 
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Additionally, Chief Justice Kenyon appears to have 
conceded that Marian witness examinations in felony cases 
constituted “exceptions” to the usual rules for admitting 
depositions.232  Kry concedes that “Grose and Kenyon never 
clearly dispute[d Buller’s] premise,”233 but that is an 
understatement.  
Kry admits that the statements of the King’s Bench 
judges in the 1790 ruling in Eriswell demonstrate that “[t]he 
[in-the-presence] rule articulated by Radbourne, Woodcock, and 
Dingler was not universally accepted.”234  However, how was it 
a “rule” if the judges of King’s Bench did not recognize it?  The 
judges’ statements in Eriswell cut against the existence of any 
in-the-presence rule in Marian procedure as of 1790.  In fact, 
Kry mentions that the judges made comments similar to those 
in Eriswell in another case in 1793.235 
Remarkably, Kry nevertheless announces under the 
heading “Conclusion” that, “[a]t some point before the 
framing”—that is, 1789—the practice of “routinely conduct[ing 
Marian witness examinations] in the prisoner’s presence” had 
“hardened into a procedural right.”236  How can that be when 
the judges of King’s Bench apparently knew of no such rule in 
1790 or 1793?   As noted above, no such rule was stated in any 
of the treatises or justice of the peace manuals that had been 
published by 1789; the first claim of any such rule appears in 
Leach’s alterations of Hawkins’s treatise in 1795—six years 
after the framing—and it was based only on Leach’s own report 
of the 1789 ruling in Woodcock and the still unpublished 1791 
  
 232 Id. at 722, 100 Eng. Rep. at 823.  Kenyon said: 
It has been said that there are cases where examinations [not taken in the 
presence of the party] are admitted, namely, before the coroner, and before 
magistrates in cases of felony. . . .  Those exceptions alluded to are founded on 
the [Marian statutes]; and that they go no further is abundantly proved. . . .  
But, without stating the cases which occur on this head, I will do little more 
than to refer to the case of The King v. Paine in Salk. 281, & 5 Mod. 163.  
That was not loosely decided, but was the opinion of this Court assisted by 
the Court of Common Pleas.  In Salkeld[’s report of that case] it is expressly 
said that the rule cannot be extended further than the particular case of 
felony . . . . 
Id. at 722-23, 100 Eng. Rep. at 823-24. 
 233 Kry, supra note 3, at 525.  
 234 Id. at 524. 
 235 Id. at 526 n.137 (citing King v. Ravenstone, 5 T.R. 373, 374, 101 Eng. Rep. 
209, 209 (K.B. 1793)). 
 236 Id. at 527 (emphasis added).  Even more remarkably, Kry writes in the 
conclusion of his article that it is hard to say “[h]ow long before the framing” the 
“procedural right” to be present “hardened.”  Id. at 554. 
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ruling in Dingler.237  Prior to 1795, the supposed rule is missing 
from the very authorities that were meant to instruct justices 
of the peace in taking Marian examinations. 
The bottom line is that Kry’s conclusion regarding a 
“hardened” in-the-presence rule outstrips his evidence.238  
Likewise, his pre-framing evidence falls far short of Crawford’s 
claim of a settled cross-examination rule.  As noted above, all 
Kry claims about a right to cross-examine in Marian 
examinations is that, at the time of the 1789 framing, the 
“absence of such a right” was not “firmly established.”239 
Kry’s English evidence indicates that the English (or 
London) bar was agitating for in-the-presence and cross-
examination rules in 1789, but that the English bench was still 
resisting that demand.  Indeed, one 1789 evidence commentary 
says precisely that.240  However, it is not clear whether this 
agitation had spread beyond London committal proceedings, 
and there is no evidence that Americans were aware of it. 
  
 237 See supra note 191.  
 238 Kry cites two English cases in addition to the cases discussed in the text.  
He asserts that the King’s Bench held in 1761 “that testimony must be given in the 
prisoner’s presence.”  Kry, supra note 3, at 545 (citing King v. Vipont, 2 Burr. 1163, 
1165, 97 Eng. Rep. 767, 768 (K.B. 1761)).  However, that case did not involve Marian 
practice because it did not involve a felony, and it appears that the justice of the peace 
who decided the case in a summary proceeding treated a single deposition as conclusive 
proof of the defendant’s guilt, and in effect denied him a trial. 
  Kry also discusses Ayrton v. Addington, an unreported 1780 civil lawsuit, 
as an example of “attempted cross-examination at a committal hearing.”  Id. at 538.  
However, in that instance, the magistrate William Addington had refused to permit an 
attorney, Thomas Ayrton, to cross-examine a witness at a committal hearing because it 
was “‘not a trial but an examination of prisoners,’” and, when the attorney persisted, 
the magistrate had him removed from the hearing room.  Id. at 537 (quoting Ayrton v. 
Addington (Dec. 7, 1780), in 2 JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE 
GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 1023, 1025-26 (1992)).  The 
attorney then sued the magistrate and the jury gave a verdict for the attorney.  Id. at 
538.  Kry suggests that the jury’s approval of cross-examination is “[i]mplicit in the 
verdict,” but that is far from clear; it seems likely that the attorney’s removal was the 
gravamen of the lawsuit.  Id. 
  Similarly, Kry cites London newspaper accounts of incidents in 1774 in 
which cross-examination was disallowed during a committal hearing, and in 1786 in 
which cross-examination was allowed.  Id. at 538-39. 
 239 Id. at 541 (emphasis added). 
 240 See 1 JOHN MORGAN, ESSAYS UPON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, NEW TRIALS, 
SPECIAL VERDICTS, TRIALS AT BAR, AND REPLEADERS 431 (London 1789) (stating that 
the admissibility of Marian examinations of unavailable witnesses “shews the 
propriety and justice of permitting a prisoner by himself, or counsel to cross-examine 
any witnesses produced against him, before the magistrate, though some justices have 
strenuously contended against the right”). 
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4. London Marian Practices Do Not Illuminate 
American Marian Practices 
A second objection to Kry’s descriptions of English 
Marian practice is that there is no reason to assume that 
English practice, as opposed to published English doctrine, 
informed American Marian practice.  Indeed, Kry primarily 
describes practice in London.241  It makes sense that the high 
volume of arrests in London and its environs would have led to 
an unusual degree of institutionalization of felony committal 
hearings.  As a result, “Newgate solicitors” may have found it 
worthwhile to hang around the London committal courtroom 
because of the high volume of potential business to be found 
there, and London magistrates may have accommodated 
them.242  However, it seems unlikely that similar circumstances 
would have existed in rural England or even in smaller cities, 
where Marian committal hearings would not have been held on 
such a routinized basis.243  Hence, it is not clear that the urban 
Marian practice that Kry describes would even have been 
typical of the rest of England in 1789, much less America. 
Additionally, Kry argues that cross-examination became 
relevant to English Marian practice only when London justices 
of the peace began to depart from the doctrinal rule by widely 
exercising extra-legal discretion to dismiss felony charges at 
Marian committal hearings if they concluded that evidence of 
the arrestee’s guilt was weak.244  However, there is no evidence 
that American justices of the peace widely exercised similar 
discretion.245  Rather, the framing-era American justice of the 
  
 241 There are references to London throughout Kry’s descriptions of pre-
framing, eighteenth-century English practice: e.g., Middlesex, Newgate (the prison 
adjacent to the Old Bailey), Bow Street, the Guildhall magistrates’ court, etc. 
 242 Kry notes that “Newgate solicitors” appeared in committal hearings in 
London, and suggests that shows there is “no substance” to my prior statement that 
arrestees would not have been represented by counsel at the time of a Marian 
committal proceeding.  See Kry, supra note 3, at 530 n.154 (criticizing Davies, supra 
note 2, at 170).  However, there is no apparent reason to assume that lawyers would 
have been as active in committal hearings outside of London or other large cities, and 
there is no apparent basis for assuming that lawyers would have been widely involved 
in American Marian committal practice. 
 243 For example, the Old Bailey had eight trial sessions a year, but outlying 
cities had only two assizes a year.  See LANGBEIN, supra note 199, at 17. 
 244 Kry, supra note 3, at 528-29, 554-55 (noting that cross-examination in 
Marian examinations served no purpose without this development). 
 245 Kry does not offer any evidence as to how American justices of the peace 
conducted Marian examinations prior to 1789, other than noting a 1766 controversy in 
New York in which a magistrate did not permit cross-examination.  Id. at 539. 
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peace manuals followed Burn’s manual by stating the doctrinal 
rule that a justice of the peace had authority only to commit or 
bail, but not release, an arrestee at a Marian hearing.246  Hence, 
there is no evidence that there was any reason for cross-
examination to emerge in American Marian practice.  London 
practice simply does not amount to evidence of American 
practice. 
5. How Would Americans Learn of London Marian 
Practice? 
A third objection to Kry’s account of English (London) 
practice is that framing-era Americans generally had no way to 
learn of English practices unless they were described in 
published sources.247  But no such published descriptions have 
been identified.  Kry ignores this point when, in addition to 
describing London practice, he cites an unreported English 
case and London newspaper accounts of other cases.248  How 
could framing-era Americans possibly have learned of those?  
The crucial fact is that Kry does not identify any description of 
in-the-presence Marian practice in any pre-framing publication 
that would have been likely to come to the attention of 
Americans.  Rather, as discussed above, the published 
descriptions of Marian procedure in framing-era authorities 
were either silent on such aspects or implied that they were not 
part of Marian procedure.  How were framing-era Americans 
  
 246 Burn recited, 
If a felony is committed, and one is brought before a justice upon suspicion 
thereof, and the justice finds upon examination that the prisoner is not 
guilty; yet the justice shall not discharge him, but he must either be bailed or 
committed: for it is not fit that a man once arrested and charged with felony, 
or suspicion thereof, should be delivered upon any man’s discretion, without 
farther trial.  Dalt. c. 164. 
1 BURN, supra note 105, at 295 (1755 ed.); 1 id. at 536 (1785 ed.).  American manuals 
repeated this statement.  See GREENLEAF, supra note 110, at 131; GRIMKE, supra note 
110, at 199; HODGE’S CONDUCTOR, supra note 110, at 178; GAINE’S CONDUCTOR, supra 
note 110, at 145; LADD, supra note 110, at 156.  Starke’s description of Virginia 
practice in the early 1770s suggests that justices of the peace did not exercise 
discretion to dismiss in the Marian hearing itself when witness examinations were 
taken; rather, Virginia created a unique “Court of Examination” that met five to ten 
days after the arrest and that court was given a “Power of Acquittal” if it deemed the 
evidence too weak to justify the prosecution.  See STARKE, supra note 110, at 114-15. 
 247 This concern is not hypothetical.  For example, the 1761 Writs of Assistance 
Case in Boston was adjourned for several months because no one could locate any 
published information as to how a writ of assistance was used for customs searches in 
England.  See generally M. H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE (1978). 
 248 See supra note 238. 
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supposed to have learned of the London Marian practice that 
Kry now describes? 
The only answer Kry offers is that nine of the American 
Framers, primarily from the southern states, had studied at 
the Inns of Court in London along with a hundred or so other 
Americans.249  However, that is a bit too facile.  One problem is 
timing: the data Kry cites refers to American lawyers who 
studied in London “between 1760 and 1775.”250  It makes sense 
that they studied prior to the outbreak of the Revolutionary 
War in 1775 and American independence in 1776, but 1760 to 
1775 would be considerably too early even for the “emerging 
consensus” that by Kry’s account was only “hardening” into an 
in-the-presence rule “by the time of the framing” in 1789.251 
Moreover, it is hardly obvious that Americans who 
crossed the Atlantic for an expensive course of legal study 
would have devoted much of their attention to Marian 
committal proceedings, the lowest rung of English felony 
justice.  In the stratified English legal community, the Inns of 
Court trained barristers, not lowly “Newgate solicitors.”252  It 
seems likely that the Americans who traveled to London for 
legal studies and “‘personal contact with some of England’s 
leading lawyers and judges’”253 would have directed their 
attention primarily to higher-status subjects like property, 
equity, legal actions, and civil procedure.  Indeed, Blackstone’s 
Commentaries provide some indirect evidence—they were 
written for the student of English law but barely mentioned 
Marian procedure.254 
  
 249 Kry, supra note 3, at 522.  
 250 Id. 
 251 See supra text accompanying note 236. 
 252 Newgate was the infamous prison in London adjacent to the Old Bailey; 
“Newgate solicitors” would have been fairly low in the hierarchy of the English legal 
community. 
 253 Kry, supra note 3, at 522 (quoting 1 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE 
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 33 (1965)). 
 254 Blackstone’s Commentaries were meant to provide such a study.  He 
mentioned Marian witness examinations only once in the four volumes of the 
commentaries, at the beginning of chapter 22 on “Commitment and Bail” in criminal 
proceedings, but did not mention any requisites of such examinations—not even that 
they had to be under oath: 
The justice, before whom such [arrested] prisoner is brought, is bound 
immediately to examine the circumstances of the crime alleged: and to this 
end by statute of 2 & 3 Ph. & M. c. 10. he is to take in writing the 
examination of such prisoner, and the information of those who bring him:  
which Mr. Lambard observes, was the first warrant given for the 
examination of a felon in English law.  For, at the common law, nemo 
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The mere fact that some Americans attended the Inns of 
Court prior to 1775 is too frail a hook on which to hang 
American knowledge of unpublished English committal 
practices as of 1789.  That hook is especially frail because, as I 
note below, post-framing American sources from 1794, and 
even 1807, do not reflect any awareness of Radbourne, 
Woodcock, or Dingler.255  The bottom line is that, even if Kry’s 
description of English practice were accurate, he has not shown 
the relevance of that description to the Framers’ design—and 
that is crucial for a claim of original meaning. 
6. Coroners’ Marian Examinations 
In addition, there is one aspect of English Marian 
practice that plainly did not involve an in-the-presence or 
cross-examination rule in 1789—coroners’ Marian witness 
examinations.  The Marian statutes also provided for coroners 
to take sworn witness examinations in the course of 
investigating a suspicious death.256  Coroners conducted 
inquests on view of the body to determine whether a crime had 
been committed and, if so, who was the likely killer.  Because 
no defendant was identified until the conclusion of the 
proceeding, it is patent that there could not have been either 
an in-the-presence or cross-examination rule for coroners’ 
witness examinations.  Yet, framing-era treatises and manuals 
affirmed the admissibility of coroners’ examinations of 
unavailable witnesses in felony trials.257 
  
tenebatur prodere seipsum; and his fault was not to be wrung out of himself, 
but rather discovered by other means, and other men.  If upon this inquiry it 
manifestly appears, either that no such crime was committed, or that the 
suspicion entertained of the prisoner was wholly groundless, in such cases 
only is it lawful totally to discharge him.  Otherwise, he must either be 
committed to prison, or give bail . . . . 
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, at 293 (1st ed. 1769) (footnote omitted).  Note that the 
focus of this passage is on the examination of the arrestee, but little is said of witness 
examinations themselves; note also that Blackstone stated such a low threshold for 
proceeding to commit or bail the arrestee that cross-examination would rarely have 
made any difference. 
  The 1791 lectures in law given by James Wilson (one of the Framers of the 
Constitution and one of the earliest justices of the Supreme Court) in Philadelphia do 
not seem to mention Marian witness examinations at all.  See THE WORKS OF JAMES 
WILSON (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967). 
 255 See infra text following note 287 (no mention of the cases in 1794 North 
Carolina case), 293 (no mention of the cases in 1794 Virginia justice of the peace 
manual), 297 (no mention of the cases in 1807 Supreme Court argument). 
 256 See Davies, supra note 2, at 128. 
 257 Id. at 171-72. 
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In Crawford, Justice Scalia breezed past this 
inconvenient fact in one evasive footnote.258  Kry at least 
addresses the difficulty.  Although he concedes that coroners’ 
Marian examinations were admissible, and also concedes that 
the defendant need not even have been identified or present 
when such examinations occurred, he takes refuge in a 
palpable fiction—because coroners’ inquests were open to the 
public, a potential defendant could have chosen to attend and 
could even have chosen to cross-examine the witnesses.  Thus, 
the requirement of an “opportunity” for such was met and 
“those who failed to show up to cross-examine had simply 
neglected their rights.”259  In addition to offering this notion of 
constructive presence, Kry notes that American state cases in 
1835, 1842, and 1844 began refusing to admit coroners’ 
examinations in criminal trials.260 
However, the significant fact for assessing the original 
understanding of the Confrontation Clause is that the framing-
era treatises and justice of the peace manuals never suggested 
that either an in-the-presence rule or cross-examination rule 
applied to Marian coroners’ examinations of witnesses, and 
they did not condition the admissibility of coroners’ 
examinations of unavailable witnesses on the examination 
having been taken in the prisoner’s presence or having been 
subject to cross-examination rules.  Indeed, Kry cites English 
statements that indicate that no such conditions were placed 
on the admissibility of coroners’ Marian examinations well 
after the 1789 framing.261 
7. Summary of Kry’s Pre-Framing Evidence 
In sum, I do not think Mr. Kry has presented historical 
evidence that sheds much light on the original American 
understanding of the Confrontation Clause.  Rather, like 
  
 258 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47 n.2 (suggesting “[t]here [was] some question 
whether the requirement of a prior opportunity for cross-examination applied as well to 
statements taken by a coroner, which were also authorized by the Marian statutes” but 
citing only post-framing sources as grounds for that “question”). 
 259 Kry, supra note 3, at 547. 
 260 Id. at 547 & n.253 (citing cases from 1835, 1842, 1844, and 1858). 
 261 For example, Kry several times cites a 1797 footnote added to the Eriswell 
case report by the reporters of that volume to the effect that “Nor [are committal 
depositions admissible] since [the Marian statutes], unless the party accused be 
present, though an examination before a coroner is.”  Id. at 496 n.12, 523 n.126, 527 
n.143, 547 n.256 (citing King v. Eriswell, 3 T.R. 707, 710 n.(c), 100 Eng. Rep. 815, 817 
n.(c) (K.B. 1790)).  See supra note 218. 
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Crawford, he has focused on matters that are, at best, 
marginally relevant and often ambiguous, while he has 
downplayed or dismissed the treatises and manuals that 
provide the best evidence we have of the Framers’ 
understanding of Marian procedure.  Although Kry offers a 
description of the evolution of English Marian practice itself, he 
has paid little heed to the essential question of what Americans 
would have known about that practice, and when they would 
have known it.  Indeed, he has not even shown that there was a 
settled English in-the-presence rule that Americans could have 
discovered in 1789, let alone the settled cross-examination rule 
asserted in Crawford. 
V. KRY’S POST-FRAMING EVIDENCE 
Kry suggests that because the pre-framing evidence is 
“conflicting,” it is appropriate “to consider a broader range of 
historical evidence,” including post-framing evidence.262  He 
asserts that post-framing evidence is relevant and effectively 
assumes that later statements reveal earlier doctrine.  Indeed, 
he asserts that “[w]hile the pre-framing evidence is ambiguous, 
the post-framing evidence is devastating.”263 
It certainly is true that post-framing sources are crucial 
to Kry’s arguments.  I invite the reader to perform an 
experiment: make a copy of Kry’s article, black out all 
statements that are based on post-1789 sources as well as on 
Radbourne, Woodcock, and Dingler, the three cases that were 
published too late to have informed the American framing, and 
see what is left.  Kry characterizes our disagreement over 
relevant evidence as “a question of timing.”264  I think “time 
travel” would be more apt.  
I do not deny that there might be instances in which 
post-framing statements could carry sufficient indicia of 
continuity with earlier doctrine to make it appropriate to treat 
them as evidence of original meaning.  However, none of the 
post-framing sources that Kry offers fall into that category.265  
  
 262 Kry, supra note 3, at 542.  
 263 Id. at 551. 
 264 Id. at 495. 
 265 An American case or statement from the immediate aftermath of the 
framing might constitute valid evidence of the original understanding if the case or 
statement exhibits some indicia of continuity.  For example, if an American state case 
from the decade after the framing had said something like “As we have construed our 
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Rather, I think his post-framing evidence is essentially 
irrelevant for reconstructing the original American 
understanding of the Confrontation Clause.  Let me briefly 
review the post-framing sources he relies upon, and then 
address the real issue—Kry’s assumption of judicial 
consistency over time. 
A. Kry’s Post-Framing English Evidence 
Kry argues that in English law, “admissibility [of 
Marian examinations] clearly became conditioned, at some 
point, on whether the defendant had an opportunity to cross-
examine,” and cites as evidence seven post-framing English 
treatises, three post-framing English cases, and a post-framing 
footnote added to a case report by the reporters rather than the 
court.266  However, “at some point” does not amount to a claim 
about “the Framers’ design.”267  The critical fact is that these 
post-framing English sources that endorsed an in-the-presence 
or cross-examination rule cited no precedents or authorities 
between the 1696 rulings in Paine and Fenwick and the 1787, 
1789, and 1791 decisions in Radbourne, Woodcock, and Dingler 
(the three cases that were published too late to have informed 
the framing of the Confrontation Clause).  Moreover, it is 
noteworthy that a number of the commentaries that Kry cites 
were written by members of the London bar who probably were 
partisans in the campaign for recognition of in-the-presence 
and cross-examination rules in Marian procedure.268  Kry does 
not identify any English court ruling that endorsed those rules 
until 1814—twenty-five years after the 1789 framing of the 
Confrontation Clause.269  Thus, the post-framing statements 
Kry cites do not provide evidence that an in-the-presence or 
cross-examination rule was recognized in England prior to the 
American framing.270 
  
statute for many years . . . ,” one would have to give some weight to that as relevant 
evidence of the framing-era understanding.  However, Kry cites no such case. 
 266 Kry, supra note 3, at 495 & nn.11-12. 
 267 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 268 For example, Leonard MacNally authored one of the English treatises that 
Kry cites.  See Kry, supra note 3, at 496 n.11 (citing LEONARD MACNALLY, THE RULES 
OF EVIDENCE ON PLEAS OF THE CROWN (Dublin 1802)).  MacNally also appears as 
defense counsel in Kry’s account.  See id. at 539 (referring to a cross-examination by 
“Mr. MacNally”).  See also supra note 204. 
 269 See Kry, supra note 3, at 496 n.12. 
 270 I invite the reader to peruse the authorities set out in Kry, supra note 3, at 
495 nn.11-12. 
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My 2005 article did not dispute or downplay the fact 
that a cross-examination rule was adopted in England in the 
decades after the American framing.271  In fact, my 2005 article 
actually introduced some of the post-framing treatises and 
cases Kry now cites.272  I simply noted the basic point that what 
was said in England after the framing does not constitute 
evidence of what the American Framers thought at the time of 
the framing. 
B. Kry’s Post-Framing American Evidence 
Kry also cites several post-framing American 
statements in cases and commentaries.  However, none of these 
statements constitute significant evidence that Americans 
understood in 1789 that a cross-examination rule was part of 
Marian procedure. 
1. “Early” State Cases 
Like Justice Scalia in Crawford, Kry also stresses post-
framing American state cases.  Although Justice Scalia invoked 
the authority of “numerous early state cases,” two were plainly 
inapposite,273 and of the nine remaining, only one was decided 
prior to 1821.274  Kry omits the inapposite cases (unlike Justice 
Scalia who continues to include them275), but Kry has added 
further cases, reaching sixteen decided “between 1794 and 
  
 271 Davies, supra note 2, at 173-78.   
 272 For example, I initially identified the passage that Thomas Leach added to 
the 1795 edition of Hawkins’s treatise.  See id. at 173.  That is the earliest English 
commentary that endorsed a cross-examination rule.  See Kry, supra note 3, at 495 
n.11.  Likewise, I initially identified King v. Smith, Holt 614, 171 Eng. Rep. 357 (1817).  
See Davies, supra note 2, at 174 n.224; Kry, supra note 3, at 496 n.12.  Justice Scalia 
did not cite either of these authorities in Crawford. 
 273 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49-50 (citing, inter alia, Finn v. Commonwealth, 26 
Va. 701, 708 (1827); State v. Atkins, 1 Tenn. 229 (Super. Ct. 1807) (per curiam)).  These 
two cases are inapposite because they excluded oral testimony regarding testimony a 
deceased witness had given at a prior trial, rather than a written record of a Marian 
examination.  As I previously explained, there was no transcript of the prior court 
testimony, so an oral account of it was deemed less reliable than a written record of a 
witness examination; hence, there was a settled rule against admitting oral accounts of 
prior testimony that had nothing to do with cross-examination.  See Davies, supra note 
2, at 180 n.235.  Kry contends that these cases were offered for only a narrow point in 
Crawford.  See Kry, supra note 3, at 546 n.246.  However, they appear in Crawford  as 
“cases to the same effect” as those that deal with cross-examination.  See Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 50. 
 274 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49-50 (citing two cases from the 1820s, two from 
the 1830s, two from the 1840s, and three from the 1850s). 
 275 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2275 n.3 (2006). 
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1858,” plus a “cf.” cite.276  However, Kry still identifies only 
three cases prior to the 1830s, and they constitute only limited 
evidence: the earliest is a 1794 case that did not actually 
involve the pertinent issue, and the other two are merely 
offspring of the 1794 case. 
The earliest American case Kry cites is the 1794 North 
Carolina case, State v. Webb.277  I am chagrined that when I 
wrote my prior article, I did not notice that Webb did not 
actually deal with the pertinent issue.278  Although the cryptic 
one-paragraph statement by the court did refer to an in-the-
presence standard and right to cross-examine for admitting a 
witness “deposition” as a matter of “natural justice,”279  Mr. Kry 
errs when he describes the case as involving a Marian 
examination of an “unavailable” witness.280  As noted above, the 
settled understanding, which was stated explicitly in the 
English treatises that the prosecutor offered as authority for 
admitting the witness deposition, was that a Marian deposition 
was admissible only if the witness was genuinely unavailable—
that is, he could not attend the trial because he was dead, too 
ill to travel, or was kept away by the defendant.281  However, it 
appears that the witness in Webb did not meet any of those 
criteria—he was merely in South Carolina.282 
  
 276 Kry, supra note 3, at 496 n.13.  Kry also includes a “cf.” cite to an 1808 
Kentucky bastardy case overruling a decision by a lower court to admit the complaint 
for an arrest “warrant” as evidence.  Id.   
 277 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 139 (Super. Ct. 1794), discussed in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
49; cited in Kry, supra note 3, at 496 n.13.  See also Kry, supra note 3, at 548 (citing 
American cases “between 1794 and 1858”). 
 278 See Davies, supra note 2, at 181 (incorrectly stating that Webb offered 
support for Justice Scalia’s position). 
 279 Webb, 2 N.C. at 139 (“[I]t is a rule of the common law, founded on natural 
justice, that no man shall be prejudiced by evidence which he had not the liberty to 
cross-examine . . . .”). 
 280 Kry, supra note 3, at 502 (emphasis added) (stating that the prosecutor in 
Webb sought “to admit an unavailable witness’s deposition taken ex parte”).  Justice 
Scalia said nothing about the availability of the witness in Crawford.  See 541 U.S. at 
49. 
 281 The prosecutor cited passages in the treatises by Hale, Hawkins, and 
Buller.  Webb, 2 N.C. at 139.  Hale referred to witnesses who had died or were too ill to 
travel.  See 2 HALE, supra note 89, at 52.  Hawkins referred to witnesses who were 
dead, too ill to travel, or kept away by the defendant.  See supra note 84.  Buller 
referred to witnesses who were “dead.”  See supra text accompanying note 117.  Cf. 
Kry, supra note 3, at 553 (“Throughout the eighteenth century, it was settled law that 
a Marian deposition was admissible at trial if the witness was dead, too sick to travel, 
or kept away by the accused.”). 
 282 See Webb, 2 N.C. at 139 (reporting the only description of the witness and 
deposition offered by the prosecutor: “the deposition of one Young, to whom [Webb] had 
sold the horse in South Carolina”). 
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Given that the witness who had been deposed did not 
meet any of the unavailability criteria, it is hardly surprising 
that the North Carolina judges found that the admissibility 
rule set out in the English treatises cited by the prosecutor was 
inapplicable.283  Instead, it appears that the North Carolina 
judges construed the state Marian statute as though it 
incorporated the common-law cross-examination standard that 
pertained to admitting depositions in civil cases.  Indeed, the 
“natural justice” language that they used appears in a number 
of passages in pre-framing English authorities that pertain to 
the admissibility of “depositions” in civil lawsuits.284  It may 
also be significant that the North Carolina judges referred to 
the witness statement at issue as a “deposition,” rather than as 
an “examination,” the term that actually appears in the North 
Carolina Marian statute.285  Hence, the statements in Webb 
were not actually made in the context of resolving the 
admissibility of a Marian examination of a genuinely 
unavailable witness; rather, the context resembles that of a 
civil lawsuit deposition taken when it would merely be 
inconvenient for a witness to attend a trial.286 
Nevertheless, Webb was later invoked as the relevant 
authority in the 1798 and 1821 cases that Kry cites, both of 
which involved the admissibility of a victim’s Marian 
examination that had been taken in the presence of the 
arrestee.  The 1798 North Carolina case that Kry identifies, 
State v. Moody,287 was decided by the same court (and largely 
the same judges) that had decided Webb only four years earlier.  
Although the court ruled that the victim’s statement could not 
be admitted because it had not been properly sworn, one judge 
  
 283 See Kry, supra note 3, at 502-03 (noting that the prosecutor cited passages 
on the admissibility of Marian depositions of unavailable witnesses from “Hale, 
Hawkins, and Buller on which Davies relies”).  Kry suggests that my interpretation of 
the issue is “implausible” because it would mean that the prosecutor made a 
“nonsensical” argument to the North Carolina court.  Id. at 503 n.42.  I suggest that 
inapt citations are not an uncommon feature of arguments made in the course of 
litigation. 
 284 See, e.g., GILBERT, supra note 15, at 62 (1756 ed.) (“’tis against natural 
Justice” to admit a “Deposition” if the party “had not Liberty to cross-examine the 
Witnesses”). 
 285 See supra note 81.  The language of the North Carolina Marian Statute is 
set out in Davies, supra note 2, at 181 n.239. 
 286 See supra notes 81-82. 
 287 3 N.C. (2. Hayw.) 50 (1798). 
2007] REVISITING FICTIONAL ORIGINALISM 629 
did make a statement that appears to have reiterated the in-
the-presence standard previously announced in Webb.288   
It should also be noted that the North Carolina cases 
appear to have announced a homegrown doctrine.  Although 
Kry writes that Webb “essentially replicated the reasoning of 
Woodcock and Dingler,”289 the important fact is that Webb did 
not refer to the English reports of Radbourne or Woodcock (and 
Dingler had not yet been published).  Thus, Webb suggests that 
Americans either did not immediately become familiar with 
Leach’s reports of Old Bailey cases when they were published 
sometime in late 1789, or did not regard them as authoritative. 
The next case chronologically that Crawford cited, and 
that Kry cites, is the 1821 Tennessee ruling in Johnston v. 
State, which admitted a witness examination taken in the 
defendant’s presence.290  However, Johnston is also an offspring 
of Webb.  The Tennessee judges regarded the 1715 North 
Carolina Marian statute as having been absorbed into 
Tennessee law (presumably because Tennessee was created 
from North Carolina territory), and thus treated Webb as a 
pertinent construction of that statute.  As a result, the three 
pre-1830 cases Kry cites all really boil down to one decision, the 
1794 decision in Webb. 
Kry then also cites two state cases from the 1830s, five 
from the 1840s, and five from the 1850s.  However, those cases 
are hardly proximate to the framing in 1789.  Even by the 
  
 288  Moody involved the admissibility of a statement a murder victim had made 
on the day after the attack; however, because he died six or seven weeks later, the 
court concluded that the statement was not admissible as a dying declaration.  Id. at 
50-51.  Judge John Haywood then raised the possibility that the statement would be 
admissible as a Marian examination of an unavailable witness: 
[I]t may be a question whether [the victim’s statement] may not be received 
as an examination taken on oath before a justice of the peace, pursuant to the 
act of Assembly prescribed for such depositions in cases of felony [that is, the 
North Carolina Marian statute]; when regularly taken pursuant to the act, 
and the witness afterwards dies, it may be read in evidence; more especially 
if the party to be affected by that testimony were present at the examination, 
as the prisoner was in the present case. 
Id.  The deposition was not admitted, however, because there was a question as to 
whether it was properly sworn.  See id. at 51.  It is unclear if Haywood was on the 
bench of North Carolina Superior Court (that is, the state supreme court) when Webb 
was decided in the “September Term, 1794” because he was elected to the court in 
1794.  I agree with Kry that Judge Haywood’s “more especially” phrasing probably 
meant “more specifically” in 1798.  See Kry, supra note 3, at 496 n.13. 
 289 See Kry, supra note 3, at 534. 
 290 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 51, 52-53 (1821), cited in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.  See 
also Kry, supra note 3, at 496 n.12. 
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1820s, American courts could have begun inventing new 
understandings of the confrontation right, or—because the 
nineteenth-century English treatises that Kry cites were 
circulating in America by the 1820s—the nineteenth-century 
American cases he cites may have simply imported the new 
English understanding of Marian procedure.291 
2. Other Post-Framing American Sources  
Kry discusses three additional American statements.  
One involved a 1766 complaint about the denial of cross-
examination in a committal proceeding in colonial New York.292  
Although it is true that there was a complaint, the fact that the 
court refused to allow cross-examination would appear to 
indicate the absence of a legally recognized right.293  The other 
two statements are from 1794 and 1807. 
In 1794, William Waller Hening criticized the 
admissibility of Marian witness examinations of unavailable 
witnesses when he wrote his justice of the peace manual, The 
New Virginia Justice.  Specifically, Hening objected that “[t]he 
doctrine laid down in the books” regarding the admissibility of 
Marian examinations of deceased or otherwise unavailable 
witnesses was liable to the objection that “the accused party 
has not the same advantage of cross examination, which he 
would possess before a court, with the assistance of counsel.”294  
Kry stresses Hening’s use of the word “same” and reads this to 
mean that the accused was entitled to cross-examine the 
witness on his own during a Marian examination.295  Even by 
that literal reading, however, Hening would have referred only 
  
 291 See Davies, supra note 2, at 180 n.234.  See also Kry, supra note 3, at 495 
n.11 (citing several American printings of English commentaries).  The 1821 Tennessee 
decision in Johnston cited the evidence treatise by Phillipps that Kry cites.  See 
Johnston v. State, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 58 (1821); Kry, supra note 3, at 495 n.11 (citing 
S.M. PHILLIPPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1814)).  For example, in 1824, 
Nathaniel Dane cited “M’Nally” (that is, MacNally’s evidence treatise; see Kry, supra 
note 3, at 495 n.11), Radbourne, Woodcock, and Dingler when discussing the 
admissibility of Marian witness examinations.  See 3 NATHANIEL DANE, A GENERAL 
ABRIDGMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERICAN LAW 372-73 (1824).  Interestingly, Dane 
attributed an in-the-presence rule to Radbourne, but did not actually mention an 
opportunity for cross-examination. 
 292 Kry, supra note 3, at 539. 
 293 See Davies, supra note 2, at 188 n.269. 
 294 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 147 (entered for 
publication 1794, printed in Richmond 1795).  The passage is quoted in Davies, supra 
note 2, at 187. 
 295 Kry, supra note 3, at 535. 
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to a minimal opportunity for cross-examination.  Moreover, I do 
not think it is clear that Kry’s reading is correct.  Hening’s 
statement could also be read idiomatically as a complaint that 
the accused lacked both the opportunity to cross-examine and 
the assistance of counsel that he would have enjoyed during a 
trial. 
It is also worth noting that Hening made no mention in 
1794 of Radbourne or Woodcock, five years after the reports of 
those cases were initially published in Leach’s reports of Old 
Bailey cases (Dingler still had not been published).  In fact, 
although Hening did cite some English case reports published 
in London contemporaneously with the framing, he did not cite 
Leach’s reports at all.296  Thus, Hening’s reference to the rule of 
admissibility “laid down in the books” seems to confirm that he 
was not aware of any alteration of earlier doctrine regarding 
the admissibility of Marian examinations of unavailable 
witnesses. 
The other post-framing American statement that Kry 
invokes is a question posed by Chief Justice John Marshall 
during the 1807 arguments in Ex Parte Bollman, a proceeding 
related to the Burr conspiracy.297  Bollman had been arrested 
as a conspirator and sought a writ of habeas corpus in the 
Supreme Court.  An issue arose as to whether an affidavit by 
General Wilkerson, made after Bollman’s arrest for treason, 
could be admitted as evidence to determine whether there was 
probable cause to support the arrest warrant issued for 
Bollman.298  The Court requested that the attorneys present 
authorities on the issue.299 
At the next Court session, Bollman’s attorney, Francis 
Scott Key, cited statements from the King’s Bench ruling in 
Eriswell as authority that an “extrajudicial” affidavit is 
  
 296 At least one of the 1795 printings of Hening’s manual includes a list of the 
legal authorities cited in the manual among the opening, unnumbered pages.  Hening 
did not include Leach’s Cases in Crown Law but he did include the “Term Reports” of 
King’s Bench rulings.  There are several citations to the third volume of those reports 
that was published in 1790 (the volume in which Eriswell was reported; see supra note 
232).  See, e.g., HENING, supra note 294, at 176, 178 (citing “3 Term Rep. 590,” “3 Term 
Rep. 27”).  The fact that Hening cited recent reports of King’s Bench cases but not Old 
Bailey cases suggests that Americans in 1794 still accorded significance to decisions in 
the King’s Bench itself but may have been less interested in trial rulings in the Old 
Bailey. 
 297 Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807). 
 298 Id. at 110-11, 123-24. 
 299 Id. at 123. 
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inadmissible.300  (Notably, he did not cite the Old Bailey rulings 
in Woodcock or Dingler—again suggesting that Americans were 
not consulting Leach’s reports.)  As Kry notes, Chief Justice 
Marshall then asked: 
If a person makes an affidavit before a magistrate to obtain a 
warrant of arrest, such affidavit must necessarily be ex parte.  But 
how is it on a motion to commit, after the person is taken?  Must not 
the commitment be upon testimony given in the presence of the 
prisoner?301 
However, Attorney General Caesar Rodney responded 
that the ex parte affidavit for the arrest warrant would suffice 
to commit the arrestee unless the prisoner demonstrated his 
innocence in his own examination.302  Thus, the Attorney 
General apparently believed an ex parte warrant affidavit could 
serve as a Marian witness examination for purposes of 
committing an arrestee303—which suggests that was sometimes 
the practice.  There was no further discussion of the point, and 
Marshall subsequently ruled that Wilkerson’s affidavit was 
admissible in the habeas corpus proceeding, stating that 
“[s]uch an affidavit seems admissible on the principle that 
before the accused is put upon his trial all the proceedings are 
ex parte”304—a statement that would seem to leave room for ex 
parte witness examinations. 
Kry correctly notes that Attorney General Rodney 
conceded that General Wilkerson’s affidavit would be 
inadmissible at trial, but that simply reflects the point that 
Wilkerson (like the deponent in Webb) did not meet any of the 
unavailability criteria.  Wilkerson was not dead; he just was 
not in Washington.305  Thus, neither Hening’s statement nor the 
  
 300 Id. at 124. 
 301 Id., quoted in Kry, supra note 3, at 513. 
 302 Id. (“The first affidavit [for the arrest warrant] would be sufficient, unless 
disproved or explained by the prisoner on his examination.”). 
 303 I suggested that possibility, supra text accompanying note 89. 
 304 Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 129. 
 305 Kry correctly notes that it was understood that General Wilkerson’s 
affidavit would not have been admissible evidence at trial.  Kry, supra note 3, at 513 
n.81.  However, he ignores the point that Wilkerson did not qualify as an unavailable 
witness, which explains why his affidavit could not be admissible in a trial.  I call 
attention to the hypothetical discussion between Marshall and Attorney General 
Rodney regarding committal proceedings in which Rodney asserted that an ex parte 
arrest warrant affidavit could suffice to commit a prisoner—that is, could serve as a 
Marian examination.  There is no indication in Bollman that Rodney’s general 
statement to that effect was challenged by anyone. 
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colloquy in Bollman provide evidence of a cross-examination 
rule in America in the aftermath of the framing. 
The bottom line is that Kry has not identified any post-
framing American sources that reveal a framing-era in-the-
presence rule, let alone a cross-examination rule.  Rather, the 
sources he identifies tend to show that there was a significant 
lag between the publication of Radbourne, Woodcock, and 
Dingler in London, and American awareness of those English 
developments. 
C. Kry’s Assumption of Continuity 
Mr. Kry, however, insists that it is valid to treat post-
framing statements as evidence of pre-framing understandings, 
apparently because one can assume a high degree of 
consistency in judicial rulings over time.  He bases this 
apparent assumption not on historical methodology, but on a 
misplaced application of contract law doctrine.306  Additionally, 
he notes that “Crawford’s reliance on post-framing authorities 
is hardly novel,” that “Justices Scalia and Thomas also 
routinely rely on post-framing English authorities” in 
construing constitutional provisions,307 and that justices have 
been citing cases from Leach’s Crown Cases since the late 
nineteenth century.308  However, errors do not cease to be errors 
simply because they are repeated. 
Kry’s assumption of continuity simply conflates two 
very different things: one is an interpretive posture that judges 
assume when they purport to look to history to justify a 
preferred result; the other is authentic legal history derived 
  
 306 Kry argues “[t]hat subsequent history is relevant to original meaning 
[because s]ubsequent conduct in conformity with a particular interpretation of a 
contract is evidence of the parties’ intent; no less is true of the Constitution.”  Kry, 
supra note 3, at 548-49.  There is a significant difference between a contract ruling and 
constitutional law.  Contract law resorts to such fictions when there is no better way to 
construe a contract and it is necessary to do so because the contract has to be construed 
to settle a dispute.  However, as I noted above, it is not necessary to base a 
constitutional interpretation on original meaning because it is only one of a variety of 
approaches to constitutional justification.  Hence, when there is no direct evidence of 
original meaning, originalism should not be resorted to.  See supra text accompanying 
note 48. 
 307 Kry, supra note 3, at 549-50. 
 308 Id. at 550-51.  Kry notes that the Court cited Radbourne in Mattox v. 
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240 (1894).  Id. at 551.  However, that opinion cited 
Radbourne only regarding the content of English law, not the original meaning of the 
Confrontation Clause.  Likewise, other Supreme Court opinions cited cases in Leach 
when discussing criminal law doctrine in criminal cases, rather than constitutional 
interpretation.   
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from valid evidence.  What legal history actually teaches is that 
judges have been fudging older precedents since the beginning 
of judging.309  The English legal historian Frederic Maitland put 
it this way: 
[The] process by which old principles and old phrases are charged 
with a new content is from the lawyer’s point of view an evolution of 
the true intent and meaning of the old law; from the historian’s point 
of view it is almost of necessity a process of perversion and 
misunderstanding.310 
The reality of “perversion[s] and misunderstanding[s]” in later 
interpretations of earlier doctrines cautions that authentic 
legal history depends upon enforcing a strong distinction 
between historical evidence and judicial revisionism.  One 
cannot take judicial interpretations of cases offered several 
decades or more after a case was decided as evidence of the 
original meaning of the earlier case; neither can one take 
subsequent interpretations of a constitutional provision as 
valid evidence of the original understanding of the provision.  
There is too much likelihood that the post-framing treatments 
will involve either deliberate or unintentional adjustments or 
distortions. 
Indeed, a large contradiction lurks in Kry’s account.  On 
the one hand, the story he tells of English Marian practices is a 
story of legal “evol[ution]”311: an in-the-presence practice 
“hardened into a procedural right” to be present,312 and “at 
some point,” that led to a cross-examination rule.313  However, 
he then tells us that we can treat nineteenth-century 
commentaries and cases as evidence of eighteenth-century 
understandings, apparently because we can assume constancy 
of doctrinal content over time.  Legal history endorses only the 
evolutionary claim.   
The unfounded assumption of continuity that Kry 
ultimately relies upon in claiming that post-framing 
statements prove framing-era understandings is a common 
defect in originalist claims.  Practitioners of originalism, 
including Justices Scalia and Thomas, tend to describe our 
  
 309 See supra note 26 (discussing judicial alteration of arrest law and the 
transference of the law of arrest from “due process of law” in the Fifth Amendment to 
the Fourth Amendment). 
 310 Maitland, supra note 42. 
 311 Kry, supra note 3, at 553 (stating that Marian practice was “evolving”). 
 312 Id. at 554. 
 313 Id. at 495. 
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constitutional history as though it has been continuous and 
stable, at least until recently.  That is a profoundly false 
picture.  As I have discussed on other occasions, the past really 
is a foreign country—far more foreign than originalists are 
either able to see, or willing to admit.314  Indeed, once the 
overall foreignness of framing-era doctrine is recognized, it is 
fairly obvious that any attempt to apply a specific historical 
rule to a modern issue will always involve selective originalism 
at best; that is, originalists always choose to ignore far more 
framing-era law than they invoke.315 
For present purposes, one example of doctrinal 
discontinuity is particularly pertinent.  As noted above, the 
other prong of Crawford’s originalist scheme limits the scope of 
the confrontation right and allows the admission of unsworn 
“nontestimonial” hearsay in criminal trials.316  In the course of 
proposing that limitation, Justices Thomas and Scalia, as well 
as commentators, have assumed that the hearsay exceptions 
that now give rise to much of the current controversy over the 
application of the confrontation right were commonplace at the 
time of the framing.317  However, the historical sources present 
a very different picture.  The framing-era treatises, which 
defined “hearsay” as unsworn, out-of-court statements, indicate 
  
 314 See Davies, Arrest, supra note 20, at 419-35; Davies, Fourth Amendment, 
supra note 20, at 744-50; Davies, supra note 2, at 210-17. 
 315 As I previously noted, the issue in Crawford, the admission of a wife’s 
statement against her husband, would not have arisen in framing-era law because 
there was a settled rule that a spouse’s statement could not be admitted against the 
other spouse.  See Davies, supra note 2, at 110 n.18.  Indeed, James Wilson, one of the 
early justices of the Supreme Court who was also active in the debates that preceded 
the adoption of the Bill of Rights, observed in his 1790-1791 law lectures in 
Philadelphia that a married couple were considered to be “but one person in the law” 
and that “if they were permitted to give testimony against one another, another maxim 
of the law would be violated—No one is obliged to accuse himself.”  2 THE WORKS OF 
JAMES WILSON 602 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967) (reprinting Wilson’s 1790-1791 
lectures).  Thus, Wilson appears to have understood that the admission of the wife’s 
statement at issue in Crawford would have violated the couple’s Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination.  However, Justice Scalia’s Crawford opinion ignored 
these aspects of framing-era law when he characterized the issue in Crawford in terms 
of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 
  See also Davies, Fourth Amendment, supra note 20, at 742-48.  See also 
supra notes 13, 26. 
 316 See supra text accompanying notes 5-9. 
 317 See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 362 (1992) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“[T]here appears to be little if any indication in the historical record that 
the exceptions to the hearsay rule were understood to be limited by the simultaneously 
evolving common-law right of confrontation.”); AKHIL R. AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  FIRST PRINCIPLES 94 (1997) (“At common law, the traditional 
hearsay ‘rule’ was notoriously unruly, recognizing countless exceptions to its basic 
preference for live testimony.”).  
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that there was a virtually complete ban against the admission 
of hearsay statements as evidence of a defendant’s guilt (the 
only exception being the dying declaration of a murder 
victim).318  Thus, for example, the hearsay evidence involving 
statements a crime victim made to a 911 operator which the 
justices found to be admissible in Davis would have been 
inadmissible in 1789.319 
The rigorous ban against hearsay evidence regarding 
the defendant’s guilt that was part of framing-era law is 
obscure today because the nineteenth-century judges and 
commentators who invented the variety of modern hearsay 
“exceptions” that now permit admission of hearsay statements 
as evidence did not call attention to the novelty of their 
creations.  Those judges and commentators also do not seem to 
have paid much heed to the confrontation right when they 
made those innovations.  So much for judicial consistency over 
time. 
The core of Kry’s complaint against my article is that 
my criticisms of Crawford’s originalist claims “rest[] critically 
on [Davies’] premise that all English sources published after 
1789 and all American sources published more than a few 
years after 1789 are irrelevant to original meaning; relax either 
of those two constraints and [Davies’] argument unravels.”320  I 
do not object to that as a general summary—if one relaxes 
either of those two constraints, it is unlikely one is addressing 
the historical original meaning.  However, I prefer to state the 
  
 318 As I document in a forthcoming article, the only two forms of out-of-court 
statements that were admissible as evidence of the defendant’s guilt were dying 
declarations of murder victims and the written records of Marian examinations of 
witnesses who had become unavailable prior to trial.  Both of these involved genuinely 
unavailable witnesses and either an oath, in the instance of Marian examinations of 
witnesses, or conditions that were thought to provide assurances of truthfulness 
comparable to an oath, in the instance of dying declarations of murder victims.  Davies, 
Not the Framers’ Design, supra note 17.  Compare the statement of Chief Baron Eyre in 
the 1789 Woodcock case, supra note 73. 
  At the time of the framing, hearsay statements—that is, all unsworn out-
of-court statements—were not admissible as direct evidence of a defendant’s guilt but 
could be admitted only for the limited purposes of either corroborating that a witness 
who testified at trial had previously given the same account in out-of-court statements 
(or of impeaching the trial testimony) or generally establishing the existence of a 
conspiracy, but not the defendant’s personal involvement in it.  See Davies, Not the 
Framers’ Design, supra note 17.  There were some additional exceptions that permitted 
hearsay statements to be admitted with regard to certain specific issues that might 
arise in civil lawsuits, but those exceptions were not recognized in criminal evidence 
doctrine and also were not pertinent to criminal matters.  See id.  
 319 See Davies, Not the Framers’ Design, supra note 17. 
 320 Kry, supra note 3, at 555.  See also id. at 494. 
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criterion directly: claims of original meaning should be based 
on the legal authorities that were actually widely used by 
framing-era Americans.  If those sources do not clearly reveal a 
settled understanding, originalist claims should not be made.  
The fact that Kry has not identified significant evidence that 
meets that criterion confirms that no claim regarding an 
originalist Marian cross-examination rule should have been 
made in Crawford.  
VI. THE UNTESTED CHARACTER OF JUDICIAL-CHAMBERS 
ORIGINALISM 
Although Kry has addressed only one of my two 
criticisms of Crawford’s originalist claims,321 he complains that 
my “fictional originalism” label is “objectionable” and also 
complains about my use of Crawford as a vehicle for a broader 
criticism of originalism.322  I do not shirk from the “fictional 
originalism” label (which I have used before to criticize 
similarly ungrounded claims of original meaning323), or from the 
broader aim of my article.324  Claims that purport to reflect the 
Framers’ design but are not grounded in valid historical 
evidence should be regarded as fiction.  Mr. Kry, like Justices 
Scalia and Thomas, treats evidence that amounts to mere 
traditionalism (that was the rule during the nineteenth 
century) as though that suffices to support a normatively 
privileged claim regarding “original meaning.”  These two sorts 
of claims should not be interchangeable. 
A final general defect in originalism should be noted in 
closing—the absence of any procedure for testing originalist 
  
 321 As noted above, Kry has not undertaken to defend the other major 
“originalist” claim in Crawford, which I also criticized—the fictional claim that the 
Framers would have limited the confrontation right to “testimonial” out-of-court 
statements, but would not have applied it to “nontestimonial hearsay.”  See supra notes 
16-19 and accompanying text. 
 322 Kry, supra note 3, at 555. 
 323 See, e.g., Davies, Arrest, supra note 20 (characterizing as “fictional 
originalism” Justice Souter’s claims about framing-era arrest law in Atwater v. Lago 
Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001)). 
 324 My purpose was not to oppose the cross-examination rule as a feature of 
current procedure, which I view positively, but rather to point out the fictional 
character of the originalist rationale that Justice Scalia presented for it.  See Davies, 
supra note 2, at 106-07 (stating that the claims of original meaning in Crawford 
“provide the latest installment of fictional originalism”); id. at 206-15 (“Crawford offers 
a paradigmatic illustration of the defects of an originalist approach to criminal 
procedure.”).  For additional examples of fictional originalist claims in recent Supreme 
Court criminal procedure opinions, see, for example, Davies, Arrest, supra note 20, at 
262-66. 
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historical claims before they become enshrined in United States 
Reports.  The usual processes of briefing and oral argument in 
the Supreme Court are not adequate.  Few attorneys are 
familiar enough with the historical materials to deal with them 
effectively.  Moreover, the page limitations on briefs are too 
confined to set out historical sources, and oral argument is far 
too awkward a forum.325 
The typical result is judicial-chambers originalism: after 
the outcome of the case has been decided in the justices’ 
conference, the assigned justice (assuming he or she has 
originalist inclinations) and his or her law clerks root out 
historical materials and create an originalist account to justify 
the already-made decision, based largely on historical sources 
never even mentioned in the briefs.326  The accounts produced 
in this way are invariably superficial and too often simply 
wrong. 
The most significant feature of the controversy over the 
historical evidence between Kry and me may be its timing—we 
are debating the historical evidence only after Justice Scalia 
announced his originalist rationale.  No one had any prior 
opportunity to cross-examine Crawford’s fictional originalism. 
  
 325 I have previously argued that a similar procedural deficit exists with 
regard to the Supreme Court’s use of empirical research materials.  See Thomas Y. 
Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the “Costs” of 
the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of “Lost” Arrests, 1983 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 611, 687-88 (1983). 
 326 See Davies, Arrest, supra note 20, at 270-74, 418-19. 
